the critique of practical reason-第15章

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y；　without　consistency；　and　it　is　even　dangerous　to　allow　other　motives　（for　instance；　that　of　interest）　even　to　co…operate　along　with　the　moral　law；　hence　nothing　is　left　us　but　to　determine　carefully　in　what　way　the　moral　law　becomes　a　motive；　and　what　effect　this　has　upon　the　faculty　of　desire。　For　as　to　the　question　how　a　law　can　be　directly　and　of　itself　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　（which　is　the　essence　of　morality）；　this　is；　for　human　reason；　an　insoluble　problem　and　identical　with　the　question：　how　a　free　will　is　possible。　Therefore　what　we　have　to　show　a　priori　is　not　why　the　moral　law　in　itself　supplies　a　motive；　but　what　effect　it；　as　such；　produces　（or；　more　correctly　speaking；　must　produce）　on　the　mind。　　　The　essential　point　in　every　determination　of　the　will　by　the　moral　law　is　that　being　a　free　will　it　is　determined　simply　by　the　moral　law；　not　only　without　the　co…operation　of　sensible　impulses；　but　even　to　the　rejection　of　all　such；　and　to　the　checking　of　all　inclinations　so　far　as　they　might　be　opposed　to　that　law。　So　far；　then；　the　effect　of　the　moral　law　as　a　motive　is　only　negative；　and　this　motive　can　be　known　a　priori　to　be　such。　For　all　inclination　and　every　sensible　impulse　is　founded　on　feeling；　and　the　negative　effect　produced　on　feeling　（by　the　check　on　the　inclinations）　is　itself　feeling；　consequently；　we　can　see　a　priori　that　the　moral　law；　as　a　determining　principle　of　the　will；　must　by　thwarting　all　our　inclinations　produce　a　feeling　which　may　be　called　pain；　and　in　this　we　have　the　first；　perhaps　the　only；　instance　in　which　we　are　able　from　a　priori　considerations　to　determine　the　relation　of　a　cognition　（in　this　case　of　pure　practical　reason）　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　All　the　inclinations　together　（which　can　be　reduced　to　a　tolerable　system；　in　which　case　their　satisfaction　is　called　happiness）　constitute　self…regard　（solipsismus）。　This　is　either　the　self…love　that　consists　in　an　excessive　fondness　for　oneself　（philautia）；　or　satisfaction　with　oneself　（arrogantia）。　The　former　is　called　particularly　selfishness；　the　latter　self…conceit。　Pure　practical　reason　only　checks　selfishness；　looking　on　it　as　natural　and　active　in　us　even　prior　to　the　moral　law；　so　far　as　to　limit　it　to　the　condition　of　agreement　with　this　law；　and　then　it　is　called　rational　self…love。　But　self…conceit　reason　strikes　down　altogether；　since　all　claims　to　self…esteem　which　precede　agreement　with　the　moral　law　are　vain　and　unjustifiable；　for　the　certainty　of　a　state　of　mind　that　coincides　with　this　law　is　the　first　condition　of　personal　worth　（as　we　shall　presently　show　more　clearly）；　and　prior　to　this　conformity　any　pretension　to　worth　is　false　and　unlawful。　Now　the　propensity　to　self…esteem　is　one　of　the　inclinations　which　the　moral　law　checks；　inasmuch　as　that　esteem　rests　only　on　morality。　Therefore　the　moral　law　breaks　down　self…conceit。　But　as　this　law　is　something　positive　in　itself；　namely；　the　form　of　an　intellectual　causality；　that　is；　of　freedom；　it　must　be　an　object　of　respect；　for；　by　opposing　the　subjective　antagonism　of　the　inclinations；　it　weakens　self…conceit；　and　since　it　even　breaks　down；　that　is；　humiliates；　this　conceit；　it　is　an　object　of　the　highest　respect　and；　consequently；　is　the　foundation　of　a　positive　feeling　which　is　not　of　empirical　origin；　but　is　known　a　priori。　Therefore　respect　for　the　moral　law　is　a　feeling　which　is　produced　by　an　intellectual　cause；　and　this　feeling　is　the　only　one　that　we　know　quite　a　priori　and　the　necessity　of　which　we　can　perceive。　　　