shorter logic-第5章

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a　change　of　categories。　Speculative　Logic　contains　all　previous　Logic　and
Metaphysics：　it　preserves　the　same　forms　of　thought；　the　same　laws　and　objects　…
while　at　the　same　time　remodelling　and　expanding　them　with　wider　categories。　

From　notion　in　the　speculative　sense　we　should　distinguish　what　is　ordinarily
called　a　notion。　The　phrase；　that　no　notion　can　ever　comprehend　the　Infinite；　a
phrase　which　has　been　repeated　over　and　over　again　till　it　has　grown　axiomatic；　is
based　upon　this　narrow　estimate　of　what　is　meant　by　notions。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§10

This　thought；　which　is　proposed　as　the　instrument　of　philosophic　knowledge；
itself　calls　for　further　explanation。　We　must　understand　in　what　way　it　possesses
necessity　or　cogency：　and　when　it　claims　to　be　equal　to　the　task　of　apprehending
the　absolute　objects　（God；　Spirit；　Freedom）；　that　claim　must　be　substantiated。
Such　an　explanation；　however；　is　itself　a　lesson　in　philosophy；　and　properly　falls
within　the　scope　of　the　science　itself。　A　preliminary　attempt　to　make　matters　plain
would　only　be　unphilosophical；　and　consist　of　a　tissue　of　assumptions；　assertions；
and　inferential　pros　and　cons；　i。e。　of　dogmatism　without　cogency；　as　against
which　there　would　be　an　equal　right　of　counter…dogmatism。　

A　main　line　of　argument　in　the　Critical　Philosophy　bids　us　pause　before
proceeding　to　inquire　into　God　or　into　the　true　being　of　things；　and　tells　us　first　of
all　to　examine　the　faculty　of　cognition　and　see　whether　it　is　equal　to　such　an
effort。　We　ought；　says　Kant；　to　become　acquainted　with　the　instrument；　before
we　undertake　the　work　for　which　it　is　to　be　employed；　for　if　the　instrument　be
insufficient；　all　our　trouble　will　be　spent　in　vain。　The　plausibility　of　this　suggestion
has　won　for　it　general　assent　and　admiration；　the　result　of　which　has　been　to
withdraw　cognition　from　an　interest　in　its　objects　and　absorption　in　the　study　of
them；　and　to　direct　it　back　upon　itself；　and　so　turn　it　to　a　question　of　form。　Unless
we　wish　to　be　deceived　by　words；　it　is　easy　to　see　what　this　amounts　to。　In　the
case　of　other　instruments；　we　can　try　and　criticise　them　in　other　ways　than　by
setting　about　the　special　work　for　which　they　are　destined。　But　the　examination　of
knowledge　can　only　be　carried　out　by　an　act　of　knowledge。　To　examine　this
so…called　instrument　is　the　same　thing　as　to　know　it。　But　to　seek　to　know　before
we　know　is　as　absurd　as　the　wise　resolution　of　Scholasticus；　not　to　venture　into
the　water　until　he　had　learned　to　swim。　

Reinhold　saw　the　confusion　with　which　this　style　of　commencement　is
chargeable；　and　tried　to　get　out　of　the　difficulty　by　starting　with　a　hypothetical　and
problematical　stage　of　philosophising。　In　this　way　he　supposed　that　it　would　be
possible；　nobody　can　tell　how；　to　get　along；　until　we　found　ourselves；　further　on；
arrived　at　the　primary　truth　of　truths。　His　method；　when　closely　looked　into；　will
be　seen　to　be　identical　with　a　very　common　practice。　It　starts　from　a　substratum
of　experiential　fact；　or　from　a　provisional　assumption　which　has　been　brought　into
a　definition；　and　then　proceeds　to　analyse　this　starting…point。　We　can　detect　in
Reinhold's　argument　a　perception　of　the　truth；　that　the　usual　course　which
proceeds　by　assumptions　and　anticipations　is　no　better　than　a　hypothetical　and
problematical　mode　of　procedure。　But　his　perceiving　this　does　not　alter　the
character　of　this　method；　it　only　makes　clear　its　imperfections。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§11

