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have the same conclusion as before�察�as in the cases given at the



beginning。



  But if the major premiss is the minor universal�察�whether both are



affirmative�察�or negative�察�or different in quality�察�or if both are



indefinite or particular�察�in no way will a syllogism be possible。



For nothing prevents B from reaching beyond A�察�so that as predicates



cover unequal areas。 Let C be that by which B extends beyond A。 To C



it is not possible that A should belong´either to all or to none or to



some or not to some�察�since premisses in the mode of possibility are



convertible and it is possible for B to belong to more things than A



can。 Further�察�this is obvious if we take terms�察�for if the premisses



are as assumed�察�the major term is both possible for none of the



minor and must belong to all of it。 Take as terms common to all the



cases under consideration 'animal'´'white'´'man'�察�where the major



belongs necessarily to the minor�察�'animal'´'white'´'garment'�察�where it



is not possible that the major should belong to the minor。 It is clear



then that if the terms are related in this manner�察�no syllogism



results。 For every syllogism proves that something belongs either



simply or necessarily or possibly。 It is clear that there is no



proof of the first or of the second。 For the affirmative is



destroyed by the negative�察�and the negative by the affirmative。



There remains the proof of possibility。 But this is impossible。 For it



has been proved that if the terms are related in this manner it is



both necessary that the major should belong to all the minor and not



possible that it should belong to any。 Consequently there cannot be



a syllogism to prove the possibility�察�for the necessary ��as we stated��



is not possible。



  It is clear that if the terms are universal in possible premisses



a syllogism always results in the first figure�察�whether they are



affirmative or negative�察�only a perfect syllogism results in the first



case�察�an imperfect in the second。 But possibility must be understood



according to the definition laid down�察�not as covering necessity。 This



is sometimes forgotten。







                                15







  If one premiss is a simple proposition�察�the other a problematic��



whenever the major premiss indicates possibility all the syllogisms



will be perfect and establish possibility in the sense defined�察�but



whenever the minor premiss indicates possibility all the syllogisms



will be imperfect�察�and those which are negative will establish not



possibility according to the definition�察�but that the major does not



necessarily belong to any�察�or to all�察�of the minor。 For if this is so��



we say it is possible that it should belong to none or not to all。 Let



A be possible for all B�察�and let B belong to all C。 Since C falls



under B�察�and A is possible for all B�察�clearly it is possible for all C



also。 So a perfect syllogism results。 Likewise if the premiss AB is



negative�察�and the premiss BC is affirmative�察�the former stating



possible�察�the latter simple attribution�察�a perfect syllogism results



proving that A possibly belongs to no C。



  It is clear that perfect syllogisms result if the minor premiss



states simple belonging�此�but that syllogisms will result if the



modality of the premisses is reversed�察�must be proved per impossibile。



At the same time it will be evident that they are imperfect�此�for the



proof proceeds not from the premisses assumed。 First we must state



that if B's being follows necessarily from A's being�察�B's



possibility will follow necessarily from A's possibility。 Suppose�察�the



terms being so related�察�that A is possible�察�and B is impossible。 If



then that which is possible�察�when it is possible for it to be�察�might



happen�察�and if that which is impossible�察�when it is impossible��



could not happen�察�and if at the same time A is possible and B



impossible�察�it would be possible for A to happen without B�察�and if



to happen�察�then to be。 For that which has happened�察�when it has



happened�察�is。 But we must take the impossible and the possible not



only in the sphere of becoming�察�but also in the spheres of truth and



predicability�察�and the various other spheres in which we speak of



the possible�此�for it will be alike in all。 Further we must



understand the statement that B's being depends on A's being�察�not as



meaning that if some single thing A is�察�B will be�此�for nothing follows



of necessity from the being of some one thing�察�but from two at



least�察�i。e。 when the premisses are related in the manner stated to



be that of the syllogism。 For if C is predicated of D�察�and D of F��



then C is necessarily predicated of F。 And if each is possible�察�the



conclusion also is possible。 If then�察�for example�察�one should indicate



the premisses by A�察�and the conclusion by B�察�it would not only



result that if A is necessary B is necessary�察�but also that if A is



possible�察�B is possible。



  Since this is proved it is evident that if a false and not



impossible assumption is made�察�the consequence of the assumption



will also be false and not impossible�此�e。g。 if A is false�察�but not



impossible�察�and if B is the consequence of A�察�B also will be false but



not impossible。 For since it has been proved that if B's being is



