philosophy of right-第16章

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assigned　to　freedom；　the　Idea's　existential　aspect；　or　its　moment　of　reality；　is　now
the　subjectivity　of　the　will。　Only　in　the　Will　as　subjective　can　freedom　or　the
implicit　principle　of　the　will　be　actual。　

Remark：　The　second　sphere；　—　Morality；　therefore　throughout　portrays　the　real　aspect　of　the
concept　of　freedom；　and　the　movement　of　this　sphere　is　as　follows：　the　will；　which　at　the　start　is
aware　only　of　its　independence　and　which　before　it　is　mediated　is　only　implicitly　identical　with　the
universal　will　or　the　principle　of　the　will；　is　raised　beyond　its　＇explicit＇　difference　from　the　universal
will；　beyond　this　situation　in　which　it　sinks　deeper　and　deeper　into　itself；　and　is　established　as
explicitly　identical　with　the　principle　of　the　will。；　—　This　process　is　accordingly　the　cultivation　of　the
ground　in　which　freedom　is　now　set；　i。e。　subjectivity。　What　happens　is　that　subjectivity；　which　is
abstract　at　the　start；　i。e。　distinct　from　the　concept；　becomes　likened　to　it；　and　thereby　the　Idea
acquires　its　genuine　realisation；　The　result　is　that　the　subjective…will　determines　itself　as　objective
too　and　so　as　truly　concrete。　

Addition：　So　far　as　right　in　the　strict　sense　was　concerned；　it　was　of　no　importance　what　my
intention　or　my　principle　was。　This　question　about　the　self…determination　and　motive　of　the　will；
like　the　question　about　its　purpose；　now　enters　at　this　point　in　connection　with　morality。　Since　man
wishes　to　be　judged　in　accordance　with　his　own　self…determined　choices；　he　is　free　in　this　relation
to　himself　whatever　the　external　situation　may　impose　upon　him。　No　one　can　break　in　upon　this
inner　conviction　of　mankind；　no　violence　can　be　done　to　it；　and　the　moral　will；　therefore；　is
inaccessible。　Man's　worth　is　estimated　by　reference　to　his　inward　action　and　hence　the　standpoint
of　morality　is　that　of　freedom　aware　of　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　107。

The　self…determination　of　the　will　is　at　the　same　time　a　moment　in　the　concept　of
the　will；　and　subjectivity　is　not　merely　its　existential　aspect　but　its　own
determinate　character　（see　§　104）。　The　will　aware　of　its　freedom　and　determined
as　subjective　is　at　the　start　concept　alone；　but　itself　has　determinate　existence　in
order　to　exist　as　Idea。　The　moral　standpoint　therefore　takes　shape　as　the　right　of
the　subjective　Will。　In　accordance　with　this　right；　the　will　recognises　something
and　is　something；　only　in　so　far　as　the　thing　is　its　own　and　as　the　will　is　present　to
itself　there　as　something　subjective。　

The　same　process　through　which　the　moral　attitude　develops　（see　the　Remark　to
the　preceding　Paragraph）　has　from　this　point　of　view　the　form　of　being　the
development　of　the　right　of　the　subjective　will；　or　of　the　mode　of　its　existence。　In
this　process　the　subjective　will　further　determines　what　it　recognises　as　its　own　in
its　object　（Gegenstand）；　so　that　this　object　becomes　the　will's　own　true　concept；
becomes　objective　（objektiv）　as　the　expression　of　the　will's　own　universality。　

Addition：　This　entire　category　of　the　subjectivity　of　the　will　is　once　again　a　whole　which；　as
subjectivity；　must　also　have　objectivity。　It　is　in　a　subject　that　freedom　can　first　be　realised；　since
the　subjective　is　the　true　material　for　this　realisation。　But　this　embodiment　of　the　will　which　we　have
called　subjectivity　is　different　from　the　will　which　has　developed　all　its　potentialities　to　actuality。
That　is　to　say；　the　will　must　free　itself　from　this　second　one…sidedness　of　pure　subjectivity　in　order
to　become　the　fully　actualised　will。　In　morality；　it　is　man's　private　interest　that　comes　into　question；
and　the　high　worth　of　this　interest　consists　precisely　in　the　fact　that　man　knows　himself　as　absolute
and　is　self…determined。　The　uneducated　man　allows　himself　to　be　constrained　in　everything　by
brute　force　and　natural　factors；　children　have　no　moral　will　but　leave　their　parents　to　decide　things
for　them。　The　educated　man；　however；　develops　an　inner　life　and　wills　that　he　himself　shall　be　in
everything　he　does。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　108。　

