the critique of practical reason-第12章

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　a　priori　as　the　determining　principle　of　the　action；　and　the　latter　therefore　as　determined　by　pure　practical　reason；　the　judgement　whether　a　thing　is　an　object　of　pure　practical　reason　or　not　does　not　depend　at　all　on　the　comparison　with　our　physical　power；　and　the　question　is　only　whether　we　should　will　an　action　that　is　directed　to　the　existence　of　an　object；　if　the　object　were　in　our　power；　hence　the　previous　question　is　only　as　the　moral　possibility　of　the　action；　for　in　this　case　it　is　not　the　object；　but　the　law　of　the　will；　that　is　the　determining　principle　of　the　action。　The　only　objects　of　practical　reason　are　therefore　those　of　good　and　evil。　For　by　the　former　is　meant　an　object　necessarily　desired　according　to　a　principle　of　reason；　by　the　latter　one　necessarily　shunned；　also　according　to　a　principle　of　reason。　　　If　the　notion　of　good　is　not　to　be　derived　from　an　antecedent　practical　law；　but；　on　the　contrary；　is　to　serve　as　its　foundation；　it　can　only　be　the　notion　of　something　whose　existence　promises　pleasure；　and　thus　determines　the　causality　of　the　subject　to　produce　it；　that　is　to　say；　determines　the　faculty　of　desire。　Now；　since　it　is　impossible　to　discern　a　priori　what　idea　will　be　accompanied　with　pleasure　and　what　with　pain；　it　will　depend　on　experience　alone　to　find　out　what　is　primarily　good　or　evil。　The　property　of　the　subject；　with　reference　to　which　alone　this　experiment　can　be　made；　is　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　pain；　a　receptivity　belonging　to　the　internal　sense；　thus　that　only　would　be　primarily　good　with　which　the　sensation　of　pleasure　is　immediately　connected；　and　that　simply　evil　which　immediately　excites　pain。　Since；　however；　this　is　opposed　even　to　the　usage　of　language；　which　distinguishes　the　pleasant　from　the　good；　the　unpleasant　from　the　evil；　and　requires　that　good　and　evil　shall　always　be　judged　by　reason；　and；　therefore；　by　concepts　which　can　be　communicated　to　everyone；　and　not　by　mere　sensation；　which　is　limited　to　individual　＇subjects＇　and　their　susceptibility；　and；　since　nevertheless；　pleasure　or　pain　cannot　be　connected　with　any　idea　of　an　object　a　priori；　the　philosopher　who　thought　himself　obliged　to　make　a　feeling　of　pleasure　the　foundation　of　his　practical　judgements　would　call　that　good　which　is　a　means　to　the　pleasant；　and　evil；　what　is　a　cause　of　unpleasantness　and　pain；　for　the　judgement　on　the　relation　of　means　to　ends　certainly　belongs　to　reason。　But；　although　reason　is　alone　capable　of　discerning　the　connexion　of　means　with　their　ends　（so　that　the　will　might　even　be　defined　as　the　faculty　of　ends；　since　these　are　always　determining　principles　of　the　desires）；　yet　the　practical　maxims　which　would　follow　from　the　aforesaid　principle　of　the　good　being　merely　a　means；　would　never　contain　as　the　object　of　the　will　anything　good　in　itself；　but　only　something　good　for　something；　the　good　would　always　be　merely　the　useful；　and　that　for　which　it　is　useful　must　always　lie　outside　the　will；　in　sensation。　Now　if　this　as　a　pleasant　sensation　were　to　be　distinguished　from　the　notion　of　good；　then　there　would　be　nothing　primarily　good　at　all；　but　the　good　would　have　to　be　sought　only　in　the　means　to　something　else；　namely；　some　pleasantness。　　　It　is　an　old　formula　of　the　schools：　Nihil　appetimus　nisi　sub　ratione　boni；　Nihil　aversamur　nisi　sub　ratione　mali；　and　it　is　used　often　correctly；　but　often　also　in　a　manner　injurious　to　philosophy；　because　the　expressions　boni　and　mali　are　ambiguous；　owing　to　the　poverty　of　language；　in　consequence　of　which　they　admit　a　double　sense；　and；　therefore；　inevitably　bring　the　practical　laws　into　ambiguity；　and　philosophy；　which　in　employing　them　becomes　aware　of　the　different　meanings　in　the　same　word；　but　can　find　no　special　expressions　for　them；　is　driven　to　subtile　distinctions　about　which　there　is　subsequently　no　unanimity；　because　the　distinction　could　not　be　directly　marked　by　any　suitable　expression。*