In　the　preceding　chapter　we　have　seen　that　everything　that　presents　itself　as　an　object　of　the　will　prior　to　the　moral　law　is　by　that　law　itself；　which　is　the　supreme　condition　of　practical　reason；　excluded　from　the　determining　principles　of　the　will　which　we　have　called　the　unconditionally　good；　and　that　the　mere　practical　form　which　consists　in　the　adaptation　of　the　maxims　to　universal　legislation　first　determines　what　is　good　in　itself　and　absolutely；　and　is　the　basis　of　the　maxims　of　a　pure　will；　which　alone　is　good　in　every　respect。　However；　we　find　that　our　nature　as　sensible　beings　is　such　that　the　matter　of　desire　（objects　of　inclination；　whether　of　hope　or　fear）　first　presents　itself　to　us；　and　our　pathologically　affected　self；　although　it　is　in　its　maxims　quite　unfit　for　universal　legislation；　yet；　just　as　if　it　constituted　our　entire　self；　strives　to　put　its　pretensions　forward　first；　and　to　have　them　acknowledged　as　the　first　and　original。　This　propensity　to　make　ourselves　in　the　subjective　determining　principles　of　our　choice　serve　as　the　objective　determining　principle　of　the　will　generally　may　be　called　self…love；　and　if　this　pretends　to　be　legislative　as　an　unconditional　practical　principle　it　may　be　called　self…conceit。　Now　the　moral　law；　which　alone　is　truly　objective　（namely；　in　every　respect）；　entirely　excludes　the　influence　of　self…love　on　the　supreme　practical　principle；　and　indefinitely　checks　the　self…conceit　that　prescribes　the　subjective　conditions　of　the　former　as　laws。　Now　whatever　checks　our　self…conceit　in　our　own　judgement　humiliates；　therefore　the　moral　law　inevitably　humbles　every　man　when　he　compares　with　it　the　physical　propensities　of　his　nature。　That；　the　idea　of　which　as　a　determining　principle　of　our　will　humbles　us　in　our　self…consciousness；　awakes　respect　for　itself；　so　far　as　it　is　itself　positive　and　a　determining　principle。　Therefore　the　moral　law　is　even　subjectively　a　cause　of　respect。　Now　since　everything　that　enters　into　self…love　belongs　to　inclination；　and　all　inclination　rests　on　feelings；　and　consequently　whatever　checks　all　the　feelings　together　in　self…love　has　necessarily；　by　this　very　circumstance；　an　influence　on　feeling；　hence　we　comprehend　how　it　is　possible　to　perceive　a　priori　that　the　moral　law　can　produce　an　effect　on　feeling；　in　that　it　excludes　the　inclinations　and　the　propensity　to　make　them　the　supreme　practical　condition；　i。e。；　self…love；　from　all　participation　in　the　supreme　legislation。　This　effect　is　on　one　side　merely　negative；　but　on　the　other　side；　relatively　to　the　restricting　principle　of　pure　practical　reason；　it　is　positive。　No　special　kind　of　feeling　need　be　assumed　for　this　under　the　name　of　a　practical　or　moral　feeling　as　antecedent　to　the　moral　law　and　serving　as　its　foundation。　　　The　negative　effect　on　feeling　（unpleasantness）　is　pathological；　like　every　influence　on　feeling　and　like　every　feeling　generally。　But　as　an　effect　of　the　consciousness　of　the　moral　law；　and　consequently　in　relation　to　a　supersensible　cause；　namely；　the　subject　of　pure　practical　reason　which　is　the　supreme　lawgiver；　this　feeling　of　a　rational　being　affected　by　inclinations　is　called　humiliation　（intellectual　self…depreciation）；　but　with　reference　to　the　positive　source　of　this　humiliation；　the　law；　it　is　respect　for　it。　There　is　indeed　no　feeling　for　this　law；　but　inasmuch　as　it　removes　the　resistance　out　of　the　way；　this　removal　of　an　obstacle　is；　in　the　judgement　of　reason；　esteemed　equivalent　to　a　positive　help　to　its　causality。　Therefore　this　feeling　may　also　be　called　a　feeling　of　respect　for　the　moral　law；　and　for　both　reasons　together　a　moral　feeling。　　　While　the　moral　law；　therefore；　is　a　formal　determining　principle　of　action　by　practical　pure　reason；　and　is　moreover　a　material　though　only　objective　determining　principle　of　the　objects　of　action　as　called　good　and　evil；　it　is　also　a　subjective　determining　principle；　that　is；　a　motive　to　this　action；　inasmuch　as　it　has　influence　on　the　morality　of　the　subject　and　produces　a　feeling　conducive　to　the　influence　of　the　law　on　the　will。　