the critique of practical reason-第17章

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idence　of　our　will　with　the　pure　moral　law　becoming　as　it　were　part　of　our　nature；　never　to　be　shaken　（in　which　case　the　law　would　cease　to　be　a　command　for　us；　as　we　could　never　be　tempted　to　be　untrue　to　it）。　　　The　moral　law　is　in　fact　for　the　will　of　a　perfect　being　a　law　of　holiness；　but　for　the　will　of　every　finite　rational　being　a　law　of　duty；　of　moral　constraint；　and　of　the　determination　of　its　actions　by　respect　for　this　law　and　reverence　for　its　duty。　No　other　subjective　principle　must　be　assumed　as　a　motive；　else　while　the　action　might　chance　to　be　such　as　the　law　prescribes；　yet；　as　does　not　proceed　from　duty；　the　intention；　which　is　the　thing　properly　in　question　in　this　legislation；　is　not　moral。　　　It　is　a　very　beautiful　thing　to　do　good　to　men　from　love　to　them　and　from　sympathetic　good　will；　or　to　be　just　from　love　of　order；　but　this　is　not　yet　the　true　moral　maxim　of　our　conduct　which　is　suitable　to　our　position　amongst　rational　beings　as　men；　when　we　pretend　with　fanciful　pride　to　set　ourselves　above　the　thought　of　duty；　like　volunteers；　and；　as　if　we　were　independent　on　the　command；　to　want　to　do　of　our　own　good　pleasure　what　we　think　we　need　no　command　to　do。　We　stand　under　a　discipline　of　reason　and　in　all　our　maxims　must　not　forget　our　subjection　to　it；　nor　withdraw　anything　therefrom；　or　by　an　egotistic　presumption　diminish　aught　of　the　authority　of　the　law　（although　our　own　reason　gives　it）　so　as　to　set　the　determining　principle　of　our　will；　even　though　the　law　be　conformed　to；　anywhere　else　but　in　the　law　itself　and　in　respect　for　this　law。　Duty　and　obligation　are　the　only　names　that　we　must　give　to　our　relation　to　the　moral　law。　We　are　indeed　legislative　members　of　a　moral　kingdom　rendered　possible　by　freedom；　and　presented　to　us　by　reason　as　an　object　of　respect；　but　yet　we　are　subjects　in　it；　not　the　sovereign；　and　to　mistake　our　inferior　position　as　creatures；　and　presumptuously　to　reject　the　authority　of　the　moral　law；　is　already　to　revolt　from　it　in　spirit；　even　though　the　letter　of　it　is　fulfilled。　　　With　this　agrees　very　well　the　possibility　of　such　a　command　as：　Love　God　above　everything；　and　thy　neighbour　as　thyself。*　For　as　a　command　it　requires　respect　for　a　law　which　commands　love　and　does　not　leave　it　to　our　own　arbitrary　choice　to　make　this　our　principle。　Love　to　God；　however；　considered　as　an　inclination　（pathological　love）；　is　impossible；　for　He　is　not　an　object　of　the　senses。　The　same　affection　towards　men　is　possible　no　doubt；　but　cannot　be　commanded；　for　it　is　not　in　the　power　of　any　man　to　love　anyone　at　command；　therefore　it　is　only　practical　love　that　is　meant　in　that　pith　of　all　laws。　To　love　God　means；　in　this　sense；　to　like　to　do　His　commandments；　to　love　one's　neighbour　means　to　like　to　practise　all　duties　towards　him。　But　the　command　that　makes　this　a　rule　cannot　command　us　to　have　this　disposition　in　actions　conformed　to　duty；　but　only　to　endeavour　after　it。　For　a　command　to　like　to　do　a　thing　is　in　itself　contradictory；　because　if　we　already　know　of　ourselves　what　we　are　bound　to　do；　and　if　further　we　are　conscious　of　liking　to　do　it；　a　command　would　be　quite　needless；　and　if　we　do　it　not　willingly；　but　only　out　of　respect　for　the　law；　a　command　that　makes　this　respect　the　motive　of　our　maxim　would　directly　counteract　the　disposition　commanded。　That　law　of　all　laws；　therefore；　like　all　the　moral　precepts　of　the　Gospel；　exhibits　the　moral　disposition　in　all　its　perfection；　in　which；　viewed　as　an　ideal　of　holiness；　it　is　not　attainable　by　any　creature；　but　yet　is　the　pattern　which　we　should　strive　to　approach；　and　in　an　uninterrupted　but　infinite　progress　become　like　to。　