　　*Besides　this；　the　expression　sub　ratione　boni　is　also　ambiguous。　For　it　may　mean：　〃We　represent　something　to　ourselves　as　good；　when　and　because　we　desire　（will）　it〃；　or　〃We　desire　something　because　we　represent　it　to　ourselves　as　good；〃　so　that　either　the　desire　determines　the　notion　of　the　object　as　a　good；　or　the　notion　of　good　determines　the　desire　（the　will）；　so　that　in　the　first　case　sub　ratione　boni　would　mean；　〃We　will　something　under　the　idea　of　the　good〃；　in　the　second；　〃In　consequence　of　this　idea；〃　which；　as　determining　the　volition；　must　precede　it。

　　The　German　language　has　the　good　fortune　to　possess　expressions　which　do　not　allow　this　difference　to　be　overlooked。　It　possesses　two　very　distinct　concepts　and　especially　distinct　expressions　for　that　which　the　Latins　express　by　a　single　word；　bonum。　For　bonum　it　has　das　Gute　＇good＇；　and　das　Wohl　＇well；　weal＇；　for　malum　das　Bose　＇evil＇；　and　das　Ubel　＇ill；　bad＇；　or　das　Well　＇woe＇。　So　that　we　express　two　quite　distinct　judgements　when　we　consider　in　an　action　the　good　and　evil　of　it；　or　our　weal　and　woe　（ill）。　Hence　it　already　follows　that　the　above　quoted　psychological　proposition　is　at　least　very　doubtful　if　it　is　translated：　〃We　desire　nothing　except　with　a　view　to　our　weal　or　woe〃；　on　the　other　hand；　if　we　render　it　thus：　〃Under　the　direction　of　reason　we　desire　nothing　except　so　far　as　we　esteem　it　good　or　evil；〃　it　is　indubitably　certain　and　at　the　same　time　quite　clearly　expressed。　　　Well　or　ill　always　implies　only　a　reference　to　our　condition；　as　pleasant　or　unpleasant；　as　one　of　pleasure　or　pain；　and　if　we　desire　or　avoid　an　object　on　this　account；　it　is　only　so　far　as　it　is　referred　to　our　sensibility　and　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain　that　it　produces。　But　good　or　evil　always　implies　a　reference　to　the　will；　as　determined　by　the　law　of　reason；　to　make　something　its　object；　for　it　is　never　determined　directly　by　the　object　and　the　idea　of　it；　but　is　a　faculty　of　taking　a　rule　of　reason　for　or　motive　of　an　action　（by　which　an　object　may　be　realized）。　Good　and　evil　therefore　are　properly　referred　to　actions；　not　to　the　sensations　of　the　person；　and　if　anything　is　to　be　good　or　evil　absolutely　（i。e。；　in　every　respect　and　without　any　further　condition）；　or　is　to　be　so　esteemed；　it　can　only　be　the　manner　of　acting；　the　maxim　of　the　will；　and　consequently　the　acting　person　himself　as　a　good　or　evil　man　that　can　be　so　called；　and　not　a　thing。　　　However；　then；　men　may　laugh　at　the　Stoic；　who　in　the　severest　paroxysms　of　gout　cried　out：　〃Pain；　however　thou　tormentest　me；　I　will　never　admit　that　thou　art　an　evil　（kakov；　malum）〃：　he　was　right。　A　bad　thing　it　certainly　was；　and　his　cry　betrayed　that；　but　that　any　evil　attached　to　him　thereby；　this　he　bad　no　reason　whatever　to　admit；　for　pain　did　not　in　the　least　diminish　the　worth　of　his　person；　but　only　that　of　his　condition。　If　he　had　been　conscious　of　a　single　lie；　it　would　have　lowered　his　pride；　but　pain　served　only　to　raise　it；　when　he　was　conscious　that　he　had　not　deserved　it　by　any　unrighteous　action　by　which　he　had　rendered　himself　worthy　of　punishment。　　　What　we　call　good　must　be　an　object　of　desire　in　the　judgement　of　every　rational　man；　and　evil　an　object　of　aversion　in　the　eyes　of　everyone；　therefore；　in　addition　to　sense；　this　judgement　requires　reason。　So　it　is　with　truthfulness；　as　opposed　to　lying；　so　with　justice；　as　opposed　to　violence；　&c。　But　we　may　call　a　thing　a　bad　＇or　ill）　thing；　which　yet　everyone　must　at　the　same　time　acknowledge　to　be　good；　sometimes　directly；　sometimes　indirectly。　