the critique of practical reason-第29章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


all　the　parts　that　offer　themselves　to　our　nearer　knowledge；　it　is　just　the　same　in　all　the　rest；　and　that　it　would　therefore　be　reasonable　to　ascribe　all　possible　perfections　to　the　Author　of　the　world；　but　these　are　not　strict　logical　inferences　in　which　we　can　pride　ourselves　on　our　insight；　but　only　permitted　conclusions　in　which　we　may　be　indulged　and　which　require　further　recommendation　before　we　can　make　use　of　them。　On　the　path　of　empirical　inquiry　then　（physics）；　the　conception　of　God　remains　always　a　conception　of　the　perfection　of　the　First　Being　not　accurately　enough　determined　to　be　held　adequate　to　the　conception　of　Deity。　（With　metaphysic　in　its　transcendental　part　nothing　whatever　can　be　accomplished。）　　　When　I　now　try　to　test　this　conception　by　reference　to　the　object　of　practical　reason；　I　find　that　the　moral　principle　admits　as　possible　only　the　conception　of　an　Author　of　the　world　possessed　of　the　highest　perfection。　He　must　be　omniscient；　in　order　to　know　my　conduct　up　to　the　inmost　root　of　my　mental　state　in　all　possible　cases　and　into　all　future　time；　omnipotent；　in　order　to　allot　to　it　its　fitting　consequences；　similarly　He　must　be　omnipresent；　eternal；　etc。　Thus　the　moral　law；　by　means　of　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　as　the　object　of　a　pure　practical　reason；　determines　the　concept　of　the　First　Being　as　the　Supreme　Being；　a　thing　which　the　physical　（and　in　its　higher　development　the　metaphysical）；　in　other　words；　the　whole　speculative　course　of　reason；　was　unable　to　effect。　The　conception　of　God；　then；　is　one　that　belongs　originally　not　to　physics；　i。e。；　to　speculative　reason；　but　to　morals。　The　same　may　be　said　of　the　other　conceptions　of　reason　of　which　we　have　treated　above　as　postulates　of　it　in　its　practical　use。　　　In　the　history　of　Grecian　philosophy　we　find　no　distinct　traces　of　a　pure　rational　theology　earlier　than　Anaxagoras；　but　this　is　not　because　the　older　philosophers　had　not　intelligence　or　penetration　enough　to　raise　themselves　to　it　by　the　path　of　speculation；　at　least　with　the　aid　of　a　thoroughly　reasonable　hypothesis。　What　could　have　been　easier；　what　more　natural；　than　the　thought　which　of　itself　occurs　to　everyone；　to　assume　instead　of　several　causes　of　the　world；　instead　of　an　indeterminate　degree　of　perfection；　a　single　rational　cause　having　all　perfection？　But　the　evils　in　the　world　seemed　to　them　to　be　much　too　serious　objections　to　allow　them　to　feel　themselves　justified　in　such　a　hypothesis。　They　showed　intelligence　and　penetration　then　in　this　very　point；　that　they　did　not　allow　themselves　to　adopt　it；　but　on　the　contrary　looked　about　amongst　natural　causes　to　see　if　they　could　not　find　in　them　the　qualities　and　power　required　for　a　First　Being。　But　when　this　acute　people　had　advanced　so　far　in　their　investigations　of　nature　as　to　treat　even　moral　questions　philosophically；　on　which　other　nations　had　never　done　anything　but　talk；　then　first　they　found　a　new　and　practical　want；　which　did　not　fail　to　give　definiteness　to　their　conception　of　the　First　Being：　and　in　this　the　speculative　reason　played　the　part　of　spectator；　or　at　best　had　the　merit　of　embellishing　a　conception　that　had　not　grown　on　its　own　ground；　and　of　applying　a　series　of　confirmations　from　the　study　of　nature　now　brought　forward　for　the　first　time；　not　indeed　to　strengthen　the　authority　of　this　conception　（which　was　already　established）；　but　rather　to　make　a　show　with　a　supposed　discovery　of　theoretical　reason。