There　is　here　in　the　subject　no　antecedent　feeling　tending　to　morality。　For　this　is　impossible；　since　every　feeling　is　sensible；　and　the　motive　of　moral　intention　must　be　free　from　all　sensible　conditions。　On　the　contrary；　while　the　sensible　feeling　which　is　at　the　bottom　of　all　our　inclinations　is　the　condition　of　that　impression　which　we　call　respect；　the　cause　that　determines　it　lies　in　the　pure　practical　reason；　and　this　impression　therefore；　on　account　of　its　origin；　must　be　called；　not　a　pathological　but　a　practical　effect。　For　by　the　fact　that　the　conception　of　the　moral　law　deprives　self…love　of　its　influence；　and　self…conceit　of　its　illusion；　it　lessens　the　obstacle　to　pure　practical　reason　and　produces　the　conception　of　the　superiority　of　its　objective　law　to　the　impulses　of　the　sensibility；　and　thus；　by　removing　the　counterpoise；　it　gives　relatively　greater　weight　to　the　law　in　the　judgement　of　reason　（in　the　case　of　a　will　affected　by　the　aforesaid　impulses）。　Thus　the　respect　for　the　law　is　not　a　motive　to　morality；　but　is　morality　itself　subjectively　considered　as　a　motive；　inasmuch　as　pure　practical　reason；　by　rejecting　all　the　rival　pretensions　of　selflove；　gives　authority　to　the　law；　which　now　alone　has　influence。　Now　it　is　to　be　observed　that　as　respect　is　an　effect　on　feeling；　and　therefore　on　the　sensibility；　of　a　rational　being；　it　presupposes　this　sensibility；　and　therefore　also　the　finiteness　of　such　beings　on　whom　the　moral　law　imposes　respect；　and　that　respect　for　the　law　cannot　be　attributed　to　a　supreme　being；　or　to　any　being　free　from　all　sensibility；　in　whom；　therefore；　this　sensibility　cannot　be　an　obstacle　to　practical　reason。　　　This　feeling　（which　we　call　the　moral　feeling）　is　therefore　produced　simply　by　reason。　It　does　not　serve　for　the　estimation　of　actions　nor　for　the　foundation　of　the　objective　moral　law　itself；　but　merely　as　a　motive　to　make　this　of　itself　a　maxim。　But　what　name　could　we　more　suitably　apply　to　this　singular　feeling　which　cannot　be　compared　to　any　pathological　feeling？　It　is　of　such　a　peculiar　kind　that　it　seems　to　be　at　the　disposal　of　reason　only；　and　that　pure　practical　reason。　　　Respect　applies　always　to　persons　only…　not　to　things。　The　latter　may　arouse　inclination；　and　if　they　are　animals　（e。g。；　horses；　dogs；　etc。）；　even　love　or　fear；　like　the　sea；　a　volcano；　a　beast　of　prey；　but　never　respect。　Something　that　comes　nearer　to　this　feeling　is　admiration；　and　this；　as　an　affection；　astonishment；　can　apply　to　things　also；　e。g。；　lofty　mountains；　the　magnitude；　number；　and　distance　of　the　heavenly　bodies；　the　strength　and　swiftness　of　many　animals；　etc。　But　all　this　is　not　respect。　A　man　also　may　be　an　object　to　me　of　love；　fear；　or　admiration；　even　to　astonishment；　and　yet　not　be　an　object　of　respect。　His　jocose　humour；　his　courage　and　strength；　his　power　from　the　rank　be　has　amongst　others；　may　inspire　me　with　sentiments　of　this　kind；　but　still　inner　respect　for　him　is　wanting。　Fontenelle　says；　〃I　bow　before　a　great　man；　but　my　mind　does　not　bow。〃　I　would　add；　before　an　humble　plain　man；　in　whom　I　perceive　uprightness　of　character　in　a　higher　degree　than　I　am　conscious　of　in　myself；…　my　mind　bows　whether　I　choose　it　or　not；　and　though　I　bear　my　head　never　so　high　that　he　may　not　forget　my　superior　rank。　Why　is　this？　Because　his　example　exhibits　to　me　a　law　that　humbles　my　self…conceit　when　I　compare　it　with　my　conduct：　a　law；　the　practicability　of　obedience　to　which　I　see　proved　by　fact　before　my　eyes。　Now；　I　may　even　be　conscious　of　a　like　degree　of　uprightness；　and　yet　the　respect　remains。　For　since　in　man　all　good　is　defective；　the　law