philosophy of right-第24章

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vague　consciousness　of　the　dialectic　of　the　aforesaid　'positive'　element　in　isolated　legal　or　ethical
principles；　or　of　such　equally　vague　general　maxims　as：　'Thou　shalt　not　kill'；　or　'Thou　shalt　take
thought　for　thy　welfare　and　the　welfare　of　thy　family'。　Executioners　and　soldiers　have　not　merely
the　right　but　the　duty　to　kill　men；　though　there　it　has　been　precisely　laid　down　what　kind　of　men
and　what　circumstances　make　the　killing　permissible　and　obligatory。　So　also　my　welfare　and　the
welfare　of　my　family　must　be　subordinated　to　higher　ends　and　so　reduced　to　means　to　their
attainment。　（ii）　And　yet　what　bears　the　mark　of　crime　is　not　a　general　maxim　of　that　kind；　left
vague　and　still　subject　to　a　dialectic；　on　the　contrary；　its　specific　character　is　already　objectively
fixed。　Now　what　is　set　up　against　such　a　determinate　crime；　what　is　supposed　to　have　deprived
the　crime　of　its　criminal　nature；　is　the　justifying　end；　and　this　is　simply　subjective　opinion　about
what　is　good　and　better。　What　happens　here　is　the　same　as　what　happens　when　the　will　stops　at
willing　good　in　the　abstract；　i。e。　the　absolute　and　valid　determinate　character　assigned　to　good　and
evil；　right　and　wrong；　is　entirely　swept　away　and　the　determination　of　them　is　ascribed　instead　to
the　individual's　feeling；　imagination；　and　caprice。　

（e）　Subjective　opinion　is　at　last　expressly　given　out　as　the　measuring…rod　of　right　and　duty　and　it　is
supposed　that　the　conviction　which　holds　something　to　be　right　is　to　decide　the　ethical　character　of
an　action。　Since　the　good　we　will　to　do　is　here　still　without　content；　the　principle　of　conviction　only
adds　the　information　that　the　subsumption　of　an　action　under　the　category　of　good　is　purely　a
personal　matter。　If　this　be　so；　the　very　pretence　of　an　ethical　objectivity　has　totally　disappeared。　A
doctrine　like　this　is　directly　connected　with　the　self…styled　philosophy；　often　mentioned　already；
which　denies　that　the　truth　is　knowable　…　and　the　truth　of　mind　qua　will；　the　rationality　of　mind　in　its
self…actualising　process；　is　the　laws　of　ethics。　Asserting；　as　such　philosophising　does；　that　the
knowledge　of　the　true　is　an　empty　vanity；　transcending　the　territory　of　science　（which　is　supposed
to　be　mere　appearance）；　it　must　in　the　matter　of　action　at　once　find　its　principle　also　in　the
apparent；　thereby　ethics　is　reduced　to　the　special　theory　of　life　held　by　the　individual　and　to　his
private　conviction：　The　degradation　into　which　philosophy　has　thus　sunk　appears　doubtless　at　a
first　glance　to　be　only　an　affair　of　supreme　indifference；　an　occurrence　confined　to　the　trivial　field
of　academic　futilities；　but　the　view　necessarily　makes　itself　a　home　in　ethics；　an　essential　part　of
philosophy；　and　it　is　then　that　the　true　meaning　of　these　theories　makes　its　first　appearance　in　and
is　apprehended　by　the　world　of　actuality。　

The　result　of　the　dissemination　of　the　view　that　subjective　conviction；　and　it　alone；　decides　the
ethical　character　of　an　action　is　that　the　charge　of　hypocrisy；　once　so　frequent；　is　now　rarely　heard；
you　can　only　qualify　wickedness　as　hypocrisy　on　the　assumption　that　certain　actions　are　inherently
and　actually　misdeeds；　vices　and　crimes；　and　that　the　defaulter　is　necessarily　aware　of　them　as
such；　because　he　is　aware　of　and　recognises　the　principles　and　outward　acts　of　piety　and　honesty
even　in　the　pretence　to　which　he　misapplies　them。　In　other　words；　it　was　generally　assumed　as
regards　evil　that　it　is　a　duty　to　know　the　good　and　to　be　aware　of　its　distinction　from　evil。　In　any
case；　however；　it　was　an　absolute　injunction　which　forbade　the　commission　of　vicious　and　criminal
actions　and　which　insisted　on　such　actions　being　imputed　to　the　agent；　so　far　as　he　was　a　man　and
not　a　beast。　But　if　a　good　heart；　a　good　intention；　a　subjective　conviction　are　set　forth　as　the
sources　from　which　conduct　derives　its　worth；　then　there　is　no　longer　any　hypocrisy　or　immorality
at　all；　for　whatever　a　man　does；　he　can　always　justify　by　the　reflection　on　it　of　good　intentions　and
motives；　and　by　the　influence　of　that　conviction　it　is　good。　

