the ethics(part iv)-及5嫗
梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ○ 賜 ★ 辛酔堀貧和鍬匈��梓囚徒貧議 Enter 囚辛指欺云慕朕村匈��梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ● 辛指欺云匈競何��
!!!!隆堋響頼��紗秘慕禰厮宴和肝写偬堋響��
to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding�察�this effort
at understanding is ��IV��xxii。Coroll。�� the first and single basis of virtue�察�
nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior
object ��IV��xxv。���察�on the other hand�察�the mind�察�in so far as it reasons�察�
will not be able to conceive any good for itself�察�save such things as are
conducive to understanding。
Prop。 XXVII。 We know nothing to be certainly
good or evil�察�save such things as really
conduce to understanding�察�or such as are
able to hinder us from understanding。
Proof。´ The mind�察�in so far as it reasons�察�desires nothing beyond
understanding�察�and judges nothing to be useful to itself�察�save such
things as conduce to understanding ��by the foregoing Prop。��。 But the
mind ��II��xli。&Note�� cannot possess certainty concerning anything�察�
except in so far as it has adequate ideas�察�or ��what by II��xl。Note�察�
is the same thing�� in so far as it reasons。 Therefore we know nothing
to be good or evil save such things as really conduce�察�&c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXVIII。 The mind's highest good is
the knowledge of God�察�and the mind's
highest virtue is to know God。
Proof。´ The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God�察�
that is ��I��Def。vi。���察�than a Being absolutely infinite�察�and without which
��I��xv。�� nothing can either be or be conceived�察�therefore ��IV��xxvi。�察�
&xxvii。���察�the mind's highest utility or ��IV��Def。i。�� good is the knowledge
of God。 Again�察�the mind is active�察�only in so far as it understands�察�and
only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously。 The
mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand。 Now�察�as we have already
shown�察�the highest that the mind can understand is God�察�therefore the
highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXIX。 No individual thing�察�which is
entirely different from our own nature�察�
can help or check our power of activity�察�and
absolutely nothing can do us good or harm�察�
unless it has something in common with our nature。
Proof。´ The power of every individual thing�察�and consequently the power of
man�察�whereby he exists and operates�察�can only be determined by an
individual thing ��I��xxviii。���察�whose nature ��II��vi。�� must be understood
through the same nature as that�察�through which human nature is conceived。
Therefore our power of activity�察�however it be conceived�察�can be determined
and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual
thing�察�which has something in common with us�察�but not by the power of
anything�察�of which the nature is entirely different from our own�察�and
since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain
��IV��viii。���察�that is ��III��xi。Note���察�which increases or diminishes�察�helps
or hinders�察�our power of activity�察�therefore�察�that which is entirely�察�
different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXX。 A thing cannot be bad for us
through the quality which it has in common
with our nature�察�but it is bad for us in so
far as it is contrary to our nature。
Proof。´ We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain ��IV��viii。���察�that
is ��by the Def。�察�which see in III��xi。Note���察�when it diminishes or checks
our power of action。 Therefore�察�if anything were bad for us through that
quality which it has in common with our nature�察�it would be able
itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature�察�
which ��III��iv。�� is absurd。 Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through
that quality which it has in common with us�察�but�察�on the other hand�察�in
so far as it is bad for us�察�that is ��as we have just shown���察�in so far as
it can diminish or check our power of action�察�it is contrary to our nature。
Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXXI。 In so far as a thing is in harmony
with our nature�察�it is necessarily good。
Proof。´ In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature�察�it cannot be
bad for it。 It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent。
If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad�察�nothing will follow from
its nature ��IV��Def。i。���察�which tends to the preservation of our nature�察�
that is ��by the hypothesis���察�which tends to the preservation of the thing
itself�察�but this ��III��vi。�� is absurd�察�therefore�察�in so far as a thing is
in harmony with our nature�察�it is necessarily good。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。´ Hence it follows�察�that�察�in proportion as a thing is in harmony
with our nature�察�so is it more useful or better for us�察�and vice versa�察�in
proportion as a thing is more useful for us�察�so is it more in harmony with
our nature。 For�察�in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature�察�it
will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto。 If different�察�
it can neither be good nor bad ��IV��xxix。���察�if contrary�察�it will be contrary
to that which is in harmony with our nature�察�that is�察�contrary to what is
good ´ in short�察�bad。 Nothing�察�therefore�察�can be good�察�except in so far as
it is in harmony with our nature�察�and hence a thing is useful�察�in proportion
