philosophy of right-第7章

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been　accustomed　to　call　mere　conceptions。　It　has　indeed　to　exhibit　the　one…sidedness　and　untruth
of　these　mere　conceptions；　and　to　show　that；　while　that　which　commonly　bears　the　name
〃conception；〃　is　only　an　abstract　product　of　the　understanding；　the　true　conception　alone　has
reality　and　gives　this　reality　to　itself。　Everything；　other　than　the　reality　which　is　established　by　the
conception；　is　transient　surface　existence；　external　attribute；　opinion；　appearance　void　of　essence；
untruth；　delusion；　and　so　forth。　Through　the　actual　shape；　which　it　takes　upon　itself　in　actuality；　is
the　conception　itself　understood。　This　shape　is　the　other　essential　element　of　the　idea；　and　is　to　be
distinguished　from　the　form；　which　exists　only　as　conception。　

Addition。　The　conception　and　its　existence　are　two　sides；　distinct　yet　united；　like　soul　and
body。　The　body　is　the　same　life　as　the　soul；　and　yet　the　two　can　be　named　independently。　A　soul
without　a　body　would　not　be　a　living　thing；　and　vice　versa。　Thus　the　visible　existence　of　the
conception　is　its　body；　just　as　the　body　obeys　the　soul　which　produced　it。　Seeds　contain　the　tree
and　its　whole　power；　though　they　are　not　the　tree　itself　；　the　tree　corresponds　accurately　to　the
simple　structure　of　the　seed。　If　the　body　does　not　correspond　to　the　soul；　it　is　defective。　The　unity
of　visible　existence　and　conception；　of　body　and　soul；　is　the　idea。　It　is　not　a　mere　harmony　of　the
two；　but　their　complete　interpenetration。　There　lives　nothing；　which　is　not　in　some　way　idea。　The
idea　of　right　is　freedom；　which；　if　it　is　to　be　apprehended　truly；　must　be　known　both　in　its
conception　and　in　the　embodiment　of　the　conception。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　2。

The　science　of　right　is　a　part　of　philosophy。　Hence　it　must　develop　the　idea；
which　is　the　reason　of　an　object；　out　of　the　conception。　It　is　the　same　thing　to　say
that　it　must　regard　the　peculiar　internal　development　of　the　thing　itself。　Since　it　is
a　part；　it　has　a　definite　beginning；　which　is　the　result　and　truth　of　what　goes
before；　and　this；　that　goes　before；　constitutes　its　so…called　proof。　Hence　the　origin
of　the　conception　of　right　falls　outside　of　the　science　of　right。　The　deduction　of
the　conception　is　presupposed　in　this　treatise；　and　is　to　be　considered　as　already
given。　

Addition。　Philosophy　forms　a　circle。　It　has；　since　it　must　somehow　make　a　beginning；　a　primary；
directly　given　matter；　which　is　not　proved　and　is　not　a　result。　But　this　starting…point　is　simply
relative；　since；　from　another　point　of　view　it　appears　as　a　result。　Philosophy　is　a　consequence；
which　does　not　hang　in　the　air　or　form　a　directly　new　beginning；　but　is　self…enclosed。　

According　to　the　formal　unphilosophic　method　of　the　sciences；　definition　is　the　first　desideratum；
as　regards；　at　least；　the　external　scientific　form。　The　positive　science　of　right；　however；　is　little
concerned　with　definition；　since　its　special　aim　is　to　give　what　it　is　that　is　right；　and　also　the
particular　phases　of　the　laws。　For　this　reason　it　has　been　said　as　a　warning；　Omnis　definitio　in
jure　civili　periculosa；　and　in　fact　the　more　disconnected　and　contradictory　the　phases　of　a　right
are；　the　less　possible　is　a　definition　of　it。　

A　definition　should　contain　only　universal　features；　but　these　forthwith　bring　to　light　contradictions；
which　in　the　case　of　law　are　injustice；　in　all　their　nakedness。　Thus　in　Roman　law；　for　instance；　no
definition　of　man　was　possible；　because　it　excluded　the　slave。　The　conception　of　man　was
destroyed　by　the　fact　of　slavery。　In　the　same　way　to　have　defined　property　and　owner　would　have
appeared　to　be　perilous　to　many　relations。　But　definitions　may　perhaps　be　derived　from
etymology；　for　the　reason；　principally；　that　in　this　way　special　cases　are　avoided；　and　a；　basis　is
found　in　the　feeling　and　imaginative　thought　of　men。　

