wealbk05-第7章

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administration　and　execution　of　justice；　even　where　it　is　not

managed　with　very　good　economy；　makes；　in　any　civilised　country；

but　a　very　inconsiderable　part　of　the　whole　expense　of

government。

　　　　　The　whole　expense　of　justice；　too；　might　easily　be　defrayed

by　the　fees　of　court；　and；　without　exposing　the　administration　of

justice　to　any　real　hazard　of　corruption；　the　public　revenue

might　thus　be　discharged　from　a　certain；　though；　perhaps；　but　a

small　incumbrance。　It　is　difficult　to　regulate　the　fees　of　court

effectually　where　a　person　so　powerful　as　the　sovereign　is　to

share　in　them；　and　to　derive　any　considerable　part　of　his　revenue

from　them。　It　is　very　easy　where　the　judge　is　the　principal

person　who　can　reap　any　benefit　from　them。　The　law　can　very

easily　oblige　the　judge　to　respect　the　regulation；　though　it

might　not　always　be　able　to　make　the　sovereign　respect　it。　Where

the　fees　of　court　are　precisely　regulated　and　ascertained；　where

they　are　paid　all　at　once；　at　a　certain　period　of　every　process；

into　the　hands　of　a　cashier　or　receiver；　to　be　by　him　distributed

in　certain　known　proportions　among　the　different　judges　after　the

process　is　decided；　and　not　till　it　is　decided；　there　seems　to　be

no　more　danger　of　corruption　than　where　such　fees　are　prohibited

altogether。　Those　fees；　without　occasioning　any　considerable

increase　in　the　expense　of　a　lawsuit；　might　be　rendered　fully

sufficient　for　defraying　the　whole　expense　of　justice。　By　not

being　paid　to　the　judges　till　the　process　was　determined；　they

might　be　some　incitement　to　the　diligence　of　the　court　in

examining　and　deciding　it。　In　courts　which　consisted　of　a

considerable　number　of　judges；　by　proportioning　the　share　of　each

judge　to　the　number　of　hours　and　days　which　he　had　employed　in

examining　the　process；　either　in　the　court　or　in　a　committee　by

order　of　the　court；　those　fees　might　give　some　encouragement　to

the　diligence　of　each　particular　judge。　Public　services　are　never

better　performed　than　when　their　reward　comes　only　in　consequence

of　their　being　performed；　and　is　proportioned　to　the　diligence

employed　in　performing　them。　In　the　different　parliaments　of

France；　the　fees　of　court　（called　epices　and　vacations）

constitute　the　far　greater　part　of　the　emoluments　of　the　judges。

After　all　deductions　are　made；　the　net　salary　paid　by　the　crown

to　a　counsellor　or　judge　in　the　Parliament　of　Toulouse；　in　rank

and　dignity　the　second　parliament　of　the　kingdom；　amounts　only　to

a　hundred　and　fifty　livres；　about　six　pounds　eleven　shillings

sterling　a　year。　About　seven　years　ago　that　sum　was　in　the　same

place　the　ordinary　yearly　wages　of　a　common　footman。　The

distribution　of　those　epices；　too；　is　according　to　the　diligence

of　the　judges。　A　diligent　judge　gains　a　comfortable；　though

moderate；　revenue　by　his　office：　an　idle　one　gets　little　more

than　his　salary。　Those　Parliaments　are　perhaps；　in　many　respects；

not　very　convenient　courts　of　justice；　but　they　have　never　been

accused；　they　seem　never　even　to　have　been　suspected；　of

corruption。

　　　　　The　fees　of　court　seem　originally　to　have　been　the　principal

support　of　the　different　courts　of　justice　in　England。　Each　court

endeavoured　to　draw　to　itself　as　much　business　as　it　could；　and

was；　upon　that　account；　willing　to　take　cognisance　of　many　suits

which　were　not　originally　intended　to　fall　under　its

jurisdiction。　The　Court　of　King's　Bench；　instituted　for　the　trial

of　criminal　causes　only；　took　cognisance　of　civil　suits；　the

plaintiff　pretending　that　the　defendant；　in　not　doing　him