Footnote：　'That　he　feels　completely　convinced　I　have　not　the　least　doubt。　But　how　many　men　are　led　by
such　feelings　of　conviction　into　the　worst　of　misdeeds！　Besides；　if　everything　may　be　excused　on　this　ground；
then　that　terminates　the　rational　judgement　of　good　and　wicked；　honourable　and　shameful；　resolutions。　Lunacy
in　that　case　would　have　equal　rights　with　reason；　or　in　other　words　reason　would　have　no　rights　whatever；　its
judgement　would　cease　to　have　any　validity。　Its　voice　would　be　a　minus　quantity；　truth　would　be　the
possession　of　the　man　with　no　doubts！　I　tremble　at　the　results　of　such　toleration；　for　it　would　be　exclusively　to
the　advantage　of　unreason。'　（Jacobi　1802。）　

Thus　there　is　no　longer　anything　absolutely　vicious　or　criminal；　and　instead　of　the　abovementioned
frank　and　free；　hardened　and　unperturbed　sinner；　we　have　the　man　who　is　conscious　of　being　fully
justified　by　intention　and　conviction。　My　good　intention　in　my　action　and　my　conviction　of　its
goodness　make　it　good。　We　speak　of　judging　and　estimating　an　action；　but　on　this　principle　it　is
only　the　intention　and　conviction　of　the　agent；　his　faith；　by　which　he　ought　to　be　judged。　Not；
however；　his　faith　in　the　sense　in　which　Christ　requires　faith　in　objective　truth；　so　that　on　one　who
has　a　false　faith；　i。e。　a　conviction　bad　in　its　content；　the　judgement　to　be　pronounced　must　be　a
condemnation；　i。e。　one　in　conformity　with　this　content。　On　the　contrary；　faith　here　means　fidelity　to
conviction；　and　the　question　to　be　asked　about　action　is：　'Has　the　agent　in　his　acting　kept　true　to
his　conviction　Fidelity　to　formal　subjective　conviction　is　thus　made　the　sole　measuring…rod　of　duty。　

This　principle；　under　which　conviction　is　expressly　made　something　subjective；　cannot　but　thrust
upon　us　the　thought　of　possible　error；　with　the　further　implied　presupposition　of　an　absolute　law。
But　the　law　is　no　agent；　it　is　only　the　actual　human　being　who　acts。　And；　on　the　aforesaid　principle；
the　only　question；　in　estimating　the　worth　of　human　actions；　is　how　far　he　has　taken　up　the　law　into
his　conviction。　But　if　on　this　theory　it　is　not　actions　which　are　to　be　judged；　i。e。　measured　generally；
by　that　law；　it　is　impossible　to　see　what　the　law　is　for　and　what　end　it　is　to　serve。　Such　a　law　is
degraded　to　a　mere　external　letter；　in　fact　to　an　empty　word；　if　it　is　only　my　conviction　which
makes　it　a　law　and　invests　it　with　obligatory　force。　

Such　a　law　may　claim　its　authority　from　God　or　the　state。　It　may　even　have　behind　it　the　authority
of　tens　of　centuries　during　which　it　was　the　bond　which　gave　men；　with　all　their　deeds　and　destiny；
coherence　and　subsistence。　And　these　are　authorities　which　enshrine　the　convictions　of　countless
individuals。　Now　if　I　set　against　these　the　authority　of　my　single　conviction　…　for　as　my　subjective
conviction　its　sole　validity　is　authority　…　that　at　first　seems　a　piece　of　monstrous　self…conceit；　but　in
virtue　of　the　principle　that　subjective　conviction　is　to　be　the　measuring…rod；　it　is　pronounced　not　to
be　self…conceit　at　all。　