　　From　these　remarks；　the　reader　of　the　Critique　of　Pure　Speculative　Reason　will　be　thoroughly　convinced　how　highly　necessary　that　laborious　deduction　of　the　categories　was；　and　how　fruitful　for　theology　and　morals。　For　if；　on　the　one　hand；　we　place　them　in　pure　understanding；　it　is　by　this　deduction　alone　that　we　can　be　prevented　from　regarding　them；　with　Plato；　as　innate；　and　founding　on　them　extravagant　pretensions　to　theories　of　the　supersensible；　to　which　we　can　see　no　end；　and　by　which　we　should　make　theology　a　magic　lantern　of　chimeras；　on　the　other　hand；　if　we　regard　them　as　acquired；　this　deduction　saves　us　from　restricting；　with　Epicurus；　all　and　every　use　of　them；　even　for　practical　purposes；　to　the　objects　and　motives　of　the　senses。　But　now　that　the　Critique　has　shown　by　that　deduction；　first；　that　they　are　not　of　empirical　origin；　but　have　their　seat　and　source　a　priori　in　the　pure　understanding；　secondly；　that　as　they　refer　to　objects　in　general　independently　of　the　intuition　of　them；　hence；　although　they　cannot　effect　theoretical　knowledge；　except　in　application　to　empirical　objects；　yet　when　applied　to　an　object　given　by　pure　practical　reason　they　enable　us　to　conceive　the　supersensible　definitely；　only　so　far；　however；　as　it　is　defined　by　such　predicates　as　are　necessarily　connected　with　the　pure　practical　purpose　given　a　priori　and　with　its　possibility。　The　speculative　restriction　of　pure　reason　and　its　practical　extension　bring　it　into　that　relation　of　equality　in　which　reason　in　general　can　be　employed　suitably　to　its　end；　and　this　example　proves　better　than　any　other　that　the　path　to　wisdom；　if　it　is　to　be　made　sure　and　not　to　be　impassable　or　misleading；　must　with　us　men　inevitably　pass　through　science；　but　it　is　not　till　this　is　complete　that　we　can　be　convinced　that　it　leads　to　this　goal。

　　　　　　VIII。　Of　Belief　from　a　Requirement　of　Pure　Reason。

　　A　want　or　requirement　of　pure　reason　in　its　speculative　use　leads　only　to　a　hypothesis；　that　of　pure　practical　reason　to　a　postulate；　for　in　the　former　case　I　ascend　from　the　result　as　high　as　I　please　in　the　series　of　causes；　not　in　order　to　give　objective　reality　to　the　result　（e。g。；　the　causal　connection　of　things　and　changes　in　the　world）；　but　in　order　thoroughly　to　satisfy　my　inquiring　reason　in　respect　of　it。　Thus　I　see　before　me　order　and　design　in　nature；　and　need　not　resort　to　speculation　to　assure　myself　of　their　reality；　but　to　explain　them　I　have　to　presuppose　a　Deity　as　their　cause；　and　then　since　the　inference　from　an　effect　to　a　definite　cause　is　always　uncertain　and　doubtful；　especially　to　a　cause　so　precise　and　so　perfectly　defined　as　we　have　to　conceive　in　God；　hence　the　highest　degree　of　certainty　to　which　this　pre…supposition　can　be　brought　is　that　it　is　the　most　rational　opinion　for　us　men。*　On　the　other　hand；　a　requirement　of　pure　practical　reason　is　based　on　a　duty；　that　of　making　something　（the　summum　bonum）　the　object　of　my　will　so　as　to　promote　it　with　all　my　powers；　in　which　case　I　must　suppose　its　possibility　and；　consequently；　also　the　conditions　necessary　thereto；　namely；　God；　freedom；　and　immortality；　since　I　cannot　prove　these　by　my　speculative　reason；　although　neither　can　I　refute　them。　This　duty　is　founded　on　something　that　is　indeed　quite　independent　of　these　suppositions　and　is　of　itself　apodeictically　certain；　namely；　the　moral　law；　and　so　far　it　needs　no　further　support　by　theoretical　views　as　to　the　inner　constitution　of　things；　the　secret　final　aim　of　the　order　of　the　world；　or　a　presiding　ruler　thereof；　in　order　to　bind　me　in　the　most　perfect　manner　to　act　in　unconditional　conformity　to　the　law。　But　the　subjective　effect　of　this　law；　namely；　the　mental　disposition　conformed　to　it　and　made　necessary　by　it；　to　promote　the　practically　possible　summum　bonum；　this　pre…supposes　at　least　that　the　latter　is　possible；　for　it　would　be　practically　impossible　to　strive　after　the　object　of　a　conception　which　at　bottom　was　empty　and　had　no　object。　Now　the　above…mentioned　postulates　concern　only　the　physical　or　metaphysical　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　in　a　word；　those　which　lie　in　the　nature　of　things；　not；　however；　for　the　sake　of　an　arbitrary　speculative　purpose；　but　of　a　practically　necessary　end　of　a　pure　rational　will；　which　in　this　case　does　not　choose；　but　obeys　an　inexorable　command　of　reason；　the　foundation　of　which　is　objective；　in　the　constitution　of　things　as　they　must　be　universally　judged　by　pure　reason；　and　is　not　based　on　inclination；　for　we　are　in　nowise　justified　in　assuming；　on　account　of　what　we　wish　on　merely　subjective　grounds；　that　the　means　thereto　are　possible　or　that　its　object　is　real。　This；　then；　is　an　absolutely　necessary　requirement；　and　what　it　pre…supposes　is　not　merely　justified　as　an　allowable　hypothesis；　but　as　a　postulate　in　a　practical　point　of　view；　and　admitting　that　the　pure　moral　law　inexorably　binds　every　man　as　a　command　（not　as　a　rule　of　prudence）；　the　righteous　man　may　say：　〃I　will　that　there　be　a　God；　that　my　existence　in　this　world　be　also　an　existence　outside　the　chain　of　physical　causes　and　in　a　pure　world　of　the　understanding；　and　lastly；　that　my　duration　be　endless；　I　firmly　abide　by　this；　and　will　not　let　this　faith　be　taken　from　me；　for　in　this　instance　alone　my　interest；　because　I　must　not　relax　anything　of　it；　inevitably　determines　my　judgement；　without　regarding　sophistries；　however　unable　I　may　be　to　answer　them　or　to　oppose　them　with　others　more　plausible。*＇2＇

