the critique of practical reason-第26章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


t；　and　not　objective；　that　is；　itself　a　duty；　for　there　cannot　be　a　duty　to　suppose　the　existence　of　anything　（since　this　concerns　only　the　theoretical　employment　of　reason）。　Moreover；　it　is　not　meant　by　this　that　it　is　necessary　to　suppose　the　existence　of　God　as　a　basis　of　all　obligation　in　general　（for　this　rests；　as　has　been　sufficiently　proved；　simply　on　the　autonomy　of　reason　itself）。　What　belongs　to　duty　here　is　only　the　endeavour　to　realize　and　promote　the　summum　bonum　in　the　world；　the　possibility　of　which　can　therefore　be　postulated；　and　as　our　reason　finds　it　not　conceivable　except　on　the　supposition　of　a　supreme　intelligence；　the　admission　of　this　existence　is　therefore　connected　with　the　consciousness　of　our　duty；　although　the　admission　itself　belongs　to　the　domain　of　speculative　reason。　Considered　in　respect　of　this　alone；　as　a　principle　of　explanation；　it　may　be　called　a　hypothesis；　but　in　reference　to　the　intelligibility　of　an　object　given　us　by　the　moral　law　（the　summum　bonum）；　and　consequently　of　a　requirement　for　practical　purposes；　it　may　be　called　faith；　that　is　to　say　a　pure　rational　faith；　since　pure　reason　（both　in　its　theoretical　and　practical　use）　is　the　sole　source　from　which　it　springs。　　　From　this　deduction　it　is　now　intelligible　why　the　Greek　schools　could　never　attain　the　solution　of　their　problem　of　the　practical　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　because　they　made　the　rule　of　the　use　which　the　will　of　man　makes　of　his　freedom　the　sole　and　sufficient　ground　of　this　possibility；　thinking　that　they　had　no　need　for　that　purpose　of　the　existence　of　God。　No　doubt　they　were　so　far　right　that　they　established　the　principle　of　morals　of　itself　independently　of　this　postulate；　from　the　relation　of　reason　only　to　the　will；　and　consequently　made　it　the　supreme　practical　condition　of　the　summum　bonum；　but　it　was　not　therefore　the　whole　condition　of　its　possibility。　The　Epicureans　had　indeed　assumed　as　the　supreme　principle　of　morality　a　wholly　false　one；　namely　that　of　happiness；　and　had　substituted　for　a　law　a　maxim　of　arbitrary　choice　according　to　every　man's　inclination；　they　proceeded；　however；　consistently　enough　in　this；　that　they　degraded　their　summum　bonum　likewise；　just　in　proportion　to　the　meanness　of　their　fundamental　principle；　and　looked　for　no　greater　happiness　than　can　be　attained　by　human　prudence　（including　temperance　and　moderation　of　the　inclinations）；　and　this　as　we　know　would　be　scanty　enough　and　would　be　very　different　according　to　circumstances；　not　to　mention　the　exceptions　that　their　maxims　must　perpetually　admit　and　which　make　them　incapable　of　being　laws。　The　Stoics；　on　the　contrary；　had　chosen　their　supreme　practical　principle　quite　rightly；　making　virtue　the　condition　of　the　summum　bonum；　but　when　they　represented　the　degree　of　virtue　required　by　its　pure　law　as　fully　attainable　in　this　life；　they　not　only　strained　the　moral　powers　of　the　man　whom　they　called　the　wise　beyond　all　the　limits　of　his　nature；　and　assumed　a　thing　that　contradicts　all　our　knowledge　of　men；　but　also　and　principally　they　would　not　allow　the　second　element　of　the　summum　bonum；　namely；　happiness；　to　be　properly　a　special　object　of　human　desire；　but　made　their　wise　man；　like　a　divinity　in　his　consciousness　of　the　excellence　of　his　person；　wholly　independent　of　nature　（as　regards　his　own　contentment）；　they　exposed　him　indeed　to　the　evils　of　life；　but　made　him　not　subject　to　them　（at　the　same　time　representing　him　also　as　free　from　moral　evil）。　They　thus；　in　fact；　left　out　the　second　element　of　the　summum　bonum　namely；　personal　happiness；　placing　it　solely　in　action　and　satisfaction　with　one's　own　personal　worth；　thus　including　it　in　the　consciousness　of　being　morally　minded；　in　which　they　Might　have　been　sufficiently　refuted　by　the　voice　of　their　own　nature。　　　