Even　if　reason　and　conscience　…　which　shallow　science　and　bad　sophistry　can　never　altogether
expel　…　admit　with　a　noble　illogicality　that　error　is　possible；　still　by　describing　crime；　and　evil
generally；　as　only　an　error；　we　minimise　the　fault。　To　err　is　human　…　who　has　not　been　mistaken　on
one　point　or　another；　whether　he　had　fresh　or　pickled　cabbage　for　dinner　yesterday；　and　about
innumerable　other　things　of　more　or　less　importance？　But　the　difference　between　importance　and
triviality　vanishes　if　everything　turns　on　the　subjectivity　of　conviction　and　on　persistence　in　it。　The
said　noble　illogicality　which　admits　the　possibility　of　error　is　inevitable　then　in　the　nature　of　the
case；　but　when　it　comes　round　to　say　that　a　wrong　conviction　is　only　an　error；　it　only　falls　into　a
further　illogicality；　the　illogicality　of　dishonesty。　At　one　moment　conviction　is　made　the　basis　of
ethics　and　of　man's　supreme　value；　and　is　thus　pronounced　the　supreme　and　the　sacrosanct；　at
another；　all　we　have　to　do　with　is　error；　and　my　conviction　is　something　trivial　and　casual；　in　fact
something　strictly　external；　which　may　turn　out　this　way　or　that。　Really；　my　being　convinced　is
something　supremely　trivial　if　I　cannot　know　the　truth；　for　then　it　is　a　matter　of　indifference　how　I
think；　and　all　that　is　left　to　my　thinking　is　that　empty　good；　the　abstraction　to　which　the
Understanding　reduces　the　good。　

One　other　point。　It　follows　further；　on　this　principle　of　justification　by　conviction；　that　logic　requires
me；　in　dealing　with　the　way　others　act　against　my　action；　to　admit　that　they　are　quite　in　the　right　…
so　far　at　any　rate　as　they　maintain　with　faith　and　conviction　that　my　action　is　criminal。　On　such
logic；　not　merely　do　I　gain　nothing；　I　am　even　deposed　from　the　post　of　liberty　and　honour　into　a
situation　of　slavery　and　dishonour。　Justice；　which　in　the　abstract　is　mine　as　well　as　theirs；　I　feel　only
as　a　foreign　subjective　conviction；　and　when　it　is　executed　on　me；　I　fancy　myself　to　be　treated　only
by　an　external　force。　

（f）　Finally；　the　supreme　form　in　which　this　subjectivism　is　completely　comprised　and　expressed　is
the　phenomenon　which　has　been　called　by　a　name　borrowed　from　Plato　…　'Irony'。　The　name　alone；
however；　is　taken　from　Plato；　he　used　it　to　describe　a　way　of　speaking　which　Socrates　employed
in　conversation　when　defending　the　Idea　of　truth　and　justice　against　the　conceit　of　the　Sophists　and
the　uneducated。　What　he　treated　ironically；　however；　was　only　their　type　of　mind；　not　the　Idea
itself。　Irony　is　only　a　manner　of　talking　against　people。　Except　as　directed　against　persons；　the
essential　movement　of　thought　is　dialectic；　and　Plato　was　so　far　from　regarding　the　dialectical　in
itself；　still　less　irony；　as　the　last　word　in　thought　and　a　substitute　for　the　Idea；　that　he　terminated　the
flux　and　reflux　of　thinking；　let　alone　of　a　subjective　opinion；　and　submerged　it　in　the　substantiality　of
the　Idea。　

Footnote：　My　colleague；　the　late　Professor　Solger；　adopted　the　word　'irony'　which　Friedrich　von　Schlegel
brought　into　use　at　a　comparatively　early　period　of　his　literary　career　and　enhanced　to　equivalence　with　the
said　principle　of　subjectivity　knowing　itself　as　supreme。　But　Solger's　finer　mind　was　above　such　an
exaggeration；　he　had　philosophic　insight　and　so　seized　upon；　emphasised；　and　retained　only　that　part　of
Schlegel's　view　which　was　dialectic　in　the　strict　sense；　i。e。　dialectic　as　the　pulsating　drive　of　speculative
inquiry。　His　last　publication；　a　solid　piece　of　work；　a　thorough　Kritik　über　die　Vorlesungen　des　Herrn　August
Wilhelm　von　Schlegel　über　dramatische　Kunst　und　Literatur；　I　find　somewhat　obscure；　however；　and　I　cannot
agree　with　the　argument　which　he　develops。　'True　irony'；　he　says；　'arises　from　the　view　that　so　long　as　man
lives　in　this　present　world；　it　is　only　in　this　world　that　he　can　fulfil　his　〃appointed　task〃　no　matter　how　elevated
a　sense　we　give　to　this　expression。　Any　hope　we　may　have　of　transcending　finite　ends　is　foolish　and　empty
conceit。　'Even　the　highest　is　exis