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to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding�察�this effort 



at understanding is ��IV��xxii。Coroll。�� the first and single basis of virtue�察�



nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior 



object ��IV��xxv。���察�on the other hand�察�the mind�察�in so far as it reasons�察�



will not be able to conceive any good for itself�察�save such things as are 



conducive to understanding。















Prop。 XXVII。 We know nothing to be certainly 



good or evil�察�save such things as really 



conduce to understanding�察�or such as are 



able to hinder us from understanding。







Proof。´ The mind�察�in so far as it reasons�察�desires nothing beyond 



understanding�察�and judges nothing to be useful to itself�察�save such 



things as conduce to understanding ��by the foregoing Prop。��。 But the 



mind ��II��xli。&Note�� cannot possess certainty concerning anything�察�



except in so far as it has adequate ideas�察�or ��what by II��xl。Note�察�



is the same thing�� in so far as it reasons。 Therefore we know nothing 



to be good or evil save such things as really conduce�察�&c。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XXVIII。 The mind's highest good is 



the knowledge of God�察�and the mind's 



highest virtue is to know God。







Proof。´ The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God�察�



that is ��I��Def。vi。���察�than a Being absolutely infinite�察�and without which 



��I��xv。�� nothing can either be or be conceived�察�therefore ��IV��xxvi。�察�



&xxvii。���察�the mind's highest utility or ��IV��Def。i。�� good is the knowledge



of God。 Again�察�the mind is active�察�only in so far as it understands�察�and 



only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously。 The 



mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand。 Now�察�as we have already 



shown�察�the highest that the mind can understand is God�察�therefore the 



highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XXIX。 No individual thing�察�which is 



entirely different from our own nature�察�



can help or check our power of activity�察�and 



absolutely nothing can do us good or harm�察�



unless it has something in common with our nature。







Proof。´ The power of every individual thing�察�and consequently the power of 



man�察�whereby he exists and operates�察�can only be determined by an 



individual thing ��I��xxviii。���察�whose nature ��II��vi。�� must be understood 



through the same nature as that�察�through which human nature is conceived。 



Therefore our power of activity�察�however it be conceived�察�can be determined 



and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual 



thing�察�which has something in common with us�察�but not by the power of 



anything�察�of which the nature is entirely different from our own�察�and 



since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain 



��IV��viii。���察�that is ��III��xi。Note���察�which increases or diminishes�察�helps 



or hinders�察�our power of activity�察�therefore�察�that which is entirely�察�



different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XXX。 A thing cannot be bad for us 



through the quality which it has in common 



with our nature�察�but it is bad for us in so 



far as it is contrary to our nature。 







Proof。´ We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain ��IV��viii。���察�that 



is ��by the Def。�察�which see in III��xi。Note���察�when it diminishes or checks 



our power of action。 Therefore�察�if anything were bad for us through that 



quality which it has in common with our nature�察�it would be able 



itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature�察�



which ��III��iv。�� is absurd。 Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through 



that quality which it has in common with us�察�but�察�on the other hand�察�in 



so far as it is bad for us�察�that is ��as we have just shown���察�in so far as  



it can diminish or check our power of action�察�it is contrary to our nature。 



Q。E。D。















Prop。 XXXI。 In so far as a thing is in harmony 



with our nature�察�it is necessarily good。







Proof。´ In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature�察�it cannot be 



bad for it。 It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent。 



If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad�察�nothing will follow from 



its nature ��IV��Def。i。���察�which tends to the preservation of our nature�察�



that is ��by the hypothesis���察�which tends to the preservation of the thing 



itself�察�but this ��III��vi。�� is absurd�察�therefore�察�in so far as a thing is 



in harmony with our nature�察�it is necessarily good。 Q。E。D。







Corollary。´ Hence it follows�察�that�察�in proportion as a thing is in harmony 



with our nature�察�so is it more useful or better for us�察�and vice versa�察�in 



proportion as a thing is more useful for us�察�so is it more in harmony with 



our nature。 For�察�in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature�察�it 



will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto。 If different�察�



it can neither be good nor bad ��IV��xxix。���察�if contrary�察�it will be contrary 



to that which is in harmony with our nature�察�that is�察�contrary to what is 



good ´ in short�察�bad。 Nothing�察�therefore�察�can be good�察�except in so far as 



it is in harmony with our nature�察�and hence a thing is useful�察�in proportion 



as it is in harmony with our nature�察�and vice versa。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XXXII。 In so far as men are a prey 