justice；　had　been　guilty　of　some　trespass　or　misdemeanour。　The

Court　of　Exchequer；　instituted　for　the　levying　of　the　king's

revenue；　and　for　enforcing　the　payment　of　such　debts　only　as　were

due　to　the　king；　took　cognisance　of　all　other　contract　debts；　the

plaintiff　alleging　that　he　could　not　pay　the　king　because　the

defendant　would　not　pay　him。　In　consequence　of　such　fictions　it

came；　in　many　cases；　to　depend　altogether　upon　the　parties　before

what　court　they　would　choose　to　have　their　cause　tried；　and　each

court　endeavoured；　by　superior　dispatch　and　impartiality；　to　draw

to　itself　as　many　causes　as　it　could。　The　present　admirable

constitution　of　the　courts　of　justice　in　England　was；　perhaps；

originally　in　a　great　measure　formed　by　this　emulation　which

anciently　took　place　between　their　respective　judges；　each　judge

endeavouring　to　give；　in　his　own　court；　the　speediest　and　most

effectual　remedy　which　the　law　would　admit　for　every　sort　of

injustice。　Originally　the　courts　of　law　gave　damages　only　for

breach　of　contract。　The　Court　of　Chancery；　as　a　court　of

conscience；　first　took　upon　it　to　enforce　the　specific

performance　of　agreements。　When　the　breach　of　contract　consisted

in　the　non…payment　of　money；　the　damage　sustained　could　be

compensated　in　no　other　way　than　by　ordering　payment；　which　was

equivalent　to　a　specific　performance　of　the　agreement。　In　such

cases；　therefore；　the　remedy　of　the　courts　of　law　was　sufficient。

It　was　not　so　in　others。　When　the　tenant　sued　his　lord　for　having

unjustly　outed　him　of　his　lease；　the　damages　which　he　recovered

were　by　no　means　equivalent　to　the　possession　of　the　land。　Such

causes；　therefore；　for　some　time；　went　all　to　the　Court　of

Chancery；　to　the　no　small　loss　of　the　courts　of　law。　It　was　to

draw　back　such　causes　to　themselves　that　the　courts　of　law　are

said　to　have　invented　the　artificial　and　fictitious　Writ　of

Ejectment；　the　most　effectual　remedy　for　an　unjust　outer　or

dispossession　of　land。

　　　　　A　stamp…duty　upon　the　law　proceedings　of　each　particular

court；　to　be　levied　by　that　court；　and　applied　towards　the

maintenance　of　the　judges　and　other　officers　belonging　to　it；

might；　in　the　same　manner；　afford　revenue　sufficient　for

defraying　the　expense　of　the　administration　of　justice；　without

bringing　any　burden　upon　the　general　revenue　of　the　society。　The

judges　indeed　might；　in　this　case；　be　under　the　temptation　of

multiplying　unnecessarily　the　proceedings　upon　every　cause；　in

order　to　increase；　as　much　as　possible；　the　produce　of　such　a

stamp…duty。　It　has　been　the　custom　in　modern　Europe　to　regulate；

upon　most　occasions；　the　payment　of　the　attorneys　and　clerks　of

court　according　to　the　number　of　pages　which　they　had　occasion　to

write；　the　court；　however；　requiring　that　each　page　should

contain　so　many　lines；　and　each　line　so　many　words。　In　order　to

increase　their　payment；　the　attorneys　and　clerks　have　contrived

to　multiply　words　beyond　all　necessity；　to　the　corruption　of　the

law　language　of；　I　believe；　every　court　of　justice　in　Europe。　A

like　temptation　might　perhaps　occasion　a　like　corruption　in　the

form　of　law　proceedings。

　　　　　But　whether　the　administration　of　justice　be　so　contrived　as

to　defray　its　own　expense；　or　whether　the　judges　be　maintained　by

fixed　salaries　paid　to　them　from　some　other　fund；　it　does　not

seem　necessary　that　the　person　or　persons　entrusted　with　the

executive　power　should　be　charged　with　the　management　of　that

fund；　or　with　the　payment　of　those　salaries。　That　fund　might

arise　from　the　rent　of　landed　estates；　the　management　of　each

estate　being　entrusted　to　the　particular　court　which　was　to　be

maintained　by　it。　That　fund　might　arise　even　from　the　interest　of