The　special　conditions　which　call　for　the　existence　of　philosophy　may　be　thus
described。　The　mind　or　spirit；　when　it　is　sentient　or　perceptive；　finds　its　object　in
something　sensuous；　when　it　imagines；　in　a　picture　or　image；　when　it　wills；　in　an
aim　or　end。　But　in　contrast　to；　or　it　may　be　only　in　distinction　from；　these　forms
of　its　existence　and　of　its　objects；　the　mind　has　also　to　gratify　the　cravings　of　its
highest　and　most　inward　life。　That　innermost　self　is　thought。　Thus　the　mind
renders　thought　its　object。　In　the　best　meaning　of　the　phrase；　it　comes　to　itself；
for　thought　is　its　principle；　and　its　very　unadulterated　self。　But　while　thus
occupied；　thought　entangles　itself　in　contradictions；　i。e。　loses　itself　in　the　hard
and…fast　non…identity　of　its　thoughts；　and　so；　instead　of　reaching　itself；　is　caught
and　held　in　its　counterpart。　This　result；　to　which　honest　but　narrow　thinking　leads
the　mere　understanding；　is　resisted　by　the　loftier　craving　of　which　we　have
spoken。　That　craving　expresses　the　perseverance　of　thought；　which　continues　true
to　itself；　even　in　this　conscious　loss　of　its　native　rest　and　independence；　'that　it
may　overcome'　and　work　out　in　itself　the　solution　of　its　own　contradictions。　

To　see　that　thought　in　its　very　nature　is　dialectical；　and　that；　as　understanding；　it
must　fall　into　contradiction　…　the　negative　of　itself　…　will　form　one　of　the　main
lessons　of　logic。　When　thought　grows　hopeless　of　ever　achieving；　by　its　own
means；　the　solution　of　the　contradiction　which　it　has　by　its　own　action　brought
upon　itself；　it　turns　back　to　those　solutions　of　the　question　with　which　the　mind
had　learned　to　pacify　itself　in　some　of　its　other　modes　and　forms。　Unfortunately；
however；　the　retreat　of　thought　has　led　it；　as　Plato　noticed　even　in　his　time；　to　a
very　uncalled…for　hatred　of　reason　（misology）；　and　it　then　takes　up　against　its　own
endeavours　that　hostile　attitude　of　which　an　example　is　seen　in　the　doctrine　that
'immediate'　knowledge；　as　it　is　called；　is　the　exclusive　form　in　which　we　become
cognisant　of　truth。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§12

The　rise　of　philosophy　is　due　to　these　cravings　of　thought。　Its　point　of　departure
is　Experience；　including　under　that　name　both　our　immediate　consciousness　and
the　inductions　from　it。　Awakened；　as　it　were；　by　this　stimulus；　thought　is　vitally
characterised　by　raising　itself　above　the　natural　state　of　mind；　above　the　senses
and　inferences　from　the　senses　into　its　own　unadulterated　element；　and　by
assuming；　accordingly；　at　first　a　stand…aloof　and　negative　attitude　towards　the
point　from　which　it　started。　Through　this　state　of　antagonism　to　the　phenomena
of　sense　its　first　satisfaction　is　found　in　itself；　in　the　Idea　of　the　universal　essence
of　these　phenomena：　an　Idea　（the　Absolute；　or　God）　which　may　be　more　or　less
abstract。　Meanwhile；　on　the　other　hand；　the　sciences；　based　on　experience；　exert
upon　the　mind　a　stimulus　to　overcome　the　form　in　which　their　varied　contents　are
presented；　and　to　elevate　these　contents　to　the　rank　of　necessary　truth。　For　the
facts　of　science　have　the　aspect　of　a　vast　conglomerate；　one　thing　coming　side　by
side　with　another；　as　if　they　were　merely　given　and　presented　…　as　in　short　devoid
of　all　essential　or　necessary　connection　In　consequence　of　this　stimulus　thought　is
dragged　out　of　its　unrealised　universality　and　its　fancied　or　merely　possible
satisfaction；　and　impelled　onwards　to　a　development　from　itself。　On　one　hand　this
development　only　means　that　thought　incorporates　the　contents　of　science；　in　all
their　speciality　of　detail　as　submitted。　On　the　other　it　makes　these　contents　imitate
the　action　of　the　original　creative　thought；　and　present　the　aspect　of　a　free
evolution　determined　by　the　logic　of　the　fact　alone。　

