philosophy of right-第20章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


most　abstract　shape。　The　good；　therefore；　is　the　Idea　further　determined；　the　unity　of　the　concept
of　the　will　with　the　particular　will。　It　is　not　something　abstractly　right；　but　something　concrete
whose　contents　are　made　up　of　both　right　and　welfare　alike。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　130。　

In　this　Idea；　welfare　has　no　independent　validity　as　the　embodiment　of　a　single
particular　will　but　only　as　universal　welfare　and　essentially　as　universal　in
principle；　i。e。　as　according　with　freedom。　Welfare　without　right　is　not　a　good。
Similarly；　right　without　welfare　is　not　the　good；　fiat　justitia　should　not　be
followed　by　pereat　mundus。　Consequently；　since　the　good　must　of　necessity　be
actualised　through　the　particular　will　and　is　at　the　same　time　its　substance；　it　has
absolute　right　in　contrast　with　the　abstract　right　of　property　and　the　particular
aims　of　welfare。　If　either　of　these　moments　becomes　distinguished　from　the　good；
it　has　validity　only　in　so　far　as　it　accords　with　the　good　and　is　subordinated　to　it。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　131。　

For　the　subjective　will；　the　good　and　the　good　alone　is　the　essential；　and　the
subjective　will　has　value　and　dignity　only　in　so　far　as　its　insight　and　intention
accord　with　the　good。　Inasmuch　as　the　good　is　at　this　point　still　only　this　abstract
Idea　of　good；　the　subjective　will　has　not　yet　been　caught　up　into　it　and　established
as　according　with　it。　Consequently；　it　stands　in　a　relation　to　the　good；　and　the
relation　is　that　the　good　ought　to　be　substantive　for　it；　i。e。　it　ought　to　make　the
good　its　aim　and　realise　it　completely；　while　the　good　on　its　side　has　in　the
subjective　will　its　only　means　of　stepping　into　actuality。　

Addition：　The　good　is　the　truth　of　the　particular　will；　but　the　will　is　only　that　into　which　it　puts
itself；　it　is　not　good　by　nature　but　can　become　what　it　is　only　by　its　own　labour。　On　the　other　hand；
the　good　itself；　apart　from　the　subjective　will；　is　only　an　abstraction　without　that　real　existence
which　it　is　to　acquire　for　the　first　time　through　the　efforts　of　that　will。　Accordingly；　the　development
of　the　good　has　three　stages：　（i）　The　good　should　present　itself　to　my　volition　as　a　particular　will
and　I　should　know　it。　（ii）　I　should　myself　say　what　is　good　and　should　develop　its　particular
specifications。　（iii）　Finally；　the　specification　of　the　good　on　its　own　account；　the　particularisation　of
the　good　as　infinite　subjectivity　aware　of　itself。　This　inward　specifying　of　what　good　is；　is
conscience。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　132。　

The　right　of　the　subjective　will　is　that　whatever　it　is　to　recognise　as　valid　shall　be
seen　by　it　as　good；　and　that　an　action；　as　its　aim　entering　upon　external
objectivity；　shall　be　imputed　to　it　as　right　or　wrong；　good　or　evil；　legal　or　illegal；　in
accordance　with　its　knowledge　of　the　worth　which　the　action　has　in　this
objectivity。　

Remark：　The　good　is　in　principle　the　essence　of　the　will　in　its　substantiality　and　universality；　i。e。
of　the　will　in　its　truth；　and　therefore　it　exists　simply　and　solely　in　thinking　and　by　means　of　thinking。
Hence　assertions　such　as　'man　cannot　know　the　truth　but　has　to　do　only　with　phenomena'；　or
'thinking　injures　the　good　will'　are　dogmas　depriving　mind　not　only　of　intellectual　but　also　of　all
ethical　worth　and　dignity。　

The　right　of　giving　recognition　only　to　what　my　insight　sees　as　rational　is　the　highest　right　of　the
subject；　although　owing　to　its　subjective　character　it　remains　a　formal　right；　against　it　the　right
which　reason　qua　the　objective　possesses　over　the　subject　remains　firmly　established。　