The　doctrine　of　Christianity；*　even　if　we　do　not　yet　consider　it　as　a　religious　doctrine；　gives；　touching　this　point；　a　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　（the　kingdom　of　God）；　which　alone　satisfies　the　strictest　demand　of　practical　reason。　The　moral　law　is　holy　（unyielding）　and　demands　holiness　of　morals；　although　all　the　moral　perfection　to　which　man　can　attain　is　still　only　virtue；　that　is；　a　rightful　disposition　arising　from　respect　for　the　law；　implying　consciousness　of　a　constant　propensity　to　transgression；　or　at　least　a　want　of　purity；　that　is；　a　mixture　of　many　spurious　（not　moral）　motives　of　obedience　to　the　law；　consequently　a　self…esteem　combined　with　humility。　In　respect；　then；　of　the　holiness　which　the　Christian　law　requires；　this　leaves　the　creature　nothing　but　a　progress　in　infinitum；　but　for　that　very　reason　it　justifies　him　in　hoping　for　an　endless　duration　of　his　existence。　The　worth　of　a　character　perfectly　accordant　with　the　moral　law　is　infinite；　since　the　only　restriction　on　all　possible　happiness　in　the　judgement　of　a　wise　and　all　powerful　distributor　of　it　is　the　absence　of　conformity　of　rational　beings　to　their　duty。　But　the　moral　law　of　itself　does　not　promise　any　happiness；　for　according　to　our　conceptions　of　an　order　of　nature　in　general；　this　is　not　necessarily　connected　with　obedience　to　the　law。　Now　Christian　morality　supplies　this　defect　（of　the　second　indispensable　element　of　the　summum　bonum）　by　representing　the　world　in　which　rational　beings　devote　themselves　with　all　their　soul　to　the　moral　law；　as　a　kingdom　of　God；　in　which　nature　and　morality　are　brought　into　a　harmony　foreign　to　each　of　itself；　by　a　holy　Author　who　makes　the　derived　summum　bonum　possible。　Holiness　of　life　is　prescribed　to　them　as　a　rule　even　in　this　life；　while　the　welfare　proportioned　to　it；　namely；　bliss；　is　represented　as　attainable　only　in　an　eternity；　because　the　former　must　always　be　the　pattern　of　their　conduct　in　every　state；　and　progress　towards　it　is　already　possible　and　necessary　in　this　life；　while　the　latter；　under　the　name　of　happiness；　cannot　be　attained　at　all　in　this　world　（so　far　as　our　own　power　is　concerned）；　and　therefore　is　made　simply　an　object　of　hope。　Nevertheless；　the　Christian　principle　of　morality　itself　is　not　theological　（so　as　to　be　heteronomy）；　but　is　autonomy　of　pure　practical　reason；　since　it　does　not　make　the　knowledge　of　God　and　His　will　the　foundation　of　these　laws；　but　only　of　the　attainment　of　the　summum　bonum；　on　condition　of　following　these　laws；　and　it　does　not　even　place　the　proper　spring　of　this　obedience　in　the　desired　results；　but　solely　in　the　conception　of　duty；　as　that　of　which　the　faithful　observance　alone　constitutes　the　worthiness　to　obtain　those　happy　consequences。

　　*It　is　commonly　held　that　the　Christian　precept　of　morality　has　no　advantage　in　respect　of　purity　over　the　moral　conceptions　of　the　Stoics；　the　distinction　between　them　is；　however；　very　obvious。　The　Stoic　system　made　the　consciousness　of　strength　of　mind　the　pivot　on　which　all　moral　dispositions　should　turn；　and　although　its　disciples　spoke　of　duties　and　even　defined　them　very　well；　yet　they　placed　the　spring　and　proper　determining　principle　of　the　will　in　an　elevation　of　the　mind　above　the　lower　springs　of　the　senses；　which　owe　their　power　only　to　weakness　of　mind。　With　them　therefore；　virtue　was　a　sort　of　heroism　in　the　wise　man　raising　himself　above　the　animal　nature　of　man；　is　sufficient　for　Himself；　and；　while　he　prescribes　duties　to　others；　is　himself　raised　above　them；　and　is　not　subject　to　any　temptation　to　transgress　the　moral　law。　All　this；　however；　they　could　not　have　done　if　they　had　conceived　this　law　in　all　its　purity　and　strictness；　as　the　precept　of　the　Gospel　does。　