The　correctness　of　a　definition　would　thus　consist　in　its　agreement　with　existing　ideas。　By　such　a
method　everything　essentially　scientific　is　cast　aside。　As　regards　the　content　there　is　cast　aside　the
necessity　of　the　self…contained　and　self…developed　object；　and　as　regards　the　form　there　is
discarded　the　nature　of　the　conception。　In　philosophic　knowledge　the　necessity　of　a；　conception　is
the　main　thing；　and　the　process；　by　which　it；　as　a　result；　has　come　into　being　is　the　proof　and
deduction。　After　the　content　is　seen　to　be　necessary　independently；　the　second　point　is　to　look
about　for　that　which　corresponds　to　it　in　existing　ideas　and　modes　of　speech。　But　the　way　in　which
a　conception　exists　in　its　truth；　and　the　way　it　presents　itself　in　random　ideas　not　only　are　but　must
be　different　both　in　form　and　structure。　If　a　notion　is　not　in　its　content　false；　the　conception　can　be
shown　to　be　contained　in　it　and　to　be　already　there　in　its　essential　traits。　

A　notion　may　thus　be　raised　to　the　form　of　a　conception。　But　so　little　is　any　notion　the　measure
and　criterion　of　an　independently　necessary　and　true　conception；　that　it　must　accept　truth　from　the
conception；　be　justified　by　it；　and　know　itself　through　it。　If　the　method　of　knowing；　which　proceeds
by　formal　definition；　inference　and　proof；　has　more　or　less　disappeared；　a　worse　one　has　come　to
take　its　place。　This　new　method　maintains　that　ideas；　as；　e。g。；　the　idea　of　right　in　all　its　aspects；　are
to　be　directly　apprehended　as　mere　facts　of　consciousness；　and　that　natural　feeling　or　that
heightened　form　of　it　which　is　known　as　the　inspiration　of　one's　own　breast；　is　the　source　of　right。
This　method　may　be　the　most　convenient　of　all；　but　it　is　also　the　most　unphilosophic。　Other
features　of　this　view；　referring　not　merely　to　knowledge　but　directly　to　action；　need　not　detain　us
here。　While　the　first　or　formal　method　went　so　far　as　to　require　in　definition　the　form　of　the
conception；　and　in　proof　the　form　of　a　necessity　of　knowledge；　the　method　of　the　intuitive
consciousness　and　feeling　takes　for　its　principle　the　arbitrary　contingent　consciousness　of　the
subject。　In　this　treatise　we　take　for　granted　the　scientific　procedure　of　philosophy；　which　has　been
set　forth　in　the　philosophic　logic。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　3。　

Right　is　positive　in　general　（a）　in　its　form；　since　it　has　validity　in　a　state；　and　this
established　authority　is　the　principle　for　the　knowledge　of　right。　Hence　we　have
the　positive　science　of　right。　（b）　On　the　side　of　content　this　right　receives　a
positive　element　＇a＇　through　the　particular　character　of　a　nation；　the　stage　of　its
historical　development；　and　the　interconnection　of　all　the　relations　which　are
necessitated　by　nature：　＇b＇　through　the　necessity　that　a　system　of　legalised　right
must　contain　the　application　of　the　universal　conception　to　objects　and　cases
whose　qualities　are　given　externally。　Such　an　application　is　not　the　speculative
thought　or　the　development　of　the　conception；　but　a　subsumption　made　by　the
understanding：　＇c＇　through　the　ultimate　nature　of　a　decision　which　has　become　a
reality。　