The　man　who　submits　to　a　surgical　operation　feels　it　no　doubt　as　a　bad　thing；　but　by　their　reason　he　and　everyone　acknowledge　it　to　be　good。　If　a　man　who　delights　in　annoying　and　vexing　peaceable　people　at　last　receives　a　right　good　beating；　this　is　no　doubt　a　bad　thing；　but　everyone　approves　it　and　regards　it　as　a　good　thing；　even　though　nothing　else　resulted　from　it；　nay；　even　the　man　who　receives　it　must　in　his　reason　acknowledge　that　he　has　met　justice；　because　he　sees　the　proportion　between　good　conduct　and　good　fortune；　which　reason　inevitably　places　before　him；　here　put　into　practice。　　　No　doubt　our　weal　and　woe　are　of　very　great　importance　in　the　estimation　of　our　practical　reason；　and　as　far　as　our　nature　as　sensible　beings　is　concerned；　our　happiness　is　the　only　thing　of　consequence；　provided　it　is　estimated　as　reason　especially　requires；　not　by　the　transitory　sensation；　but　by　the　influence　that　this　has　on　our　whole　existence；　and　on　our　satisfaction　therewith；　but　it　is　not　absolutely　the　only　thing　of　consequence。　Man　is　a　being　who；　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　has　wants；　and　so　far　his　reason　has　an　office　which　it　cannot　refuse；　namely；　to　attend　to　the　interest　of　his　sensible　nature；　and　to　form　practical　maxims；　even　with　a　view　to　the　happiness　of　this　life；　and　if　possible　even　to　that　of　a　future。　But　he　is　not　so　completely　an　animal　as　to　be　indifferent　to　what　reason　says　on　its　own　account；　and　to　use　it　merely　as　an　instrument　for　the　satisfaction　of　his　wants　as　a　sensible　being。　For　the　possession　of　reason　would　not　raise　his　worth　above　that　of　the　brutes；　if　it　is　to　serve　him　only　for　the　same　purpose　that　instinct　serves　in　them；　it　would　in　that　case　be　only　a　particular　method　which　nature　had　employed　to　equip　man　for　the　same　ends　for　which　it　has　qualified　brutes；　without　qualifying　him　for　any　higher　purpose。　No　doubt　once　this　arrangement　of　nature　has　been　made　for　him　he　requires　reason　in　order　to　take　into　consideration　his　weal　and　woe；　but　besides　this　he　possesses　it　for　a　higher　purpose　also；　namely；　not　only　to　take　into　consideration　what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　about　which　only　pure　reason；　uninfluenced　by　any　sensible　interest；　can　judge；　but　also　to　distinguish　this　estimate　thoroughly　from　the　former　and　to　make　it　the　supreme　condition　thereof。　　　In　estimating　what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　as　distinguished　from　what　can　be　so　called　only　relatively；　the　following　points　are　to　be　considered。　Either　a　rational　principle　is　already　conceived；　as　of　itself　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；　without　regard　to　possible　objects　of　desire　（and　therefore　by　the　more　legislative　form　of　the　maxim）；　and　in　that　case　that　principle　is　a　practical　a　priori　law；　and　pure　reason　is　supposed　to　be　practical　of　itself。　The　law　in　that　case　determines　the　will　directly；　the　action　conformed　to　it　is　good　in　itself；　a　will　whose　maxim　always　conforms　to　this　law　is　good　absolutely　in　every　respect　and　is　the　supreme　condition　of　all　good。　Or　the　maxim　of　the　will　is　consequent　on　a　determining　principle　of　desire　which　presupposes　an　object　of　pleasure　or　pain；　something　therefore　that　pleases　or　displeases；　and　the　maxim　of　reason　that　we　should　pursue　the　former　and　avoid　the　latter　determines　our　actions　as　good　relatively　to　our　inclination；　that　is；　good　indirectly；　i。e。；　relatively　to　a　different　end　to　which　they　are　means）；　and　in　that　case　these　maxims　can　never　be　called　laws；　but　may　be　called　rational　practical　precepts。　The　end　itself；　the　pleasure　that　we　seek；　is　in　the　latter　case　not　a　good　but　a　welfare；　not　a　concept　of　reason；　but　an　empirical　concept　of　an　object　of　sensation；　but　the　use　of　the　means　thereto；　that　is；　the　action；　is　nevertheless　called　good　（becau