　　*But　even　here　we　should　not　be　able　to　allege　a　requirement　of　reason；　if　we　had　not　before　our　eyes　a　problematical；　but　yet　inevitable；　conception　of　reason；　namely；　that　of　an　absolutely　necessary　being。　This　conception　now　seeks　to　be　defined；　and　this；　in　addition　to　the　tendency　to　extend　itself；　is　the　objective　ground　of　a　requirement　of　speculative　reason；　namely；　to　have　a　more　precise　definition　of　the　conception　of　a　necessary　being　which　is　to　serve　as　the　first　cause　of　other　beings；　so　as　to　make　these　latter　knowable　by　some　means。　Without　such　antecedent　necessary　problems　there　are　no　requirements…　at　least　not　of　pure　reason…　the　rest　are　requirements　of　inclination。　　　*＇2＇　In　the　Deutsches　Museum；　February；　1787；　there　is　a　dissertation　by　a　very　subtle　and　clear…headed　man；　the　late　Wizenmann；　whose　early　death　is　to　be　lamented；　in　which　he　disputes　the　right　to　argue　from　a　want　to　the　objective　reality　of　its　object；　and　illustrates　the　point　by　the　example　of　a　man　in　love；　who　having　fooled　himself　into　an　idea　of　beauty；　which　is　merely　a　chimera　of　his　own　brain；　would　fain　conclude　that　such　an　object　really　exists　somewhere。　I　quite　agree　with　him　in　this；　in　all　cases　where　the　want　is　founded　on　inclination；　which　cannot　necessarily　postulate　the　existence　of　its　object　even　for　the　man　that　is　affected　by　it；　much　less　can　it　contain　a　demand　valid　for　everyone；　and　therefore　it　is　merely　a　subjective　ground　of　the　wish。　But　in　the　present　case　we　have　a　want　of　reason　springing　from　an　objective　determining　principle　of　the　will；　namely；　the　moral　law；　which　necessarily　binds　every　rational　being；　and　therefore　justifies　him　in　assuming　a　priori　in　nature　the　conditions　proper　for　it；　and　makes　the　latter　inseparable　from　the　complete　practical　use　of　reason。　It　is　a　duty　to　realize　the　summum　bonum　to　the　utmost　of　our　power；　therefore　it　must　be　possible；　consequently　it　is　unavoidable　for　every　rational　being　in　the　world　to　assume　what　is　necessary　for　its　objective　possibility。　The　assumption　is　as　necessary　as　the　moral　law；　in　connection　with　which　alone　it　is　valid。

　　In　order　to　prevent　misconception　in　the　use　of　a　notion　as　yet　so　unusual　as　that　of　a　faith　of　pure　practical　reason；　let　me　be　permitted　to　add　one　more　remark。　It