When　I　give　the　name　idea　to　a　perfection　to　which　nothing　adequate　can　be　given　in　experience；　it　does　not　follow　that　the　moral　ideas　are　thing　transcendent；　that　is　something　of　which　we　could　not　even　determine　the　concept　adequately；　or　of　which　it　is　uncertain　whether　there　is　any　object　corresponding　to　it　at　all；　as　is　the　case　with　the　ideas　of　speculative　reason；　on　the　contrary；　being　types　of　practical　perfection；　they　serve　as　the　indispensable　rule　of　conduct　and　likewise　as　the　standard　of　comparison。　Now　if　I　consider　Christian　morals　on　their　philosophical　side；　then　compared　with　the　ideas　of　the　Greek　schools；　they　would　appear　as　follows：　the　ideas　of　the　Cynics；　the　Epicureans；　the　Stoics；　and　the　Christians　are：　simplicity　of　nature；　prudence；　wisdom；　and　holiness。　In　respect　of　the　way　of　attaining　them；　the　Greek　schools　were　distinguished　from　one　another　thus　that　the　Cynics　only　required　common　sense；　the　others　the　path　of　science；　but　both　found　the　mere　use　of　natural　powers　sufficient　for　the　purpose。　Christian　morality；　because　its　precept　is　framed　（as　a　moral　precept　must　be）　so　pure　and　unyielding；　takes　from　man　all　confidence　that　be　can　be　fully　adequate　to　it；　at　least　in　this　life；　but　again　sets　it　up　by　enabling　us　to　hope　that　if　we　act　as　well　as　it　is　in　our　power　to　do；　then　what　is　not　in　our　power　will　come　in　to　our　aid　from　another　source；　whether　we　know　how　this　may　be　or　not。　Aristotle　and　Plato　differed　only　as　to　the　origin　of　our　moral　conceptions。

　　In　this　manner；　the　moral　laws　lead　through　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　as　the　object　and　final　end　of　pure　practical　reason　to　religion；　that　is；　to　the　recognition　of　all　duties　as　divine　commands；　not　as　sanctions；　that　is　to　say；　arbitrary　ordinances　of　a　foreign　and　contingent　in　themselves；　but　as　essential　laws　of　every　free　will　in　itself；　which；　nevertheless；　must　be　regarded　as　commands　of　the　Supreme　Being；　because　it　is　only　from　a　morally　perfect　（holy　and　good）　and　at　the　same　time　all…powerful　will；　and　consequently　only　through　harmony　with　this　will；　that　we　can　hope　to　attain　the　summum　bonum　which　the　moral　law　makes　it　our　duty　to　take　as　the　object　of　our　endeavours。　Here　again；　then；　all　remains　disinterested　and　founded　merely　on　duty；　neither　fear　nor　hope　being　made　the　fundamental　springs；　which　if　taken　as　principles　would　destroy　the　whole　moral　worth　of　actions。　The　moral　law　commands　me　to　make　the　highest　possible　good　in　a　world　the　ultimate　object　of　all　my　conduct。　But　I　cannot　hope　to　effect　this　otherwise　than　by　the　harmony　of　my　will　with　that　of　a　holy　and　good　Author　of　the　world；　and　although　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　as　a　whole；　in　which　the　greatest　happiness　is　conceived　as　combined　in　the　most　exact　proportion　with　the　highest　degree　of　moral　perfection　（possible　in　creatures）；　includes　my　own　happiness；　yet　it　is　not　this　that　is　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　which　is　enjoined　to　promote　the　summum　bonum；　but　the　moral　law；　which；　on　the　contrary；　limits　by　strict　conditions　my　unbounded　desire　of　happiness。　　　Hence　also　morality　is　not　properly　the　doctrine　how　we　should　make　ourselves　happy；　but　how　we　should　become　worthy　of　happiness。　It　is　only　when　religion　is　added　that　there　also　comes　in　the　hope　of　participating　some　day　in　happiness　in　proportion　as　we　have　endeavoured　to　be　not　unworthy　of　it。　　　A　man　is　worthy　to　possess　a　thing　or　a　state　when　his　possession　of　it　is　in　harmony　with　the　summum　bonum。　We　can　now　easily　see　that　all　worthiness　depends　on　moral　conduct；　since　in　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　this　constitutes　the　condition　of　the　rest　（which　belongs　to　one's　state）；　namel