a　sum　of　money；　the　lending　out　of　which　might；　in　the　same

manner；　be　entrusted　to　the　court　which　was　to　be　maintained　by

it。　A　part；　though　indeed　but　a　small　part；　of　the　salary　of　the

judges　of　the　Court　of　Session　in　Scotland　arises　from　the

interest　of　a　sum　of　money。　The　necessary　instability　of　such　a

fund　seems；　however；　to　render　it　an　improper　one　for　the

maintenance　of　an　institution　which　ought　to　last　for　ever。

　　　　　The　separation　of　the　judicial　from　the　executive　power

seems　originally　to　have　arisen　from　the　increasing　business　of

the　society；　in　consequence　of　its　increasing　improvement。　The

administration　of　justice　became　so　laborious　and　so　complicated

a　duty　as　to　require　the　undivided　attention　of　the　persons　to

whom　it　was　entrusted。　The　person　entrusted　with　the　executive

power　not　having　leisure　to　attend　to　the　decision　of　private

causes　himself；　a　deputy　was　appointed　to　decide　them　in　his

stead。　In　the　progress　of　the　Roman　greatness；　the　consul　was　too

much　occupied　with　the　political　affairs　of　the　state　to　attend

to　the　administration　of　justice。　A　praetor；　therefore；　was

appointed　to　administer　it　in　his　stead。　In　the　progress　of　the

European　monarchies　which　were　founded　upon　the　ruins　of　the

Roman　empire；　the　sovereigns　and　the　great　lords　came　universally

to　consider　the　administration　of　justice　as　an　office　both　too

laborious　and　too　ignoble　for　them　to　execute　in　their　own

persons。　They　universally；　therefore；　discharged　themselves　of　it

by　appointing　a　deputy；　bailiff；　or　judge。

　　　　　When　the　judicial　is　united　to　the　executive　power；　it　is

scarce　possible　that　justice　should　not　frequently　be　sacrificed

to　what　is　vulgarly　called　polities。　The　persons　entrusted　with

the　great　interests　of　the　state　may；　even　without　any　corrupt

views；　sometimes　imagine　it　necessary　to　sacrifice　to　those

interests　the　rights　of　a　private　man。　But　upon　the　impartial

administration　of　justice　depends　the　liberty　of　every

individual；　the　sense　which　he　has　of　his　own　security。　In　order

to　make　every　individual　feel　himself　perfectly　secure　in　the

possession　of　every　right　which　belongs　to　him；　it　is　not　only

necessary　that　the　judicial　should　be　separated　from　the

executive　power；　but　that　it　should　be　rendered　as　much　as

possible　independent　of　that　power。　The　judge　should　not　be

liable　to　be　removed　from　his　office　according　to　the　caprice　of

that　power。　The　regular　the　good…will　or　even　upon　the　good

economy　payment　of　his　salary　should　not　depend　upon　of　that

power。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　3

　　　　　　　Of　the　Expense　of　Public　Works　and　Public　Institutions　

　　　　　THE　third　and　last　duty　of　the　sovereign　or　commonwealth　is

that　of　erecting　and　maintaining　those　public　institutions　and

those　public　works；　which；　though　they　may　be　in　the　highest

degree　advantageous　to　a　great　society；　are；　however；　of　such　a

nature　that　the　profit　could　never　repay　the　expense　to　any

individual　or　small　number　of　individuals；　and　which　it　therefore

cannot　be　expected　that　any　individual　or　small　number　of

individuals　should　erect　or　maintain。　The　performance　of　this

duty　requires；　too；　very　different　degrees　of　expense　in　the

different　periods　of　society。

　　　　　After　the　public　institutions　and　public　works　necessary　for

the　defence　of　the　society；　and　for　the　administration　of

justice；　both　of　which　have　already　been　mentioned；　the　other

works　and　institutions　of　this　kind　are　chiefly　those　for

facilitating　the　commerce　of　the　society；　and　those　for　promoting

the　instruction　of　the　people。　The　institutions　for　instruction