the critique of practical reason-第4章

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r　not。　The　former　would　be　hypothetical　imperatives；　and　contain　mere　precepts　of　skill；　the　latter；　on　the　contrary；　would　be　categorical；　and　would　alone　be　practical　laws。　Thus　maxims　are　principles；　but　not　imperatives。　Imperatives　themselves；　however；　when　they　are　conditional　（i。e。；　do　not　determine　the　will　simply　as　will；　but　only　in　respect　to　a　desired　effect；　that　is；　when　they　are　hypothetical　imperatives）；　are　practical　precepts　but　not　laws。　Laws　must　be　sufficient　to　determine　the　will　as　will；　even　before　I　ask　whether　I　have　power　sufficient　for　a　desired　effect；　or　the　means　necessary　to　produce　it；　hence　they　are　categorical：　otherwise　they　are　not　laws　at　all；　because　the　necessity　is　wanting；　which；　if　it　is　to　be　practical；　must　be　independent　of　conditions　which　are　pathological　and　are　therefore　only　contingently　connected　with　the　will。　Tell　a　man；　for　example；　that　he　must　be　industrious　and　thrifty　in　youth；　in　order　that　he　may　not　want　in　old　age；　this　is　a　correct　and　important　practical　precept　of　the　will。　But　it　is　easy　to　see　that　in　this　case　the　will　is　directed　to　something　else　which　it　is　presupposed　that　it　desires；　and　as　to　this　desire；　we　must　leave　it　to　the　actor　himself　whether　he　looks　forward　to　other　resources　than　those　of　his　own　acquisition；　or　does　not　expect　to　be　old；　or　thinks　that　in　case　of　future　necessity　he　will　be　able　to　make　shift　with　little。　Reason；　from　which　alone　can　spring　a　rule　involving　necessity；　does；　indeed；　give　necessity　to　this　precept　（else　it　would　not　be　an　imperative）；　but　this　is　a　necessity　dependent　on　subjective　conditions；　and　cannot　be　supposed　in　the　same　degree　in　all　subjects。　But　that　reason　may　give　laws　it　is　necessary　that　it　should　only　need　to　presuppose　itself；　because　rules　are　objectively　and　universally　valid　only　when　they　hold　without　any　contingent　subjective　conditions；　which　distinguish　one　rational　being　from　another。　Now　tell　a　man　that　he　should　never　make　a　deceitful　promise；　this　is　a　rule　which　only　concerns　his　will；　whether　the　purposes　he　may　have　can　be　attained　thereby　or　not；　it　is　the　volition　only　which　is　to　be　determined　a　priori　by　that　rule。　If　now　it　is　found　that　this　rule　is　practically　right；　then　it　is　a　law；　because　it　is　a　categorical　imperative。　Thus；　practical　laws　refer　to　the　will　only；　without　considering　what　is　attained　by　its　causality；　and　we　may　disregard　this　latter　（as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense）　in　order　to　have　them　quite　pure。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　THEOREM　I。

　　All　practical　principles　which　presuppose　an　object　（matter）　of　the　faculty　of　desire　as　the　ground　of　determination　of　the　will　are　empirical　and　can　furnish　no　practical　laws。　　　By　the　matter　of　the　faculty　of　desire　I　mean　an　object　the　realization　of　which　is　desired。　Now；　if　the　desire　for　this　object　precedes　the　practical　rule　and　is　the　condition　of　our　making　it　a　principle；　then　I　say　（in　the　first　place）　this　principle　is　in　that　case　wholly　empirical；　for　then　what　determines　the　choice　is　the　idea　of　an　object　and　that　relation　of　this　idea　to　the　subject　by　which　its　faculty　of　desire　is　determined　to　its　realization。　Such　a　relation　to　the　subject　is　called　the　pleasure　in　the　realization　of　an　object。　This；　then；　must　be　presupposed　as　a　condition　of　the　possibility　of　determination　of　the　will。　But　it　is　impossible　to　know　a　priori　of　any　idea　of　an　object　whether　it　will　be　connected　with　pleasure　or　pain；　or　be　indifferent。　In　such　cases；　therefore；　the　determining　principle　of　the　choice　must　be　empirical　and；　therefore；　also　the　practical　material　principle　which　presupposes　it　as　a　condition。　　　In　the　second　place；　since　susceptibility　to　a　pleasure　or　pain　can　be　known　only　empirically　and　cannot　hold　in　the　same　degree　for　all　rational　beings；　a　principle　which　is　based　on　this　subjective　condition　may　serve　indeed　as　a　maxim　for　the　subject　which　possesses　this　susceptibility；　but　not　as　a　law　even　to　him　（because　it　is　wanting　in　objective　necessity；　which　must　be　recognized　a　priori）；　it　follows；　therefore；　that　such　a　principle　can　never　furnish　a　practical　law。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　III。　THEOREM　II。