The　subjective　will；　directly　aware　of　itself；　and　distinguished　from　the　principle
of　the　will　（see　Remark　to　§　106）；　is　therefore　abstract；　restricted；　and　formal。
But　not　merely　is　subjectivity　itself　formal；　in　addition；　as　the　infinite
self…determination　of　the　will；　it　constitutes　the　form　of　all　willing。　In　this；　its　first
appearance　in　the　single　will；　this　form　has　not　yet　been　established　as　identical
with　the　concept　of　the　will；　and　therefore　the　moral　point　of　view　is　that　of
relation；　of　ought…to…be；　or　demand。　And　since　the　self…difference　of　subjectivity
involves　at　the　same　time　the　character　of　being　opposed　to　objectivity　as　external
fact；　it　follows　that　the　point　of　view　of　consciousness　comes　on　the　scene　here
too　（see　§　8）。　The　general　point　of　view　here　is　that　of　the　will's　self…difference；
finitude；　and　appearance。　

Remark：　The　moral　is　not　characterised　primarily　by　its　having　already　been　opposed　to　the
immoral；　nor　is　right　directly　characterised　by　its　opposition　to　wrong。　The　point　is　rather　that　the
general　characteristics　of　morality　and　immorality　alike　rest　on　the　subjectivity　of　the　will。　

Addition：　In　morality；　self…determination　is　to　be　thought　of　as　the　pure　restlessness　and　activity
which　can　never　arrive　at　anything　that　is。　It　is　in　the　sphere　of　ethical　life　that　the　will　is　for　the　first
time　identical　with　the　concept　of　the　will　and　has　this　concept　alone　as　its　content。　In　the　moral
sphere　the　will　still　relates　itself　to　its　implicit　principle　and　consequently　its　position　is　that　of
difference。　The　process　through　which　this　position　develops　is　that　whereby　the　subjective　will
becomes　identified　with　its　concept。　Therefore　the　'ought…to…be'　which　is　never　absent　from　the
moral　sphere　becomes　an　'is'　only　in　ethical　life。　Further；　this　'other'　in　relation　to　which　the
subjective　will　stands　is　two…sided：　first；　it　is　what　is　substantive；　the　concept；　secondly；　it　is
external　fact。　Even　if　the　good　were　posited　in　the　subjective　will；　that　still　would　not　give　it
complete　realisation。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　109。　

This　form　of　all　willing　primarily　involves　in　accordance　with　its　general　character
（a）　the　opposition　of　subjectivity　and　objectivity；　and　（b）　the　activity　（see　§　8）
related　to　this　opposition。　Now　existence　and　specific　determinacy　are　identical　in
the　concept　of　the　will　（see　§　104）；　and　the　will　as　subjective　is　itself　this　concept
。　Hence　the　moments　of　this　activity　consist　more　precisely　in　（a）　distinguishing
between　objectivity　and　subjectivity　and　even　ascribing　independence　to。　them
both；　and　（b）　establishing　them　as　identical。　In　the　will　which　is　self…determining；　

　　　　　＇a＇　its　specific　determinacy　is　in　the　first　place　established　in　the　will　itself　by
　　　　　itself　as　its　inner　particularisation；　as　a　content　which　it　gives　to　itself。　This　is
　　　　　the　first　negation；　and　the　formal　limitation　（Grenze）　of　this　negation　is　that
　　　　　of　being　only　something　posited；　something　subjective。　
　　　　　＇b＇　As　infinitely　reflected　into　itself；　this　limitation　exists　for　the　will；　and　the
　　　　　will　is　the　struggle　to　transcend　this　barrier　（Schranke）；　i。e。　it　is　the　activity
　　　　　of　translating　this　content　in　some　way　or　other　from　subjectivity　into
　　　　　objectivity；　into　an　immediate　existence。　
　　　　　＇c＇　The　simple　identity　of　the　will　with　itself　in　this　opposition　is　the　content
　　　　　which　remains　self…identical　in　both　these　opposites　and　indifferent　to　this
　　　　　formal　distinction　of　opposition。　In　short；　it　is　my　aim　＇the　purpose　willed＇。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　110。　

