meno-第3章
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are said by you to be parts of virtue。
Men。 What of that？
Soc。 What of that！ Why； did not I ask you to tell me the nature of
virtue as a whole？ And you are very far from telling me this； but
declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue；
as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue；
and this too when frittered away into little pieces。 And； therefore；
my dear I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question：
What is virtue？ for otherwise； I can only say； that every action
done with a part of virtue is virtue； what else is the meaning of
saying that every action done with justice is virtue？ Ought I not to
ask the question over again； for can any one who does not know
virtue know a part of virtue？
Men。 No； I do not say that he can。
Soc。 Do you remember how； in the example of figure； we rejected any
answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted？
Men。 Yes； Socrates； and we were quite right in doing so。
Soc。 But then； my friend； do not suppose that we can explain to any
one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion
of virtue； or anything at all in that fashion； we should only have
to ask over again the old question； What is virtue？ Am I not right？
Men。 I believe that you are。
Soc。 Then begin again； and answer me； What； according to you and
your friend Gorgias； is the definition of virtue？
Men。 O Socrates； I used to be told； before I knew you； that you
were always doubting yourself and making others doubt； and now you are
casting your spells over me； and I am simply getting bewitched and
enchanted； and am at my wits' end。 And if I may venture to make a jest
upon you； you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power
over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish； who torpifies those
who come near him and touch him； as you have now torpified me； I
think。 For my soul and my tongue are really torpid； and I do not
know how to answer you； and though I have been delivered of an
infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now； and to many
persons…and very good ones they were； as I thought…at this moment I
cannot even say what virtue is。 And I think that。 you are very wise in
not voyaging and going away from home； for if you did in other
places as do in Athens； you would be cast into prison as a magician。
Soc。 You are a rogue； Meno； and had all but caught me。
Men。 What do you mean； Socrates？
Soc。 I can tell why you made a simile about me。
Men。 Why？
Soc。 In order that I might make another simile about you。 For I know
that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about
them…as well they may…but I shall not return the compliment。 As to
my being a torpedo； if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of
torpidity in others； then indeed I am a torpedo； but not otherwise；
for I perplex others； not because I am clear； but because I am utterly
perplexed myself。 And now I know not what virtue is； and you seem to
be in the same case； although you did once perhaps know before you
touched me。 However； I have no objection to join with you in the
enquiry。
Men。 And how will you enquire； Socrates； into that which you do
not know？ What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry？ And if
you find what you want； how will you ever know that this is the
thing which you did not know？
Soc。 I know； Meno； what you mean； but just see what a tiresome
dispute you are introducing。 You argue that man cannot enquire
either about that which he knows； or about that which he does not
know； for if he knows； he has no need to enquire； and if not； he
cannot； for he does not know the； very subject about which he is to
enquire。
Men。 Well； Socrates； and is not the argument sound？
Soc。 I think not。
Men。 Why not？
Soc。 I will tell you why： I have heard from certain wise men and
women who spoke of things divine that…
Men。 What did they say？
Soc。 They spoke of a glorious truth； as I conceive。
Men。 What was it？ and who were they？
Soc。 Some of them were priests and priestesses； who had studied
how they might be able to give a reason of their profession： there；
have been poets also； who spoke of these things by inspiration； like
Pindar； and many others who were inspired。 And they say…mark； now； and
see whether their words are true…they say that the soul of man is
immortal； and at one time has an end； which is termed dying； and at
another time is born again； but is never destroyed。 And the moral
is； that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness。 〃For in the
ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has
received the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the
light of the sun above； and these are they who become noble kings
and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in
after ages。〃 The soul； then； as being immortal； and having been born
again many times； rand having seen all things that exist； whether in
this world or in the world below； has knowledge of them all； and it is
no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that
she ever knew about virtue； and about everything； for as all nature is
akin； and the soul has learned all things； there is no difficulty in