　　All　material　practical　principles　as　such　are　of　one　and　the　same　kind　and　come　under　the　general　principle　of　self…love　or　private　happiness。　　　Pleasure　arising　from　the　idea　of　the　idea　of　the　existence　of　a　thing；　in　so　far　as　it　is　to　determine　the　desire　of　this　thing；　is　founded　on　the　susceptibility　of　the　subject；　since　it　depends　on　the　presence　of　an　object；　hence　it　belongs　to　sense　（feeling）；　and　not　to　understanding；　which　expresses　a　relation　of　the　idea　to　an　object　according　to　concepts；　not　to　the　subject　according　to　feelings。　It　is；　then；　practical　only　in　so　far　as　the　faculty　of　desire　is　determined　by　the　sensation　of　agreeableness　which　the　subject　expects　from　the　actual　existence　of　the　object。　Now；　a　rational　being's　consciousness　of　the　pleasantness　of　life　uninterruptedly　accompanying　his　whole　existence　is　happiness；　and　the　principle　which　makes　this　the　supreme　ground　of　determination　of　the　will　is　the　principle　of　self…love。　All　material　principles；　then；　which　place　the　determining　ground　of　the　will　in　the　pleasure　or　pain　to　be　received　from　the　existence　of　any　object　are　all　of　the　same　kind；　inasmuch　as　they　all　belong　to　the　principle　of　self…love　or　private　happiness。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　COROLLARY。

　　All　material　practical　rules　place　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　in　the　lower　desires；　and　if　there　were　no　purely　formal　laws　of　the　will　adequate　to　determine　it；　then　we　could　not　admit　any　higher　desire　at　all。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK　I。