as it is in harmony with our nature�察�and vice versa。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXXII。 In so far as men are a prey
to passion�察�they cannot�察�in that respect�察�
be said to be naturally in harmony。
Proof。 Things�察�which are said to be in harmony naturally�察�are understood to
agree in power ��III��vii。���察�not in want of power or negation�察�and
consequently not in passion ��III��iii。Note���察�wherefore men�察�in so far as
they are a prey to their passions�察�cannot be said to be naturally in
harmony。 Q。E。D。
Note。´ This is also self´evident�察�for�察�if we say that white and black only
agree in the fact that neither is red�察�we absolutely affirm that the do not
agree in any respect。 So�察�if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the
fact that both are finite ´ wanting in power�察�not existing by the necessity
of their own nature�察�or�察�lastly�察�indefinitely surpassed by the power of
external causes ´ we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in
no respect alike�察�therefore�察�things which agree only in negation�察�or in
qualities which neither possess�察�really agree in no respect。
Prop。 XXXIII。 Men can differ in nature�察�
in so far as they are assailed by those
emotions�察�which are passions�察�or passive
states�察�and to this extent one and the
same man is variable and inconstant。
Proof。´ The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely
through our essence or nature ��III��Def。i。&ii。���察�but it must be defined by
the power�察�that is ��III��vii。���察�by the nature of external causes in
comparison with our own�察�hence it follows�察�that there are as many kinds of
each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected
��III��lvi。���察�and that men may be differently affected by one and the same
object ��III��li���察�and to this extent differ in nature�察�lastly�察�that one and
the same man may be differently affected towards the same object�察�and may
therefore be variable and inconstant。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXXIV。 In so far as men are assailed
by emotions which are passions�察�they can be
contrary one to another。
Proof。´ A man�察�for instance Peter�察�can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain�察�
because he ��Peter�� possesses something similar to that which Paul hates
��III��xvi。���察�or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also
loves ��III��xxxii。&Note���察�or for other causes ��of which the chief are
enumerated in III��lv。Note�� �察�it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
Peter ��Def。 of Emotions�此�vii。���察�consequently it may easily happen also�察�that
Peter should hate Paul in return�察�and that each should endeavour to do the
other an injury�察。�III��xxxix。���察�that is ��IV��xxx。���察�that they should be
contrary one to another。 But the emotion of pain is always a passion
or passive state ��III��lix。���察�hence men�察�in so far as they are assailed by
emotions which are passions�察�can be contrary one to another。 Q。E。D。
Note。´ I said that Paul may hate Peter�察�because he conceives that Peter
possesses something which he ��Paul�� also loves�察�from this it seems�察�at first
sight�察�to follow�察�that these two men�察�through both loving the same thing�察�
and�察�consequently�察�through agreement of their respective natures�察�stand in
one another's way�察�if this were so�察�II��xxx。 and II��xxxi。 would be untrue。
But if we give the matter our unbiased attention�察�we shall see that the
discrepancy vanishes。 For the two men are not in one another's way in
virtue of the agreement of their natures�察�that is�察�through both loving the
same thing�察�but in virtue of one differing from the other。 For�察�in so far
as each loves the same thing�察�the love of each is fostered thereby
��III��xxxi。���察�that is ��Def。 of the Emotions�此�vi。�� the pleasure of each is
fostered thereby。 Wherefore it is far from being the case�察�that they are
at variance through both loving the same thing�察�and through the agreement
in their natures。 The cause for their opposition lies�察�as I have said�察�
solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ。 For we assume that
Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession�察�while
Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost。 Hence the one man will be
affected with pleasure�察�the other will be affected with pain�察�and thus they
will be at variance one with another。 We can easily show in like manner�察�
that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences�察�and not on
the agreement between men's natures。
Prop。 XXXV。 In so far only as men live
in obedience to reason�察�do they always
necessarily agree in nature。
Proof。´ In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions�察�they
can be different in nature ��IV��xxxiii。���察�and at variance one with another。
But men are only said to be active�察�in so far as they act in obedience to
reason ��III��iii。���察�therefore�察�what so ever follows from human nature in so
far as it is defined by reason must ��III��Def。ii。�� be understood solely
through human nature as its proximate cause。 But�察�since every man by the
laws of his nature desires that which he deems good�察�and endeavours to
remove that which he deems bad ��IV��xix。���察�and further�察�since that which we�察�
in accordance with reason�察�deem good or bad�察�necessarily is good
or bad ��II��xli。���察�it follows that men�察�in so far as they live in obedience
to reason�察�necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for
human nature�察�and consequently for each individual