Remark：　Philosophy　at　least　cannot　recognise　the　authority　of　feeling；　inclination　and　caprice；
when　they　are　set　in　opposition　to　positive　right　and　the　laws。　It　is　an　accident；　external　to　the
nature　of　positive　right；　when　force　or　tyranny　becomes　an　element　of　it。　It　will　be　shown　later　（§§
211　…　214）；　at　what　point　right　must　become　positive。　The　general　phases　which　are　there
deduced；　are　here　only　mentioned；　in　order　to　indicate　the　limit　of　philosophic　right；　and　also　to
forestall　the　idea　or　indeed　the　demand　that　by　a　systematic　development　of　right　should　be
produced　a　law…book；　such　as　would　be　needed　by　in　actual　state。　To　convert　the　differences
between　right　of　nature　and　positive　right；　or　those　between　philosophic　right　and　positive　right；
into　open　antagonism　would　be　a　complete　misunderstanding。　

Natural　right　or　philosophic　right　stands　to　positive　right　as　institutions　to　pandects。　With　regard　to
the　historical　element　in　positive　right；　referred　to　in　the　paragraph；　it　may　be　said　that　the　true
historical　view　and　genuine　philosophic　standpoint　have　been　presented　by　Montesquieu。　He
regards　legislation　and　its　specific　traits　not　in　an　isolated　and　abstract　way；　but　rather　as　a
dependent　element　of　one　totality；　connecting　it　with　all　the　other　elements　which　form　the
character　of　a　nation　and　an　epoch。　In　this　interrelation　the　various　elements　receive　their　meaning
and　justification。　The　purely　historical　treatment　of　the　phases　of　right；　as　they　develop　in　time；　and
a　comparison　of　their　results　with　existing　relations　of　right　have　their　own　value；　but　they　are　out
of　place　in　a　philosophic　treatise；　except　in　so　far　as　the　development　out　of　historic　grounds
coincides　with　the　development　out　of　the　conception；　and　the　historical　exposition　and　justification
can　be　made　to　cover　a　justification　which　is　valid　in　itself　and　independently。　

This　distinction　is　as　manifest　as　it　is　weighty。　A　phase　of　right　may　be　shown　to　rest　upon　and
follow　from　the　circumstances　and　existing　institutions　of　right；　and　yet　may　be　absolutely
unreasonable　and　void　of　right。　This　is　the　case　in　Roman　law　with　many　aspects　of　private　right；
which　were　the　logical　results　of　its　interpretation　of　paternal　power　and　of　marriage。　Further；　if　the
aspects　of　right　are　really　right　and　reasonable；　it　is　one　thing　to　point　out　what　with　regard　to　them
can　truly　take　place　through　the　conception；　and　quite　another　thing　to　portray　the　manner　of　their
appearance　in　history；　along　with　the　circumstances；　cases；　wants　and　events；　which　they　have
called　forth。　Such　a　demonstration　and　deduction　from　nearer　or　more　remote　historic　causes；
which　is　the　occupation　of　pragmatic　history；　is　frequently　called　exposition；　or　preferably
conception；　under　the　opinion　that　in　such　an　indication　of　the　historic　elements　is　found　all　that　is
essential　to　a　conception　of　law　and　institutions　of　right。　In　point　of　fact　that　which　is　truly　essential；
the　conception　of　the　matter；　has　not　been　so　much　as　mentioned。　So　also　we　are　accustomed　to
hear　of　Roman　or　German　conceptions　of　right；　and　of　conceptions　of　right　as　they　are　laid　down
in　this　or　that　statute…book；　when　indeed　nothing　about　conceptions　can　be　found　in　them；　but　only
general　phases　of　right；　propositions　derived　from　the　understanding；　general　maxims；　and　laws。　

By　neglect　of　the　distinction；　just　alluded　to；　the　true　standpoint　is　obscured　and　the　question　of　a
valid　justification　is　shifted　into　a　justification　based　upon　circumstances；　results　are　founded　on
presuppositions；　which　in　themselves　are　of　little　value；　and　in　general　the　relative　is　put　in　place　of
the　absolute；　and　external　appearance　in　place　of　the　nature　of　the　thing。　When　the　historical
vindication　substitutes　the　external　origin　for　the　origin　from　the　conception；　it　unconsciously　does
the　opposite　of　what　it　intends。　Suppose　that　an　institution；　originating　under　definite
circumstances；　is　shown　to　be　necessary　and　to　answer　its　purpose；　and　that　it　accomplishes　all
that　is　required　of　it　by　the　historical　standpoint。　When　such　a　proof　is　made　to　stand　for　a
justification　of　the　thing　itself；　it　follows　that；　when　the　c