　　It　is　surprising　that　men；　otherwise　acute；　can　think　it　possible　to　distinguish　between　higher　and　lower　desires；　according　as　the　ideas　which　are　connected　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure　have　their　origin　in　the　senses　or　in　the　understanding；　for　when　we　inquire　what　are　the　determining　grounds　of　desire；　and　place　them　in　some　expected　pleasantness；　it　is　of　no　consequence　whence　the　idea　of　this　pleasing　object　is　derived；　but　only　how　much　it　pleases。　Whether　an　idea　has　its　seat　and　source　in　the　understanding　or　not；　if　it　can　only　determine　the　choice　by　presupposing　a　feeling　of　pleasure　in　the　subject；　it　follows　that　its　capability　of　determining　the　choice　depends　altogether　on　the　nature　of　the　inner　sense；　namely；　that　this　can　be　agreeably　affected　by　it。　However　dissimilar　ideas　of　objects　may　be；　though　they　be　ideas　of　the　understanding；　or　even　of　the　reason　in　contrast　to　ideas　of　sense；　yet　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　by　means　of　which　they　constitute　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　（the　expected　satisfaction　which　impels　the　activity　to　the　production　of　the　object）；　is　of　one　and　the　same　kind；　not　only　inasmuch　as　it　can　only　be　known　empirically；　but　also　inasmuch　as　it　affects　one　and　the　same　vital　force　which　manifests　itself　in　the　faculty　of　desire；　and　in　this　respect　can　only　differ　in　degree　from　every　other　ground　of　determination。　Otherwise；　how　could　we　compare　in　respect　of　magnitude　two　principles　of　determination；　the　ideas　of　which　depend　upon　different　faculties；　so　as　to　prefer　that　which　affects　the　faculty　of　desire　in　the　highest　degree。　The　same　man　may　return　unread　an　instructive　book　which　he　cannot　again　obtain；　in　order　not　to　miss　a　hunt；　he　may　depart　in　the　midst　of　a　fine　speech；　in　order　not　to　be　late　for　dinner；　he　may　leave　a　rational　conversation；　such　as　he　otherwise　values　highly；　to　take　his　place　at　the　gaming…table；　he　may　even　repulse　a　poor　man　whom　he　at　other　times　takes　pleasure　in　benefiting；　because　he　has　only　just　enough　money　in　his　pocket　to　pay　for　his　admission　to　the　theatre。　If　the　determination　of　his　will　rests　on　the　feeling　of　the　agreeableness　or　disagreeableness　that　he　expects　from　any　cause；　it　is　all　the　same　to　him　by　what　sort　of　ideas　he　will　be　affected。　The　only　thing　that　concerns　him；　in　order　to　decide　his　choice；　is；　how　great；　how　long　continued；　how　easily　obtained；　and　how　often　repeated；　this　agreeableness　is。　just　as　to　the　man　who　wants　money　to　spend；　it　is　all　the　same　whether　the　gold　was　dug　out　of　the　mountain　or　washed　out　of　the　sand；　provided　it　is　everywhere　accepted　at　the　same　value；　so　the　man　who　cares　only　for　the　enjoyment　of　life　does　not　ask　whether　the　ideas　are　of　the　understanding　or　the　senses；　but　only　how　much　and　how　great　pleasure　they　will　give　for　the　longest　time。　It　is　only　those　that　would　gladly　deny　to　pure　reason　the　power　of　determining　the　will；　without　the　presupposition　of　any　feeling；　who　could　deviate　so　far　from　their　own　exposition　as　to　describe　as　quite　heterogeneous　what　they　have　themselves　previously　brought　under　one　and　the　same　principle。　Thus；　for　example；　it　is　observed　that　we　can　find　pleasure　in　the　mere　exercise　of　power；　in　the　consciousness　of　our　strength　of　mind　in　overcoming　obstacles　which　are　opposed　to　our　designs；　in　the　culture　of　our　mental　talents；　etc。；　and　we　justly　call　these　more　refined　pleasures　and　enjoyments；　because　they　are　more　in　our　power　than　others；　they　do　not　wear　out；　but　rather　increase　the　capacity　for　further　enjoyment　of　them；　and　while　they　delight　they　at　the　same　time　cultivate。　But　to　say　on　this　account　that　they　determine　the　will　in　a　different　way　and　not　through　sense；　whereas　the　possibility　of　the　pleasure　presupposes　a　feeling　for　it　implanted　in　us；　which　is　the　first　condition　of　this　satisfaction；　this　is　just　as　when　ignorant　persons　that　like　to　dabble　in　metaphysics　imagine　matter　so　subtle；　so　supersubtle　that　they　almost　make　themselves　giddy　with　it；　and　then　think　that　in　this　way　they　have　conceived　it　as　a　spiritual　and　yet　extended　being。　If　with　Epicurus　we　make　virtue　determine　the　will　only　by　means　of　the　pleasure　it　promises；　we　cannot　afterwards　blame　him　for　holding　that　this　pleasure　is　of　the　same　kind　as　those　of　the　coarsest　senses。　For　we　have　no　reason　whatever　to　charge　him　with　holding　that　the　ideas　by　which　this　feeling　is　excited　in　us　belong　merely　to　the　bodily　senses。　As　far　as　can　be　conjectured；　he　sought　the　source　of　many　of　them　in　the　use　of　the　higher　cognitive　faculty；　but　this　did　not　prevent　him；　and　could　not　prevent　him；　from　holding　on　the　principle　above　stated；　that　the　pleasure　itself　which　those　intellectual　ideas　give　us；　and　by　which　alone　they　can　determine　the　will；　is　just　of　the　same　kind。　Consistency　is　the　highest　obligation　of　a　philosopher；　and　yet　the　most　rarely　found。　The　ancient　Greek　schools　give　us　more　examples　of　it　than　we　find　in　our　syncretistic　age；　in　which　a　certain　shallow　and　dishonest　system　of　compromise　of　contradictory　principles　is　devised；　because　it　commends　itself　better　to　a　public　which　is　content　to　know　something　of　everything　and　nothing　thoroughly；　so　as　to　please　every　party。　　　The　principle　of　private　happiness；　however　much　understanding　and　reason　may　be　used　in　it；　cannot　contain　any　other　determining　principles　for　the　will　than　those　which　belong　to　the　lower　desires；　and　either　there　are　no　＇higher＇　desires　at　all；　or　pure　reason　must　of　itself　alone　be　practical；　that　is；　it　must　be　able　to　d