philosophy of right-第4章

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§　348　World…historical　actions；　culminate　with　individuals　as　subjects　—　living　instruments　of　the
world　mind。　
§　349　The　transition　from　a　family；　a　horde；　&c。；　to　political　conditions　is　the　realisation　of　the
Idea　as　that　nation。　
§　350　The　right　of　heroes　to　found　states。　
§　351　Civilised　nations　are　justified　in　regarding　as　barbarians　those　who　lag　behind　them　in
institutions。　
§　352　Four　world…historical　realms。　
§　353　The　substantial　mind；　ethical　individuality　as　beauty；　mind…forsaken　&　actual　laws。　
§　354　（1）　The　Oriental；　（2）　Greek；　（3）　Roman；　and　（4）　Germanic　principle。　
§　355　（1）　The　Oriental　realm。　
§　356　（2）　The　Greek　realm。　
§　357　（3）　The　Roman　realm。　
§　358　（4）　The　Germanic　realm。　
§　359　The　power　of　mind　over　the　mundane　heart；　acts　against　the　latter　as　a　compulsive　and
frightful　force。　
§　360　The　realm　of　mind　lowers　itself　to　an　earthly　here　and　now　and　the　mundane　realm　builds
up　into　thought。　




Preface

THE　immediate　occasion　for　publishing　these　outlines　is　the　need　of　placing　in　the
bands　of　my　hearers　a　guide　to　my　professional　lectures　upon　the　Philosophy　of
Right。　Hitherto　I　have　used　as　lectures　that　portion　of　the　Encyclopaedia　of　the
Philosophic　Sciences　（1817）　which　deals　with　this　subject。　The　present　work
covers　the　same　ground　in　a　more　detailed　and　systematic　way。　

But　now　that　these　outlines　are　to　be　printed　and　given　to　the　general　public；　there
is　an　opportunity　of　explaining　points　which　in　lecturing　would　be　commented　on
orally。　Thus　the　notes　are　enlarged　in　order　to　include　cognate　or　conflicting　ideas；
further　consequences　of　the　theory　advocated；　and　the　like。　These　expanded
notes　will；　it　is　hoped；　throw　light　upon　the　more　abstract　substance　of　the　text；
and　present　a　more　complete　view　of　some　of　the　ideas　currant　in　our　own　time。
Moreover；　there　is　also　subjoined；　as　far　as　was　compatible　with　the　purpose　of　a
compendium；　a　number　of　notes；　ranging　over　a　still　greater　latitude。　A
compendium　proper；　like　a　science；　has　its　subject…matter　accurately　laid　out。
With　the　exception；　possibly；　of　one　or　two　slight　additions；　its　chief　task　is　to
arrange　the　essential　phases　of　its　material。　This　material　is　regarded　as　fixed　and
known；　just　as　the　form　is　assumed　to　be　governed　by　well…ascertained　rules。　A
treatise　in　philosophy　is　usually　not　expected　to　be　constructed　on　such　a　pattern；
perhaps　because　people　suppose　that　a　philosophical　product　is　a　Penelope's　web
which　must　be　started　anew　every　day。　

This　treatise　differs　from　the　ordinary　compendium　mainly　in　its　method　of
procedure。　It　must　be　understood　at　the　outset　that　the　philosophic　way　of
advancing　from　one　matter　to　another；　the　general　speculative　method；　which　is
the　only　kind　of　scientific　proof　available　in　philosophy；　is　essentially　different
from　every　other。　Only　a　clear　insight　into　the　necessity　for　this　difference　can
snatch　philosophy　out　of　the　ignominious　condition　into　which　it　has　fallen　in　our
day。　True；　the　logical　rules；　such　as　those　of　definition；　classification；　and
inference　are　now　generally　recognised　to　be　inadequate　for　speculative　science。
Perhaps　it　is　nearer　the　mark　to　say　that　the　inadequacy　of　the　rules　has　been　felt
rather　than　recognised；　because　they　have　been　counted　as　mere　fetters；　and
thrown　aside　to　make　room　for　free　speech　from　the　heart；　fancy　and　random
intuition。　But　when　reflection　and　relations　of　thought　were　required；　people
unconsciously　fell　back　upon　the　old…fashioned　method　of　inference　and　formal
reasoning。　In　my　Science　of　Logic　I　have　developed　the　nature　of　speculative
science　in　detail。　Hence　in　this　treatise　an　explanation　of　method　will　be　added
only　here　and　there。　In　a　work　which　is　concrete；　and　presents　such　a　diversity　of
phases；　we　may　safely　neglect　to　display　at　every　turn　the　logical　process；　and
may　take　for　granted　an　acquaintance　with　the　scientific　procedure。　Besides；　it
may　readily　be　observed　that　the　work　as　a　whole；　and　also　the　construction　of
the　parts；　rest　upon　the　logical　spirit。　From　this　standpoint；　especially；　is　it　that　I
would　like　this　treatise　to　be　understood　and　judged。　In　such　a　work　as　this　we
are　dealing　with　a　science；　and　in　a　science　the　matter　must　not　be　separated　from
the　form。　