her eliciting or as men say learning； out of a single recollection
…all the rest； if a man is strenuous and does not faint； for all
enquiry and all learning is but recollection。 And therefore we ought
not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility
of enquiry： for it will make us idle； and is sweet only to the
sluggard； but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive。 In
that confiding； I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of
virtue。
Men。 Yes； Socrates； but what do you mean by saying that we do not
learn； and that what we call learning is only a process of
recollection？ Can you teach me how this is？
Soc。 I told you； Meno； just now that you were a rogue； and now you
ask whether I can teach you； when I am saying that there is no
teaching； but only recollection； and thus you imagine that you will
involve me in a contradiction。
Men。 Indeed； Socrates； I protest that I had no such intention。 I
only asked the question from habit； but if you can prove to me that
what you say is true； I wish that you would。
Soc。 It will be no easy matter； but I will try to please you to
the utmost of my power。 Suppose that you call one of your numerous
attendants； that I may demonstrate on him。
Men。 Certainly。 Come hither； boy。
Soc。 He is Greek； and speaks Greek； does he not？
Men。 Yes； indeed； he was born in the house。
Soc。 Attend now to the questions which I ask him； and observe
whether he learns of me or only remembers。
Men。 I will。
Soc。 Tell me； boy； do you know that a figure like this is a square？
Boy。 I do。
Soc。 And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal？
Boy。 Certainly。
Soc。 And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the
square are also equal？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 A square may be of any size？
Boy。 Certainly。
Soc。 And if one side of the figure be of two feet； and the other
side be of two feet； how much will the whole be？ Let me explain： if in
one direction the space was of two feet； and in other direction of one
foot； the whole would be of two feet taken once？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 But since this side is also of two feet； there are twice two
feet？
Boy。 There are。
Soc。 Then the square is of twice two feet？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 And how many are twice two feet？ count and tell me。
Boy。 Four； Socrates。
Soc。 And might there not be another square twice as large as this；
and having like this the lines equal？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 And of how many feet will that be？
Boy。 Of eight feet。
Soc。 And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms
the side of that double square： this is two feet…what will that be？
Boy。 Clearly； Socrates； it will be double。
Soc。 Do you observe； Meno； that I am not teaching the boy
anything； but only asking him questions； and now he fancies that he
knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of
eight square feet； does he not？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And does he really know？
Men。 Certainly not。
Soc。 He only guesses that because the square is double； the line
is double。
Men。 True。
Soc。 Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order。 （To
the Boy。） Tell me； boy； do you assert that a double space comes from a
double line？ Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong； but of a
figure equal every way； and twice the size of this…that is to say of
eight feet； and I want to know whether you still say that a double
square comes from double line？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 But does not this line become doubled if we add another such
line here？
Boy。 Certainly。
Soc。 And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 Let us describe such a figure： Would you not say that this is
the figure of eight feet？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 And are there not these four divisions in the figure； each of
which is equal to the figure of four feet？
Boy。 True。
Soc。 And is not that four times four？
Boy。 Certainly。
Soc。 And four times is not double？
Boy。 No； indeed。
Soc。 But how much？
Boy。 Four times as much。
Soc。 Therefore the double line； boy； has given a space； not twice；
but four times as much。
Boy。 True。
Soc。 Four times four are sixteen…are they not？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 What line would give you a space of right feet； as this gives
one of sixteen feet；…do you see？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 And the space of four feet is made from this half line？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 Good； and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of
this； and half the size of the other？
Boy。 Certainly。
Soc。 Such a space； then； will be made out of a line greater than
this one； and less than that one？
Boy。 Yes； I think so。
Soc。 Very good； I like to hear you say what you think。 And now
tell me； is not this a line of two feet and that of four？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be
more than this line of two feet； and less than the other of four feet？
Boy。 It ought。
Soc。 Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be。
Boy。 Three feet。
Soc。 Then if we add a half to this line of two； that will be the
line of three。 Here are two