In　fact；　if　a　rational　creature　could　ever　reach　this　point；　that　he　thoroughly　likes　to　do　all　moral　laws；　this　would　mean　that　there　does　not　exist　in　him　even　the　possibility　of　a　desire　that　would　tempt　him　to　deviate　from　them；　for　to　overcome　such　a　desire　always　costs　the　subject　some　sacrifice　and　therefore　requires　self…compulsion；　that　is；　inward　constraint　to　something　that　one　does　not　quite　like　to　do；　and　no　creature　can　ever　reach　this　stage　of　moral　disposition。　For；　being　a　creature；　and　therefore　always　dependent　with　respect　to　what　be　requires　for　complete　satisfaction；　he　can　never　be　quite　free　from　desires　and　inclinations；　and　as　these　rest　on　physical　causes；　they　can　never　of　themselves　coincide　with　the　moral　law；　the　sources　of　which　are　quite　different；　and　therefore　they　make　it　necessary　to　found　the　mental　disposition　of　one's　maxims　on　moral　obligation；　not　on　ready　inclination；　but　on　respect；　which　demands　obedience　to　the　law；　even　though　one　may　not　like　it；　not　on　love；　which　apprehends　no　inward　reluctance　of　the　will　towards　the　law。　Nevertheless；　this　latter；　namely；　love　to　the　law　（which　would　then　cease　to　be　a　command；　and　then　morality；　which　would　have　passed　subjectively　into　holiness；　would　cease　to　be　virtue）　must　be　the　constant　though　unattainable　goal　of　his　endeavours。　For　in　the　case　of　what　we　highly　esteem；　but　yet　（on　account　of　the　consciousness　of　our　weakness）　dread；　the　increased　facility　of　satisfying　it　changes　the　most　reverential　awe　into　inclination；　and　respect　into　love；　at　least　this　would　be　the　perfection　of　a　disposition　devoted　to　the　law；　if　it　were　possible　for　a　creature　to　attain　it。

　　*This　law　is　in　striking　contrast　with　the　principle　of　private　happiness　which　some　make　the　supreme　principle　of　morality。　This　would　be　expressed　thus：　Love　thyself　above　everything；　and　God　and　thy　neighbour　for　thine　own　sake。

　　This　reflection　is　intended　not　so　much　to　clear　up　the　evangelical　command　just　cited；　in　order　to　prevent　religious　fanaticism　in　regard　to　love　of　God；　but　to　define　accurately　the　moral　disposition　with　regard　directly　to　our　duties　towards　men；　and　to　check；　or　if　possible　prevent；　a　merely　moral　fanaticism　which　infects　many　persons。　The　stage　of　morality　on　which　man　（and；　as　far　as　we　can　see；　every　rational　creature）　stands　is　respect　for　the　moral　law。　The　disposition　that　he　ought　to　have　in　obeying　this　is　to　obey　it　from　duty；　not　from　spontaneous　inclination；　or　from　an　endeavour　taken　up　from　liking　and　unbidden；　and　this　proper　moral　condition　in　which　he　can　always　be　is　virtue；　that　is；　moral　disposition　militant；　and　not　holiness　in　the　fancied　possession　of　a　perfect　purity　of　the　disposition　of　the　will。　It　is　nothing　but　moral　fanaticism　and　exaggerated　self…conceit　that　is　infused　into　the　mind　by　exhortation　to　actions　as　noble；　sublime；　and　magnanimous；　by　which　men　are　led　into　the　delusion　that　it　is　not　duty；　that　is；　respect　for　the　law；　whose　yoke　（an　easy　yoke　indeed；　because　reason　itself　imposes　it　on　us）　they　must　bear；　whether　they　like　it　or　not；　that　constitutes　the　determining　principle　of　their　actions；　and　which　always　humbles　them　while　they　obey　it；　fancying　that　those　actions　are　expected　from　them；　not　from　duty；　but　as　pure　merit。　For　not　only　would　they；　in　imitating　such　deeds　from　such　a　principle；　not　have　fulfilled　the　spirit　of　the　law　in　the　least；　which　consists　not　in　the　legality　of　the　action　（without　regard　to　principle）；　but　in　the　subjection　of　the　mind　to　the　law；　not　only　do　they　make　the　motives　pathological　（seated　in　sympathy　or　self…love）；　not　moral　（in　the　law）；　but　they　produce　in　this　way　a　vain；　high…flying；　fantastic　way　of　thinking；　flattering　themselves　with　a　spontaneous　goodness　of　heart　that　needs　neither　spur　nor　bridle；　for　which　no　command　is　needed；　and　thereby　forgetting　their　obligation；　which　they　ought　to　think　of　rather　than　merit。　