Some；　who　are　thought　to　be　taking　a　profound　view；　are　heard　to　say　that
everything　turns　upon　the　subject…matter；　and　that　the　form　may　be　ignored。　The
business　of　any　writer；　and　especially　of　the　philosopher；　is；　as　they　say；　to
discover；　utter；　and　diffuse　truth　and　adequate　conceptions。　In　actual　practice　this
business　usually　consists　in　warming　up　and　distributing　on　all　sides　the　same　old
cabbage。　Perhaps　the　result　of　this　operation　may　be　to　fashion　and　arouse　the
feelings；　though　even　this　small　merit　may　be　regarded　as　superfluous；　for　〃they
have　Moses　and　the　prophets：　let　them　hear　them。〃　Indeed；　we　have　great　cause
to　be　amazed　at　the　pretentious　tone　of　those　who　take　this　view。　They　seem　to
suppose　that　up　till　now　the　dissemination　of　truth　throughout　the　world　has　been
feeble。　They　think　that　the　warmed…up　cabbage　contains　new　truths；　especially　to
be　laid　to　heart　at　the　present　time。　And　yet　we　see　that　what　is　on　one　side
announced　as　true；　is　driven　out　and　swept　away　by　the　same　kind　of　worn…out
truth。　Out　of　this　hurly…burly　of　opinions；　that　which　is　neither　new　nor　old；　but
permanent；　cannot　be　rescued　and　preserved　except　by　science。　

Further；　as　to　rights；　ethical　life；　and　the　state；　the　truth　is　as　old　as　that　in　which
it　is　openly　displayed　and　recognised；　namely；　the　law；　morality；　and　religion。　But
as　the　thinking　spirit　is　not　satisfied　with　possessing　the　truth　in　this　simple　way；　it
must　conceive　it；　and　thus　acquire　a　rational　form　for　a　content　which　is　already
rational　implicitly。　In　this　way　the　substance　is　justified　before　the　bar　of　free
thought。　Free　thought　cannot　be　satisfied　with　what　is　given　to　it；　whether　by　the
external　positive　authority　of　the　state　or　human　agreement；　or　by　the　authority　of
internal　feelings；　the　heart；　and　the　witness　of　the　spirit；　which　coincides
unquestioningly　with　the　heart。　It　is　the　nature　of　free　thought　rather　to　proceed
out　of　its　own　self；　and　hence　to　demand　that　it　should　know　itself　as　thoroughly
one　with　truth。　

The　ingenuous　mind　adheres　with　simple　conviction　to　the　truth　which　is　publicly
acknowledged。　On　this　foundation　it　builds　its　conduct　and　way　of　life。　In
opposition　to　this　naive　view　of　things　rises　the　supposed　difficulty　of　detecting
amidst　the　endless　differences　of　opinion　anything　of　universal　application。　This
trouble　may　easily　be　supposed　to　spring　from　a　spirit　of　earnest　inquiry。　But　in
point　of　fact　those　who　pride　themselves　upon　the　existence　of　this　obstacle　are　in
the　plight　of　him　who　cannot　see　the　woods　for　the　trees。　The　confusion　is　all　of
their　own　making。　Nay；　more：　this　confusion　is　an　indication。　that　they　are　in　fact
not　seeking　for　what　is　universally　valid　in　right　and　the　ethical　order。　If　they　were
at　pains　to　find　that　out；　and　refused　to　busy　themselves　with　empty　opinion　and
minute　detail；　they　would　adhere　to　and　act　in　accordance　with　substantive　right；
namely　the　commands　of　the　state　and　the　claims　of　society。　But　a　further
difficulty　lies　in　the　fact　that　man　thinks；　and　seeks　freedom　and　a　basis　for
conduct　in　thought。　Divine　as　his　right　to　act　in　this　way　is；　it　becomes　a　wrong；
when　it　takes　the　place　of　thinking。　Thought　then　regards　itself　as　free　only　when
it　is　conscious　of　being　at　variance　with　what　is　generally　recognised；　and　of
setting　itself　up　as　something　original。　