But；　at　the　standpoint　of　morality；　where　the　will　is　aware　of　its　freedom；　of　this
identity　of　the　will　with　itself　（see　§　105）；　this　identity　of　content　acquires　the
more　particularised　character　appropriate　to　itself。　

（a）　The　content　as　'mine'　has　for　me　this　character：　by　virtue　of　its　identity　in
subject　and　object　it　enshrines　for　me　my　subjectivity；　not　merely　as　my　inner
purpose；　but　also　inasmuch　as　it　has　acquired　outward　existence。　

Addition：　The　content　of　the　subjective　or　moral　will　has　a　specific　character　of　its　own；　i。e。
even　if　it　has　acquired　the　form　of　objectivity；　it　must　still　continue　to　enshrine　my　subjectivity；　and
my　act　is　to　count　as　mine　only　if　on　its　inward　side　it　has　been　determined　by　me；　if　it　was　my
purpose；　my　intention。　Beyond　what　lay　in　my　subjective　will　I　recognise　nothing　in　its　expression
as　mine。　What　I　wish　to　see　in　my　deed　is　my　subjective　consciousness　over　again。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　111。　

（b）　Though　the　content　does　have　in　it　something　particular；　whencesoever　it　may
be　derived；　still　it　is　the　content　of　the　will　reflected　into　itself　in　its　determinacy
and　thus　of　the　self…identical　and　universal　will；　and　therefore：　

　　　　　＇a＇　the　content　is　inwardly　characterised　as　adequate　to　the　principle　of　the
　　　　　will　or　as　possessing　the　objectivity　of　the　concept；　
　　　　　＇b＇　since　the　subjective　will；　as　aware　of　itself；　is　at　the　same　time　still
　　　　　formal　（see　§　108）；　the　content's　adequacy　to　the　concept　is　still　only
　　　　　something　demanded；　and　hence　this　entails　the　possibility　that　the　content
　　　　　may　not　be　adequate　to　the　concept。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　112。　

（c）　Since　in　carrying　out　my　aims　I　retain　my　subjectivity　（see　§　110）；　during　this
process　of　objectifying　them　I　simultaneously　supersede　the　immediacy　of　this
subjectivity　as　well　as　its　character　as　this　my　individual　subjectivity。　But　the
external　subjectivity　which　is　thus　identical　with　me　is　the　will　of　others　（see　§
73）。　The　will's　ground　of　existence　is　now　subjectivity　（see　§　106）　and　the　will　of
others　is　that　existence　which　I　give　to　my　aim　and　which　is　at　the　same　time　to
me　an　other。　The　achievement　of　my　aim；　therefore；　implies　this　identity　of　my
will　with　the　will　of　others；　it　has　a　positive　bearing　on　the　will　of　others。　

Remark：　The　objectivity　of　the　aim　achieved　thus　involves　three　meanings；　or　rather　it　has　three
moments　present　within　it　at　once；　it　is：　

　　　　　＇a＇　something　existing　externally　and　immediately　（see　§　106）；　
　　　　　＇b＇　adequate　to　the　concept　（see　§　111）；　
　　　　　＇c＇　universal　subjectivity。　

The　subjectivity　which　maintains　itself　in　this　objectivity　consists：　

　　　　　＇a＇　in　the　fact　that　the　objective　aim　is　mine；　so　that　in　it　I　maintain　myself　as　this　individual
　　　　　（see　§　110）；　
　　　　　＇b＇　and　＇c＇；　in　moments　which　coincide　with　the　moments　＇b＇　and　＇c＇　above。　

At　the　standpoint　of　morality；　subjectivity　and　objectivity　are　distinct　from　one　another；　or　united
only　by　their　mutual　contradiction；　it　is　this　fact　more　particularly　which　constitutes　the　finitude　of
this　sphere　or　its　character　as　mere　appearance　（see　§　108）；　and　the　development　of　this
standpoint　is　the　development　of　these　contradictions　and　their　resolutions；　resolutions；　however；
which　within　this　field　can　be　no　more　than　relative。　

Addition：　In　dealing　with　formal　right；　I　said　＇see　§　38＇　that　it　contained　prohibitions　only；　that
hence