the critique of practical reason-第24章

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ghtness；　since　with　such　a　character　the　reproach　that　his　habit　of　thought　would　oblige　him　to　make　against　himself　in　case　of　transgression　and　his　moral　self…condemnation　would　rob　him　of　all　enjoyment　of　the　pleasantness　which　his　condition　might　otherwise　contain）。　But　the　question　is：　How　is　such　a　disposition　possible　in　the　first　instance；　and　such　a　habit　of　thought　in　estimating　the　worth　of　one's　existence；　since　prior　to　it　there　can　be　in　the　subject　no　feeling　at　all　for　moral　worth？　If　a　man　is　virtuous　without　being　conscious　of　his　integrity　in　every　action；　he　will　certainly　not　enjoy　life；　however　favourable　fortune　may　be　to　him　in　its　physical　circumstances；　but　can　we　make　him　virtuous　in　the　first　instance；　in　other　words；　before　he　esteems　the　moral　worth　of　his　existence　so　highly；　by　praising　to　him　the　peace　of　mind　that　would　result　from　the　consciousness　of　an　integrity　for　which　he　has　no　sense？　　　On　the　other　hand；　however；　there　is　here　an　occasion　of　a　vitium　subreptionis；　and　as　it　were　of　an　optical　illusion；　in　the　self…consciousness　of　what　one　does　as　distinguished　from　what　one　feels…　an　illusion　which　even　the　most　experienced　cannot　altogether　avoid。　The　moral　disposition　of　mind　is　necessarily　combined　with　a　consciousness　that　the　will　is　determined　directly　by　the　law。　Now　the　consciousness　of　a　determination　of　the　faculty　of　desire　is　always　the　source　of　a　satisfaction　in　the　resulting　action；　but　this　pleasure；　this　satisfaction　in　oneself；　is　not　the　determining　principle　of　the　action；　on　the　contrary；　the　determination　of　the　will　directly　by　reason　is　the　source　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　and　this　remains　a　pure　practical　not　sensible　determination　of　the　faculty　of　desire。　Now　as　this　determination　has　exactly　the　same　effect　within　in　impelling　to　activity；　that　a　feeling　of　the　pleasure　to　be　expected　from　the　desired　action　would　have　had；　we　easily　look　on　what　we　ourselves　do　as　something　which　we　merely　passively　feel；　and　take　the　moral　spring　for　a　sensible　impulse；　just　as　it　happens　in　the　so…called　illusion　of　the　senses　（in　this　case　the　inner　sense）。　It　is　a　sublime　thing　in　human　nature　to　be　determined　to　actions　immediately　by　a　purely　rational　law；　sublime　even　is　the　illusion　that　regards　the　subjective　side　of　this　capacity　of　intellectual　determination　as　something　sensible　and　the　effect　of　a　special　sensible　feeling　（for　an　intellectual　feeling　would　be　a　contradiction）。　It　is　also　of　great　importance　to　attend　to　this　property　of　our　personality　and　as　much　as　possible　to　cultivate　the　effect　of　reason　on　this　feeling。　But　we　must　beware　lest　by　falsely　extolling　this　moral　determining　principle　as　a　spring；　making　its　source　lie　in　particular　feelings　of　pleasure　（which　are　in　fact　only　results）；　we　degrade　and　disfigure　the　true　genuine　spring；　the　law　itself；　by　putting　as　it　were　a　false　foil　upon　it。　Respect；　not　pleasure　or　enjoyment　of　happiness；　is　something　for　which　it　is　not　possible　that　reason　should　have　any　antecedent　feeling　as　its　foundation　（for　this　would　always　be　sensible　and　pathological）；　and　consciousness　of　immediate　obligation　of　the　will　by　the　law　is　by　no　means　analogous　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　although　in　relation　to　the　faculty　of　desire　it　produces　the　same　effect；　but　from　different　sources：　it　is　only　by　this　mode　of　conception；　however；　that　we　can　attain　what　we　are　seeking；　namely；　that　actions　be　done　not　merely　in　accordance　with　duty　（as　a　result　of　pleasant　feelings）；　but　from　duty；　which　must　be　the　true　end　of　all　moral　cultivation。　　　