the consequence of A's being�察�then B's possibility will follow from



A's possibility ��and A is assumed to be possible���察�consequently B will



be possible�此�for if it were impossible�察�the same thing would at the



same time be possible and impossible。



  Since we have defined these points�察�let A belong to all B�察�and B



be possible for all C�此�it is necessary then that should be a



possible attribute for all C。 Suppose that it is not possible�察�but



assume that B belongs to all C�此�this is false but not impossible。 If



then A is not possible for C but B belongs to all C�察�then A is not



possible for all B�此�for a syllogism is formed in the third degree。 But



it was assumed that A is a possible attribute for all B。 It is



necessary then that A is possible for all C。 For though the assumption



we made is false and not impossible�察�the conclusion is impossible。



It is possible also in the first figure to bring about the



impossibility�察�by assuming that B belongs to C。 For if B belongs to



all C�察�and A is possible for all B�察�then A would be possible for all



C。 But the assumption was made that A is not possible for all C。



  We must understand 'that which belongs to all' with no limitation in



respect of time�察�e。g。 to the present or to a particular period�察�but



simply without qualification。 For it is by the help of such



premisses that we make syllogisms�察�since if the premiss is



understood with reference to the present moment�察�there cannot be a



syllogism。 For nothing perhaps prevents 'man' belonging at a



particular time to everything that is moving�察�i。e。 if nothing else



were moving�此�but 'moving' is possible for every horse�察�yet 'man' is



possible for no horse。 Further let the major term be 'animal'�察�the



middle 'moving'�察�the the minor 'man'。 The premisses then will be as



before�察�but the conclusion necessary�察�not possible。 For man is



necessarily animal。 It is clear then that the universal must be



understood simply�察�without limitation in respect of time。



  Again let the premiss AB be universal and negative�察�and assume



that A belongs to no B�察�but B possibly belongs to all C。 These



propositions being laid down�察�it is necessary that A possibly



belongs to no C。 Suppose that it cannot belong�察�and that B belongs



to C�察�as above。 It is necessary then that A belongs to some B�此�for



we have a syllogism in the third figure�此�but this is impossible。



Thus it will be possible for A to belong to no C�察�for if at is



supposed false�察�the consequence is an impossible one。 This syllogism



then does not establish that which is possible according to the



definition�察�but that which does not necessarily belong to any part



of the subject ��for this is the contradictory of the assumption



which was made�此�for it was supposed that A necessarily belongs to some



C�察�but the syllogism per impossibile establishes the contradictory



which is opposed to this��。 Further�察�it is clear also from an example



that the conclusion will not establish possibility。 Let A be



'raven'�察�B 'intelligent'�察�and C 'man'。 A then belongs to no B�此�for



no intelligent thing is a raven。 But B is possible for all C�此�for



every man may possibly be intelligent。 But A necessarily belongs to no



C�此�so the conclusion does not establish possibility。 But neither is it



always necessary。 Let A be 'moving'�察�B 'science'�察�C 'man'。 A then will



belong to no B�察�but B is possible for all C。 And the conclusion will



not be necessary。 For it is not necessary that no man should move��



rather it is not necessary that any man should move。 Clearly then



the conclusion establishes that one term does not necessarily belong



to any instance of another term。 But we must take our terms better。



  If the minor premiss is negative and indicates possibility�察�from the



actual premisses taken there can be no syllogism�察�but if the



problematic premiss is converted�察�a syllogism will be possible�察�as



before。 Let A belong to all B�察�and let B possibly belong to no C。 If



the terms are arranged thus�察�nothing necessarily follows�此�but if the



proposition BC is converted and it is assumed that B is possible for



all C�察�a syllogism results as before�此�for the terms are in the same



relative positions。 Likewise if both the relations are negative�察�if



the major premiss states that A does not belong to B�察�and the minor



premiss indicates that B may possibly belong to no C。 Through the



premisses actually taken nothing necessary results in any way�察�but



if the problematic premiss is converted�察�we shall have a syllogism。



Suppose that A belongs to no B�察�and B may possibly belong to no C。



Through these comes nothing necessary。 But if B is assumed to be



possible for all C ��and this is true�� and if the premiss AB remains as



before�察�we shall again have the same syllogism。 But if it be assumed



that B does not belong to any C�察�instead of possibly not belonging��



there cannot be a syllogism anyhow�察�whether the premiss AB is negative



or affirmative。 As common instances of a necessary and positive



relation we may take the terms white´animal´snow�此�of a necessary and



negative relation�察�white´animal´pitch。 Clearly then if the terms are



universal�察�and one of the premisses is assertoric�察�the other



problematic�察�

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