The　idea　that　freedom　of　thought　and　mind　is　indicated　only　by　deviation　from；　or
even　hostility　to　what　is　everywhere　recognised；　is　most　persistent　with　regard　to
the　state。　The　essential　task　of　a　philosophy　of　the　state　would　thus　seem　to　be
the　discovery　and　publication　of　a　new　and　original　theory。　

When　we　examine　this　idea　and　the　way　it　is　applied；　we　are　almost　led　to　think
that　no　state　or　constitution　has　ever　existed；　or　now　exists。　We　are　tempted　to
suppose　that　we　must　now　begin　and　keep　on　beginning　afresh　for　ever。　We　are
to　fancy　that　the　founding　of　the　social　order　has　depended　upon　present　devices
and　discoveries。　As　to　nature；　philosophy；　it　is　admitted；　has　to　understand　it　as　it
is。　The　philosophers'　stone　must　be　concealed　somewhere；　we　say；　in　nature
itself；　as　nature　is　in　itself　rational。　Knowledge　must；　therefore；　examine；
apprehend　and　conceive　the　reason　actually　present　in　nature。　Not　with　the
superficial　shapes　and　accidents　of　nature；　but　with　its　eternal　harmony；　that　is　to
say；　its　inherent　law　and　essence；　knowledge　has　to　cope。　But　the　ethical　world　or
the　state；　which　is　in　fact　reason　potently　and　permanently　actualised　in
self…consciousness；　is　not　permitted　to　enjoy　the　happiness　of　being　reason　at　all。　

Footnote　There　are　two　kinds　of　laws；　laws　of　nature　and　laws　of　right。　The　laws　of　nature　are
simply　there；　and　are　valid　as　they　are。　They　cannot　be　gainsaid；　although　in　certain　cases　they　may
be　transgressed。　In　order　to　know　laws　of　nature；　we　must　get　to　work　to　ascertain　them。　for　they
are　true；　and　only　our　ideas　of　them　can　be　false。　Of　these　laws　the　measure　is　outside　of　us。　Our
knowledge　adds　nothing　to　them；　and　does　not　further　their　operation。　Only　our　knowledge　of
them　expands。　The　knowledge　of　right　is　partly　of　the　same　nature　and　partly　different。　The　laws　of
right　also　are　simply　there；　and　we　have　to　become　acquainted　with　them。　In　this　way　the　citizen
has　a　more　or　less　firm　hold　of　them　as　they　are　given　to　him；　and　the　jurist　also　abides　by　the
same　standpoint。　But　there　is　also　a　distinction。　In　connection　with　the　laws　of　right　the　spirit　of
investigation　is　stirred　up；　and　our　attention　is　turned　to　the　fact　that　the　laws；　because　they　are
different；　are　not　absolute。　Laws　of　right　are　established　and　handed　down　by　men。　The　inner
voice　must　necessarily　collide　or　agree　with　them。　Man　cannot　be　limited　to　what　is　presented　to
him；　but　maintains　that　he　has　the　standard　of　right　within　himself。　He　may　be　subject　to　the
necessity　and　force　of　external　authority；　but　not　in　the　same　way　as　he　is　to　the　necessity　of
nature；　for　always　his　inner　being　says　to　him　how　a　thing　ought　to　be；　and　within　himself　he　finds
the　confirmation　or　lack　of　confirmation　of　what　is　generally　accepted。　In　nature　the　highest　truth　is
that　a　law　is。　In　right　a　thing　is　not　valid　because　it　is；　since　every　one　demands　that　it　shall　conform
to　his　standard。　Hence　arises　a　possible　conflict　between　what　is　and　what　ought　to　be；　between
absolute　unchanging　right　and　the　arbitrary　decision　of　what　ought　to　be　right。　Such　division　and
strife　occur　only　on　the　soil　of　the　spirit。　Thus　the　unique　privilege　of　the　spirit　would　appear　to
lead　to　discontent　and　unhappiness；　and　frequently　we　are　directed　to　nature　in　contrast　with　the
fluctuations　of　life。　But　it　is　exactly　in　the　opposition　arising　between　absolute　right；　and　that　which
the　arbitrary　will　seeks　to　make　right；　that　the　need　lies　of　knowing　thoroughly　what　right　is。　Men
must　o