Have　we　not；　however；　a　word　which　does　not　express　enjoyment；　as　happiness　does；　but　indicates　a　satisfaction　in　one's　existence；　an　analogue　of　the　happiness　which　must　necessarily　accompany　the　consciousness　of　virtue？　Yes　this　word　is　self…contentment　which　in　its　proper　signification　always　designates　only　a　negative　satisfaction　in　one's　existence；　in　which　one　is　conscious　of　needing　nothing。　Freedom　and　the　consciousness　of　it　as　a　faculty　of　following　the　moral　law　with　unyielding　resolution　is　independence　of　inclinations；　at　least　as　motives　determining　（though　not　as　affecting）　our　desire；　and　so　far　as　I　am　conscious　of　this　freedom　in　following　my　moral　maxims；　it　is　the　only　source　of　an　unaltered　contentment　which　is　necessarily　connected　with　it　and　rests　on　no　special　feeling。　This　may　be　called　intellectual　contentment。　The　sensible　contentment　（improperly　so…called）　which　rests　on　the　satisfaction　of　the　inclinations；　however　delicate　they　may　be　imagined　to　be；　can　never　be　adequate　to　the　conception　of　it。　For　the　inclinations　change；　they　grow　with　the　indulgence　shown　them；　and　always　leave　behind　a　still　greater　void　than　we　had　thought　to　fill。　Hence　they　are　always　burdensome　to　a　rational　being；　and；　although　he　cannot　lay　them　aside；　they　wrest　from　him　the　wish　to　be　rid　of　them。　Even　an　inclination　to　what　is　right　（e。g。；　to　beneficence）；　though　it　may　much　facilitate　the　efficacy　of　the　moral　maxims；　cannot　produce　any。　For　in　these　all　must　be　directed　to　the　conception　of　the　law　as　a　determining　principle；　if　the　action　is　to　contain　morality　and　not　merely　legality。　Inclination　is　blind　and　slavish；　whether　it　be　of　a　good　sort　or　not；　and；　when　morality　is　in　question；　reason　must　not　play　the　part　merely　of　guardian　to　inclination；　but　disregarding　it　altogether　must　attend　simply　to　its　own　interest　as　pure　practical　reason。　This　very　feeling　of　compassion　and　tender　sympathy；　if　it　precedes　the　deliberation　on　the　question　of　duty　and　becomes　a　determining　principle；　is　even　annoying　to　right　thinking　persons；　brings　their　deliberate　maxims　into　confusion；　and　makes　them　wish　to　be　delivered　from　it　and　to　be　subject　to　lawgiving　reason　alone。　　　From　this　we　can　understand　how　the　consciousness　of　this　faculty　of　a　pure　practical　reason　produces　by　action　（virtue）　a　consciousness　of　mastery　over　one's　inclinations；　and　therefore　of　independence　of　them；　and　consequently　also　of　the　discontent　that　always　accompanies　them；　and　thus　a　negative　satisfaction　with　one's　state；　i。e。；　contentment；　which　is　primarily　contentment　with　one's　own　person。　Freedom　itself　becomes　in　this　way　（namely；　indirectly）　capable　of　an　enjoyment　which　cannot　be　called　happiness；　because　it　does　not　depend　on　the　positive　concurrence　of　a　feeling；　nor　is　it；　strictly　speaking；　bliss；　since　it　does　not　include　complete　independence　of　inclinations　and　wants；　but　it　resembles　bliss　in　so　far　as　the　determination　of　one's　will　at　least　can　hold　itself　free　from　their　influence；　and　thus；　at　least　in　its　origin；　this　enjoyment　is　analogous　to　the　self…sufficiency　which　we　can　ascribe　only　to　the　Supreme　Being。　　　From　this　solution　of　the　antinomy　of　practical　pure　reason；　it　follows　that　in　practical　principles　we　may　at　least　conceive　as　possible　a　natural　and　necessary　connection　between　the　consciousness　of　morality　and　the　expectation　of　a　proportionate　happiness　as　its　result；　though　it　does　not　follow　that　we　can　know　or　perceive　this　connection；　that；　on　the　other　hand；　principles　of　the　pursuit　of　happiness　cannot　possibly　produce　morality；　that；　therefore；　morality　is　the　supreme　good　（as　the　first　condition　of　the　summum　bonum）；　while　happiness　constitutes　its　second　element；　but　only　in　such　a　way　that　it　is　the　morally　conditioned；　but　necessary　consequence　of　the　former。　