On　account　of　its　formal　character；　insight　is　capable　equally　of　being　true　and　of　being　mere
opinion　and　error。　The　individual's　acquisition　of　this　right　of　insight　is；　on　the　principles　of　the
sphere　which　is　still　moral　only；　part　and　parcel　of　his　particular　subjective　education。　I　may
demand　from　myself；　and　regard　it　as　one　of　my　subjective　rights；　that　my　insight　into　an　obligation
shall　be　based　on　good　reasons；　that　I　shall　be　convinced　of　the　obligation　and　even　that　I　shall
apprehend　it　from　its　concept　and　fundamental　nature。　But　whatever　I　may　claim　for　the
satisfaction　of　my　conviction　about　the　character　of　an　action　as　good；　permitted；　or　forbidden；
and　so　about　its　imputability　in　respect　of　this　character；　this　in　no　way　detracts　from　the　right　of
objectivity。　

This　right　of　insight　into　the　good　is　distinct　from　the　right　of　insight　in　respect　of　action　as　such　（see
§　117）　；　the　form　of　the　right　of　objectivity　which　corresponds　to　the　latter　is　this；　that　since　action
is　an　alteration　which　is　to　take　place　in　an　actual　world　and　so　will　have　recognition　in　it；　it　must　in
general　accord　with　what　has　validity　there。　Whoever　wills　to　act　in　this　world　of　actuality　has　eo
ipso　submitted　himself　to　its　laws　and　recognised　the　right　of　objectivity。　

Similarly；　in　the　state　as　the　objectivity　of　the　concept　of　reason；　legal　responsibility　cannot　be　tied
down　to　what　an　individual　may　hold　to　be　or　not　to　be　in　accordance　with　his　reason；　or　to　his
subjective　insight　into　what　is　right　or　wrong；　good　or　evil；　or　to　the　demands　which　he　makes　for
the　satisfaction　of　his　conviction。　In　this　objective　field；　the　right　of　insight　is　valid　as　insight　into　the
legal　or　illegal；　qua　into　what　is　recognised　as　right；　and　it　is　restricted　to　its　elementary　meaning；
i。e。　to　knowledge　in　the　sense　of　acquaintance　with　what　is　legal　and　to　that　extent　obligatory。　By
means　of　the　publicity　of　the　laws　and　the　universality　of　manners；　the　state　removes　from　the　right
of　insight　its　formal　aspect　and　the　contingency　which　it　still　retains　for　the　subject　at　the　level　of
morality。　The　subject's　right　to　know　action　in　its　specific　character　as　good　or　evil；　legal　or　illegal；
has　the　result　of　diminishing　or　cancelling　in　this　respect　too　the　responsibility　of　children；　imbeciles；
and　lunatics；　although　it　is　impossible　to　delimit　precisely　either　childhood；　imbecility；　&c。；　or　their
degree　of　irresponsibility。　But　to　turn　momentary　blindness；　the　goad　of　passion；　intoxication；　or；　in
a　word；　what　is　called　the　strength　of　sensual　impulse　（excluding　impulses　which　are　the　basis　of
the　right　of　distress　…　see　§　127）　into　reasons　when　the　imputation；　specific　character；　and
culpability　of　a　crime　are　in　question；　and　to　look　。　upon　such　circumstances　as　if　they　took　away
the　criminal's　guilt；　again　means　（compare　§　100　and　the　Remark　to　§　120）　failing　to　treat　the
criminal。　in　accordance　with　the　right　and　honour　due　to　him　as　a　man；　for　the　nature　of　man
consists　precisely　in　the　fact　that　he　is　essentially　something　universal；　not　a　being　whose
knowledge　is　an　abstractly　momentary　and　piecemeal　affair。　

Just　as　what　the　incendiary　really　sets　on　fire　is　not　the　isolated　square　inch　of　wooden　surface　to
which　he　applies　his　torch；　but　the　universal　in　that　square　inch；　e。g。　the　house　as　a　whole；　so；　as
subject；　he　is　neither　the　single　existent　of　this　moment　of　time　nor　this　isolated　hot　feeling　of
revenge。　If　he　were；　he　would　be　an　animal　which　would　have　to　be　knocked　on　the　head　as
dangerous　and　unsafe　because　of　its　liability　to　fits　of　madness。　