to passion�察�they cannot�察�in that respect�察�



be said to be naturally in harmony。







Proof。 Things�察�which are said to be in harmony naturally�察�are understood to 



agree in power ��III��vii。���察�not in want of power or negation�察�and 



consequently not in passion ��III��iii。Note���察�wherefore men�察�in so far as 



they are a prey to their passions�察�cannot be said to be naturally in 



harmony。 Q。E。D。







Note。´ This is also self´evident�察�for�察�if we say that white and black only 



agree in the fact that neither is red�察�we absolutely affirm that the do not 



agree in any respect。 So�察�if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the 



fact that both are finite ´ wanting in power�察�not existing by the necessity 



of their own nature�察�or�察�lastly�察�indefinitely surpassed by the power of 



external causes ´ we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in 



no respect alike�察�therefore�察�things which agree only in negation�察�or in 



qualities which neither possess�察�really agree in no respect。















Prop。 XXXIII。 Men can differ in nature�察�



in so far as they are assailed by those 



emotions�察�which are passions�察�or passive 



states�察�and to this extent one and the 



same man is variable and inconstant。







Proof。´ The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely 



through our essence or nature ��III��Def。i。&ii。���察�but it must be defined by 



the power�察�that is ��III��vii。���察�by the nature of external causes in 



comparison with our own�察�hence it follows�察�that there are as many kinds of 



each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected 



��III��lvi。���察�and that men may be differently affected by one and the same 



object ��III��li���察�and to this extent differ in nature�察�lastly�察�that one and 



the same man may be differently affected towards the same object�察�and may 



therefore be variable and inconstant。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XXXIV。 In so far as men are assailed 



by emotions which are passions�察�they can be 



contrary one to another。







Proof。´ A man�察�for instance Peter�察�can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain�察�



because he ��Peter�� possesses something similar to that which Paul hates 



��III��xvi。���察�or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also 



loves ��III��xxxii。&Note���察�or for other causes ��of which the chief are 



enumerated in III��lv。Note�� �察�it may therefore happen that Paul should hate 



Peter ��Def。 of Emotions�此�vii。���察�consequently it may easily happen also�察�that 



Peter should hate Paul in return�察�and that each should endeavour to do the 



other an injury�察。�III��xxxix。���察�that is ��IV��xxx。���察�that they should be 



contrary one to another。 But the emotion of pain is always a passion 



or passive state ��III��lix。���察�hence men�察�in so far as they are assailed by 



emotions which are passions�察�can be contrary one to another。 Q。E。D。







Note。´ I said that Paul may hate Peter�察�because he conceives that Peter 



possesses something which he ��Paul�� also loves�察�from this it seems�察�at first 



sight�察�to follow�察�that these two men�察�through both loving the same thing�察�



and�察�consequently�察�through agreement of their respective natures�察�stand in 



one another's way�察�if this were so�察�II��xxx。 and II��xxxi。 would be untrue。 



But if we give the matter our unbiased attention�察�we shall see that the 



discrepancy vanishes。 For the two men are not in one another's way in 



virtue of the agreement of their natures�察�that is�察�through both loving the 



same thing�察�but in virtue of one differing from the other。 For�察�in so far 



as each loves the same thing�察�the love of each is fostered thereby 



��III��xxxi。���察�that is ��Def。 of the Emotions�此�vi。�� the pleasure of each is 



fostered thereby。 Wherefore it is far from being the case�察�that they are 



at variance through both loving the same thing�察�and through the agreement 



in their natures。 The cause for their opposition lies�察�as I have said�察�



solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ。 For we assume that 



Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession�察�while 



Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost。 Hence the one man will be 



affected with pleasure�察�the other will be affected with pain�察�and thus they 



will be at variance one with another。 We can easily show in like manner�察�



that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences�察�and not on 



the agreement between men's natures。















Prop。 XXXV。 In so far only as men live 



in obedience to reason�察�do they always 



necessarily agree in nature。







Proof。´ In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions�察�they 



can be different in nature ��IV��xxxiii。���察�and at variance one with another。 



But men are only said to be active�察�in so far as they act in obedience to 



reason ��III��iii。���察�therefore�察�what so ever follows from human nature in so 



far as it is defined by reason must ��III��Def。ii。�� be understood solely 



through human nature as its proximate cause。 But�察�since every man by the 



laws of his nature desires that which he deems good�察�and endeavours to 



remove that which he deems bad ��IV��xix。���察�and further�察�since that which we�察�



in accordance with reason�察�deem good or bad�察�necessarily is good 



or bad ��II��xli。���察�it follows that men�察�in so far as they live in obedience 



to reason�察�necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for 



human nature�察�and consequently for each individual 

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