Only　with　this　subordination　is　the　summum　bonum　the　whole　object　of　pure　practical　reason；　which　must　necessarily　conceive　it　as　possible；　since　it　commands　us　to　contribute　to　the　utmost　of　our　power　to　its　realization。　But　since　the　possibility　of　such　connection　of　the　conditioned　with　its　condition　belongs　wholly　to　the　supersensual　relation　of　things　and　cannot　be　given　according　to　the　laws　of　the　world　of　sense；　although　the　practical　consequences　of　the　idea　belong　to　the　world　of　sense；　namely；　the　actions　that　aim　at　realizing　the　summum　bonum；　we　will　therefore　endeavour　to　set　forth　the　grounds　of　that　possibility；　first；　in　respect　of　what　is　immediately　in　our　power；　and　then；　secondly；　in　that　which　is　not　in　our　power；　but　which　reason　presents　to　us　as　the　supplement　of　our　impotence；　for　the　realization　of　the　summum　bonum　（which　by　practical　principles　is　necessary）。

　　　　III。　Of　the　Primacy　of　Pure　Practical　Reason　in　its　　　　　　　　　　　　Union　with　the　Speculative　Reason。

　　By　primacy　between　two　or　more　things　connected　by　reason；　I　understand　the　prerogative；　belonging　to　one；　of　being　the　first　determining　principle　in　the　connection　with　all　the　rest。　In　a　narrower　practical　sense　it　means　the　prerogative　of　the　interest　of　one　in　so　far　as　the　interest　of　the　other　is　subordinated　to　it；　while　it　is　not　postponed　to　any　other。　To　every　faculty　of　the　mind　we　can　attribute　an　interest；　that　is；　a　principle；　that　contains　the　condition　on　which　alone　the　former　is　called　into　exercise。　Reason；　as　the　faculty　of　principles；　determines　the　interest　of　all　the　powers　of　the　mind　and　is　determined　by　its　own。　The　interest　of　its　speculative　employment　consists　in　the　cognition　of　the　object　pushed　to　the　highest　a　priori　principles：　that　of　its　practical　employment；　in　the　determination　of　the　will　in　respect　of　the　final　and　complete　end。　As　to　what　is　necessary　for　the　possibility　of　any　employment　of　reason　at　all；　namely；　that　its　principles　and　affirmations　should　not　contradict　one　another；　this　constitutes　no　part　of　its　interest；　but　is　the　condition　of　having　reason　at　all；　it　is　only　its　development；　not　mere　consistency　with　itself；　that　is　reckoned　as　its　interest。　　　If　practical　reason　could　not　assume　or　think　as　given　anything　further　than　what　speculative　reason　of　itself　could　offer　it　from　its　own　insight；　the　latter　would　have　the　primacy。　But　supposing　that　it　had　of　itself　original　a　priori　principles　with　which　certain　theoretical　positions　were　inseparably　connected；　while　these　were　withdrawn　from　any　possible　insight　of　speculative　reason　（which；　however；　they　must　not　contradict）；　then　the　question　is：　Which　interest　is　the　superior　（not　which　must　give　way；　for　they　are　not　necessarily　conflicting）；　whether　speculative　reason；　which　knows　nothing　of　all　that　the　practical　offers　for　its　acceptance；　should　take　up　these　propositions　and　（although　they　transcend　it）　try　to　unite　them　with　its　own　concepts　as　a　foreign　possession　handed　over　to　it；　or　whether　it　is　justified　in　obstinately　following　its　own　separate　interest　and；　according　to　the　canonic　of　Epicurus；　rejecting　as　vain　subtlety　everything　that　cannot　accredit　its　objective　reality　by　manifest　examples　to　be　shown　in　experience；　even　though　it　should　be　never　so　much　interwoven　with　the　interest　of　the　practical　（pure）　use　of　reason；　and　in　itself　not　contradictory　to　the　theoretical；　merely　because　it　infringes　on　the　interest　of　the　speculative　reason　to　this　extent；　that　it　removes　the　bounds　which　this　latter　had　set　to　itself；　and　gives　it　up　to　every　nonsense　or　delusion　of　imagination？　　　In　fact；　so　far　as　practical　reason　is　taken　as　dependent　on　pathological　conditions；　that　is；　as　merely　regulating　the　inclinations　under　the　sensible　principle　of　happiness；　we　could　not　require　speculat