The　claim　is　made　that　the　criminal　in　the　moment　of　his　action　must　have　had　a　'clear　idea'　of　the
wrong　and　its　culpability　before　it　can　be　imputed　to　him　as　a　crime。　At　first　sight；　this　claim　seems
to　preserve　the　right　of　his　subjectivity；　but　the　truth　is　that　it　deprives　him　of　his　indwelling　nature
as　intelligent；　a　nature　whose　effective　presence　is　not　confined　to　the　'clear　ideas'　of　Wolff's
psychology；　and　only　in　cases　of　lunacy　is　it　so　deranged　as　to　be　divorced　from　the　knowing　and
doing　of　isolated　things。　

The　sphere　in　which　these　extenuating　circumstances　come　into　consideration　as　grounds　for　the
mitigation　of　punishment　is　a　sphere　other　than　that　of　rights；　the　sphere　of　pardon。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　133。　

The　particular　subject　is　related　to　the　good　as　to　the　essence　of　his　will；　and
hence　his　will's　obligation　arises　directly　in　this　relation。　Since　particularity　is
distinct　from　the　good　and　falls　within　the　subjective　will；　the　good　is
characterised　to　begin　with　only　as　the　universal　abstract　essentiality　of　the　will；
i。e。　as　duty。　Since　duty　is　thus　abstract　and　universal　in　character；　it　should　be
done　for　duty's　sake。　

Addition：　From　my　point　of　view　the　essence　of　the　will　is　duty。　Now　if　my　knowledge　stops　at
the　fact　that　the　good　is　my　duty；　I　am　still　going　no　further　than　the　abstract　character　of　duty。　I
should　do　my　duty　for　duty's　sake；　and　when　I　do　my　duty　it　is　in　a　true　sense　my　own　objectivity
which　I　am　bringing　to　realisation。　In　doing　my　duty；　I　am　by　myself　and　free。　To　have　emphasised
this　meaning　of　duty　has　constituted　the　merit　of　Kant's　moral　philosophy　and　its　loftiness　of
outlook。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　134。　

Because　every　action　explicitly　calls　for　a　particular　content　and　a　specific　end；
while　duty　as　an　abstraction　entails　nothing　of　the　kind；　the　question　arises：　what
is　my　duty？　As　an　answer　nothing　is　so　far　available　except：　（a）　to　do　the　right；
and　（b）　to　strive　after　welfare；　one's　own　welfare；　and　welfare　in　universal　terms；
the　welfare　of　others　（see　§　119）。　

Addition：　This　is　the　same　question　as　was　put　to　Jesus　when　someone　wished　to　learn　from
him　what　he　should　do　to　inherit　eternal　life。　Good　as　a　universal　is　abstract　and　cannot　be
accomplished　so　long　as　it　remains　abstract。　To　be　accomplished　it　must　acquire　in　addition　the
character　of　particularity。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　135。　

These　specific　duties；　however；　are　not　contained　in　the　definition　of　duty　itself；
but　since　both　of　them　are　conditioned　and　restricted；　they　eo　ipso　bring　about
the　transition　to　the　higher　sphere　of　the　unconditioned；　the　sphere　of　duty。　Duty
itself　in　the　moral　self…consciousness　is　the　essence　or　the　universality　of　that
consciousness；　the　way　in　which　it　is　inwardly　related　to　itself　alone；　all　that　is　left
to　it；　therefore；　is　abstract　universality；　and　for　its　determinate　character　it　has
identity　without　content；　or　the　abstractly　positive；　the　indeterminate。　

Remark：　However　essential　it　is　to　give　prominence　to　the　pure　unconditioned
self…determination　of　the　will　as　the　root　of　duty；　and　to　the　way　in　which　knowledge　of　the　will；
thanks　to　Kant's　philosophy；　has　won　its　firm　foundation　and　starting…point　for　the　first　time　owing
to　the　thought　of　its　infinite　autonomy；　still　to　adhere　to　the　exclusively　moral　position；　without
making　the　transition　to　the　conception　of　ethics；　is　to　reduce　this　gain　to　an　empty　formalism；　and
the　science　of　morals　to　the　preaching　of　duty　for　duty's　sake。　From　this　point　of　view；　no
immanent　doctrine　of　duties　is　possible；　of　course；　material　may　be　brought　in　from　outside　and
particular　duties　may　be　arrived　at　accordingly；　but　ff　the　definition　of　duty　is　taken　to　be　the
absence　of　contradiction；　formal　correspondence　with　itself　…　which　is　nothing　but　abstract
indeterminacy　stabilised　…　then　no　transition　is　possible　to　the　specifi