On　the　relation　between　'immediacy'　and　'mediation'　in　consciousness　we　shall
speak　later；　expressly　and　with　more　detail。　Here　it　may　be　sufficient　to　premise
that；　though　the　two　'moments'　or　factors　present　themselves　as　distinct；　still
neither　of　them　can　be　absent；　nor　can　one　exist　apart　from　the　other。　Thus　the
knowledge　of　God；　as　of　every　supersensible　reality；　is　in　its　true　character　an
exaltation　above　sensations　or　perceptions：　it　consequently　involves　a　negative
attitude　to　the　initial　data　of　sense；　and　to　that　extent　implies　mediation。　For　to
mediate　is　to　take　something　as　a　beginning　and　to　go　onward　to　a　second　thing；
so　that　the　existence　of　this　second　thing　depends　on　our　having　reached　it　from
something　else　contradistinguished　from　it。　In　spite　of　this；　the　knowledge　of　God
is　no　mere　sequel；　dependent　on　the　empirical　phase　of　consciousness：　in　fact；　its
independence　is　essentially　secured　through　this　negation　and　exaltation。　No
doubt；　if　we　attach　an　unfair　prominence　to　the　fact　of　mediation；　and　represent　it
as　implying　a　state　of　conditionedness；　it　may　be　said　…　not　that　the　remark　would
mean　much　…　that　philosophy　is　the　child　of　experience；　and　owes　its　rise　to　a
posteriori　fact。　（As　a　matter　of　fact；　thinking　is　always　the　negation　of　what　we
have　immediately　before　us。）　With　as　much　truth　however　we　may　be　said　to
owe　eating　to　the　means　of　nourishment；　so　long　as　we　can　have　no　eating
without　them。　If　we　take　this　view；　eating　is　certainly　represented　as　ungrateful：　it
devours　that　to　which　it　owes　itself。　Thinking；　upon　this　view　of　its　action；　is
equally　ungrateful。　

But　there　is　also　an　a　priori　aspect　of　thought；　where　by　a　mediation；　not　made
by　anything　external　but　by　a　reflection　into　self；　we　have　that　immediacy　which
is　universality；　the　selfcomplacency　of　thought　which　is　so　much　at　home　with
itself　that　it　feels　an　innate　indifference　to　descend　to　particulars；　and　in　that　way
to　the　development　of　its　own　nature。　It　is　thus　also　with　religion；　which　whether
it　be　rude　or　elaborate；　whether　it　be　invested　with　scientific　precision　of　detail　or
confined　to　the　simple　faith　of　the　heart；　possesses；　throughout；　the　same
intensive　nature　of　contentment　and　felicity。　But　if　thought　never　gets　further　than
the　universality　of　the　Ideas；　as　was　perforce　the　case　in　the　first　philosophies
（when　the　Eleatics　never　got　beyond　Being；　or　Heraclitus　beyond　Becoming）；　it　is
justly　open　to　the　charge　of　formalism。　Even　in　a　more　advanced　phase　of
philosophy；　we　may　often　find　a　doctrine　which　has　mastered　merely　certain
abstract　propositions　or　formulae；　such　as；　'In　the　absolute　all　is　one'；　

'Subject　and　object　are　identical'　…　and　only　repeating　the　same　thing　when　it
comes　to　particulars。　Bearing　in　mind　this　first　period　of　thought；　the　period　of
mere　generality；　we　may　safely　say　that　experience　is　the　real　author　of　growth
and　advance　in　philosophy。　For；　firstly；　the　empirical　sciences　do　not　stop　short　at
the　mere　observation　of　the　individual　features　of　a　phenomenon。　By　the　aid　of
thought；　they　are　able　to　meet　philosophy　with　materials　prepared　for　it；　in　the
shape　of　general　uniformities；　i。e。　laws；　and　classifications　of　the　phenomena。
When　this　is　done；　the　particular　facts　which　they　contain　are　ready　to　be
received　into　philosophy。　This；　secondly；　implies　a　certain　compulsion　on　thought
itself　to　proceed　to　these　concrete　specific　truths。　The　reception　into　philosophy
of　these　scientific　materials；　now　that　thought　has　removed　their　immediacy　and
made　them　cease　to　be　mere　data；　forms　at　the　same　time　a　development　of
thought　out　of　itself。　Philosophy；　then；　owes　its　development　to　the　empirical
sciences。　In　return　it　gives　their　contents　what　is　so　vital　to　them；　the　freedom　of
thought　…　gives　them；　in　short；　an　a　priori　character。　These　contents　are　now
warranted　necessary；　and