charmides-第11章
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itself； and of all other desires？
Certainly not。
Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good； but only for itself and
all other wishes？
I should answer； No。
Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty； but
of itself and of other loves？
I should not。
Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears； but has
no object of fear？
I never did； he said。
Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions； and
which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general？
Certainly not。
But surely we are assuming a science of this kind； which； having no
subject…matter； is a science of itself and of the other sciences？
Yes； that is what is affirmed。
But how strange is this； if it be indeed true： we must not however as yet
absolutely deny the possibility of such a science； let us rather consider
the matter。
You are quite right。
Well then； this science of which we are speaking is a science of something；
and is of a nature to be a science of something？
Yes。
Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something
else？ （Socrates is intending to show that science differs from the object
of science； as any other relative differs from the object of relation。 But
where there is comparisongreater； less； heavier； lighter； and the likea
relation to self as well as to other things involves an absolute
contradiction； and in other cases； as in the case of the senses； is hardly
conceivable。 The use of the genitive after the comparative in Greek；
（Greek）； creates an unavoidable obscurity in the translation。）
Yes。
Which is less； if the other is conceived to be greater？
To be sure。
And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself； and
greater than other great things； but not greater than those things in
comparison of which the others are greater； then that thing would have the
property of being greater and also less than itself？
That； Socrates； he said； is the inevitable inference。
Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles；
these will be halves； for the double is relative to the half？
That is true。
And that which is greater than itself will also be less； and that which is
heavier will also be lighter； and that which is older will also be younger：
and the same of other things； that which has a nature relative to self will
retain also the nature of its object： I mean to say； for example； that
hearing is； as we say； of sound or voice。 Is that true？
Yes。
Then if hearing hears itself； it must hear a voice； for there is no other
way of hearing。
Certainly。
And sight also； my excellent friend； if it sees itself must see a colour；
for sight cannot see that which has no colour。
No。
Do you remark； Critias； that in several of the examples which have been
recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible； and in
other cases hardly credibleinadmissible； for example； in the case of
magnitudes； numbers； and the like？
Very true。
But in the case of hearing and sight； or in the power of self…motion； and
the power of heat to burn； this relation to self will be regarded as
incredible by some； but perhaps not by others。 And some great man； my
friend； is wanted； who will satisfactorily determine for us； whether there
is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self； or some
things only and not others； and whether in this class of self…related
things； if there be such a class； that science which is called wisdom or
temperance is included。 I altogether distrust my own power of determining
these matters： I am not certain whether there is such a science of science
at all； and even if there be； I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom or
temperance； until I can also see whether such a science would or would not
do us any good； for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a
good。 And therefore； O son of Callaeschrus； as you maintain that
temperance or wisdom is a science of science； and also of the absence of
science； I will request you to show in the first place； as I was saying
before； the possibility； and in the second place； the advantage； of such a
science； and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your
view of temperance。
Critias heard me say this； and saw that I was in a difficulty； and as one
person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning
from him； so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty。
But as he had a reputation to maintain； he was ashamed to admit before the
company that he could not answer my challenge or determine the question at
issue； and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity。 In
order that the argument might proceed； I said to him； Well then Critias； if
you like； let us assume that there is this science of science； whether the
assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated。 Admitting the
existence of it； will you tell me how such a science enables us to
distinguish what we know or do not know； which； as we were saying； is
self…knowledge or wisdom： so we were saying？
Yes； Socrates； he said； and that I think is certainly true： for he who has
this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the knowledge
which he has； in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift； and
he who has beauty will be beautiful； and he who has knowledge will know。
In the same way he who has that knowledge which is self…knowing； will know
himself。
I do not doubt； I said； that a man will know himself； when he possesses
that which has self…knowledge： but what necessity is there that； having
this； he should know what he knows and what he does not know？
Because； Socrates； they are the same。
Very likely； I said； but I remain as stupid as ever； for still I fail to
comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as
the knowledge of self。
What do you mean？ he said。
This is what I mean； I replied： I will admit that there is a science of
science；can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the
other is not science or knowledge？
No； just that。
But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or
want of knowledge of justice？
Certainly not。
The one is medicine； and the other is politics； whereas that of which we
are speaking is knowledge pure and simple。
Very true。
And if a man knows only； and has only knowledge of knowledge； and has no
further knowledge of health and justice； the probability is that he will
only know that he knows something； and has a certain knowledge； whether
concerning himself or other men。
True。
Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows？
Say that he knows health；not wisdom or temperance； but the art of
medicine has taught it to him；and he has learned harmony from the art of
music； and building from the art of building；neither； from wisdom or
temperance： and the same of other things。
That is evident。
How will wisdom； regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of
science； ever teach him that he knows health； or that he knows building？
It is impossible。
Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows； but
not what he knows？
True。
Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things
which we do or do not know； but only the knowledge that we know or do not
know？
That is the inference。
Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a
pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows： he will
only know that he has a knowledge of some kind； but wisdom will not show
him of what the knowledge is？
Plainly not。
Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the
true physician； nor between any other true and false professor of
knowledge。 Let us consider the matter in this way： If the wise man or any
other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false； how will
he proceed？ He will not talk to him about medicine； and that； as we were
saying； is the only thing which the physician understands。
True。
And； on the other hand； the physician knows nothing of science； for this
has been assumed to be the province of wisdom。
True。
And further； since medicine is science； we must infer that he does not know
anything of medicine。
Exactly。
Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of
science or knowledge； but when he wants to discover the nature of this he
will ask； What is the subject…matter？ For the several sciences are
distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences； but by the
nature of their subjects。 Is not that true？
Quite true。
And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject…
matter of health and disease？
Yes。
And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the
enquiry into health and disease； and not into what is extraneous？
True。
And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in
what relates to these？
He will。
He will consider whether what he says is true； and whether what he does is
right； in relation to health and disease？
He will。
But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge
of medicine？
He cannot。
No one at all； it would seem； except the physician can have this knowledge；
and therefore not the wise man； he would have to be a physician as well as
a wise man。
Very true。
Then； assuredly； wisdom or temperance； if only a science of science； an