Indeed　actions　of　others　which　are　done　with　great　sacrifice；　and　merely　for　the　sake　of　duty；　may　be　praised　as　noble　and　sublime；　but　only　so　far　as　there　are　traces　which　suggest　that　they　were　done　wholly　out　of　respect　for　duty　and　not　from　excited　feelings。　If　these；　however；　are　set　before　anyone　as　examples　to　be　imitated；　respect　for　duty　（which　is　the　only　true　moral　feeling）　must　be　employed　as　the　motive…　this　severe　holy　precept　which　never　allows　our　vain　self…love　to　dally　with　pathological　impulses　（however　analogous　they　may　be　to　morality）；　and　to　take　a　pride　in　meritorious　worth。　Now　if　we　search　we　shall　find　for　all　actions　that　are　worthy　of　praise　a　law　of　duty　which　commands；　and　does　not　leave　us　to　choose　what　may　be　agreeable　to　our　inclinations。　This　is　the　only　way　of　representing　things　that　can　give　a　moral　training　to　the　soul；　because　it　alone　is　capable　of　solid　and　accurately　defined　principles。　　　If　fanaticism　in　its　most　general　sense　is　a　deliberate　over　stepping　of　the　limits　of　human　reason；　then　moral　fanaticism　is　such　an　over　stepping　of　the　bounds　that　practical　pure　reason　sets　to　mankind；　in　that　it　forbids　us　to　place　the　subjective　determining　principle　of　correct　actions；　that　is；　their　moral　motive；　in　anything　but　the　law　itself；　or　to　place　the　disposition　which　is　thereby　brought　into　the　maxims　in　anything　but　respect　for　this　law；　and　hence　commands　us　to　take　as　the　supreme　vital　principle　of　all　morality　in　men　the　thought　of　duty；　which　strikes　down　all　arrogance　as　well　as　vain　self…love。　　　If　this　is　so；　it　is　not　only　writers　of　romance　or　sentimental　educators　（although　they　may　be　zealous　opponents　of　sentimentalism）；　but　sometimes　even　philosophers；　nay；　even　the　severest　of　all；　the　Stoics；　that　have　brought　in　moral　fanaticism　instead　of　a　sober　but　wise　moral　discipline；　although　the　fanaticism　of　the　latter　was　more　heroic；　that　of　the　former　of　an　insipid；　effeminate　character；　and　we　may；　without　hypocrisy；　say　of　the　moral　teaching　of　the　Gospel；　that　it　first；　by　the　purity　of　its　moral　principle；　and　at　the　same　time　by　its　suitability　to　the　limitations　of　finite　beings；　brought　all　the　good　conduct　of　men　under　the　discipline　of　a　duty　plainly　set　before　their　eyes；　which　does　not　permit　them　to　indulge　in　dreams　of　imaginary　moral　perfections；　and　that　it　also　set　the　bounds　of　humility　（that　is；　self…knowledge）　to　self…conceit　as　well　as　to　self…love；　both　which　are　ready　to　mistake　their　limits。　　　Duty！　Thou　sublime　and　mighty　name　that　dost　embrace　nothing　charming　or　insinuating；　but　requirest　submission；　and　yet　seekest　not　to　move　the　will　by　threatening　aught　that　would　arouse　natural　aversion　or　terror；　but　merely　holdest　forth　a　law　which　of　itself　finds　entrance　into　the　mind；　and　yet　gains　reluctant　reverence　（though　not　always　obedience）；　a　law　before　which　all　inclinations　are　dumb；　even　though　they　secretly　counter…work　it；　what　origin　is　there　worthy　of　thee；　and　where　is　to　be　found　the　root　of　thy　noble　descent　which　proudly　rejects　all　kindred　with　the　inclinations；　a　root　to　be　derived　from　which　is　the　indispensable　condition　of　the　only　worth　which　men　can　give　themselves？　　　It　can　be　nothing　less　than　a　power　which　elevates　man　above　himself　（as　a　part　of　the　world　of　sense）；　a　power　which　connects　him　with　an　order　of　things　that　only　the　understanding　can　conceive；　with　a　world　which　at　the　same　time　commands　the　whole　sensible　world；　and　with　it　the　empirically　determinable　existence　of　man　in　time；　as　well　as　the　sum　total　of　all　ends　（which　totality　alone　suits　such　unconditional　practical　laws　as　the　moral）。　This　power　is