wealbk05-第31章

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defraying　the　necessary　expense　of　any　great　and　civilised　state；

it　remains　that　this　expense　must；　the　greater　part　of　it；　be

defrayed　by　taxes　of　one　kind　or　another；　the　people　contributing

a　part　of　their　own　private　revenue　in　order　to　make　up　a　public

revenue　to　the　sovereign　or　commonwealth。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　2

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Taxes　

　　　　　THE　private　revenue　of　individuals；　it　has　been　shown　in　the

first　book　of　this　Inquiry；　arises　ultimately　from　three

different　sources：　Rent；　Profit；　and　Wages。　Every　tax　must

finally　be　paid　from　some　one　or　other　of　those　three　different

sorts　of　revenue；　or　from　all　of　them　indifferently。　I　shall

endeavour　to　give　the　best　account　I　can；　first；　of　those　taxes

which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　upon　rent；　secondly；　of　those

which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　upon　profit；　thirdly；　of　those

which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　upon　wages；　and；　fourthly；　of

those　which；　it　is　intended；　should　fall　indifferently　upon　all

those　three　different　sources　of　private　revenue。　The　particular

consideration　of　each　of　these　four　different　sorts　of　taxes　will

divide　the　second　part　of　the　present　chapter　into　four　articles；

three　of　which　will　require　several　other　subdivisions。　Many　of

those　taxes；　it　will　appear　from　the　following　review；　are　not

finally　paid　from　the　fund；　or　source　of　revenue；　upon　which　it

was　intended　they　should　fall。

　　　　　Before　I　enter　upon　the　examination　of　particular　taxes；　it

is　necessary　to　premise　the　four　following　maxims　with　regard　to

taxes　in　general。

　　　　　I。　The　subjects　of　every　state　ought　to　contribute　towards

the　support　of　the　government；　as　nearly　as　possible；　in

proportion　to　their　respective　abilities；　that　is；　in　proportion

to　the　revenue　which　they　respectively　enjoy　under　the　protection

of　the　state。　The　expense　of　government　to　the　individuals　of　a

great　nation　is　like　the　expense　of　management　to　the　joint

tenants　of　a　great　estate；　who　are　all　obliged　to　contribute　in

proportion　to　their　respective　interests　in　the　estate。　In　the

observation　or　neglect　of　this　maxim　consists　what　is　called　the

equality　or　inequality　of　taxation。　Every　tax；　it　must　be

observed　once　for　all；　which　falls　finally　upon　one　only　of　the

three　sorts　of　revenue　above　mentioned；　is　necessarily　unequal　in

so　far　as　it　does　not　affect　the　other　two。　In　the　following

examination　of　different　taxes　I　shall　seldom　take　much　further

notice　of　this　sort　of　inequality；　but　shall；　in　most　cases；

confine　my　observations　to　that　inequality　which　is　occasioned　by

a　particular　tax　falling　unequally　even　upon　that　particular　sort

of　private　revenue　which　is　affected　by　it。

　　　　　II。　The　tax　which　each　individual　is　bound　to　pay　ought　to

be　certain；　and　not　arbitrary。　The　time　of　payment；　the　manner　of

payment；　the　quantity　to　be　paid；　ought　all　to　be　clear　and　plain

to　the　contributor；　and　to　every　other　person。　Where　it　is

otherwise；　every　person　subject　to　the　tax　is　put　more　or　less　in

the　power　of　the　tax…gathered；　who　can　either　aggravate　the　tax

upon　any　obnoxious　contributor；　or　extort；　by　the　terror　of　such

aggravation；　some　present　or　perquisite　to　himself。　The

uncertainty　of　taxation　encourages　the　insolence　and　favours　the

corruption　of　an　order　of　men　who　are　naturally　unpopular；　even

where　they　are　neither　insolent　nor　corrupt。　The　certainty　of

what　each　individual　ought　to　pay　is；　in　taxation；　a　matter　of　so

great　importance　that　a　very　considerable　degree　of　inequality；

it　appears；　I　believe；　from　the　experience　of　all　nations；　is　not

near　so　great　an　evil　as　a　very　small　degree　of　uncertainty。

　　　　　III。　Every　tax　ought　to　be　levied　at　the　time；　or　in　the

manner；　in　which　it　is　most　likely　to　be　convenient　for　the

contributor　to　pay　it。　A　tax　upon　the　rent　of　land　or　of　houses；

payable　at　the　same　term　at　which　such　rents　are　usually　paid；　is

levied　at　the　time　when　it　is　most　likely　to　be　convenient　for

the　contributor　to　pay；　or；　when　he　is　most　likely　to　have

wherewithal　to　pay。　Taxes　upon　such　consumable　goods　as　are

articles　of　luxury　are　all　finally　paid　by　the　consumer；　and

generally　in　a　manner　that　is　very　convenient　for　him。　He　pays

them　by　little　and　little；　as　he　has　occasion　to　buy　the　goods。

As　he　is　at　liberty；　too；　either　to　buy；　or　not　to　buy；　as　he

pleases；　it　must　be　his　own　fault　if　he　ever　suffers　any

considerable　inconveniency　from　such　taxes。

　　　　　IV。　Every　tax　ought　to　be　so　contrived　as　both　to　take　out

and　to　keep　out　of　the　pockets　of　the　people　as　little　as

possible　over　and　above　what　it　brings　into　the　public　treasury

of　the　state。　A　tax　may　either　take　out　or　keep　out　of　the

pockets　of　the　people　a　great　deal　more　than　it　brings　into　the

public　treasury；　in　the　four　following　ways。　First；　the　levying

of　it　may　require　a　great　number　of　officers；　whose　salaries　may

eat　up　the　greater　part　of　the　produce　of　the　tax；　and　whose

perquisites　may　impose　another　additional　tax　upon　the　people。

Secondly；　it　may　obstruct　the　industry　the　people；　and　discourage

them　from　applying　to　certain　branches　of　business　which　might

give　maintenance　and　unemployment　to　great　multitudes。　While　it

obliges　the　people　to　pay；　it　may　thus　diminish；　or　perhaps

destroy；　some　of　the　funds　which　might　enable　them　more　easily　to

do　so。　Thirdly；　by　the　forfeitures　and　other　penalties　which

those　unfortunate　individuals　incur　who　attempt　unsuccessfully　to

evade　the　tax；　it　may　frequently　ruin　them；　and　thereby　put　an

end　to　the　benefit　which　the　community　might　have　received　from

the　employment　of　their　capitals。　An　injudicious　tax　offers　a

great　temptation　to　smuggling。　But　the　penalties　of　smuggling

must　rise　in　proportion　to　the　temptation。　The　law；　contrary　to

all　the　ordinary　principles　of　justice；　first　creates　the

temptation；　and　then　punishes　those　who　yield　to　it；　and　it

commonly　enhances　the　punishment；　too；　in　proportion　to　the　very

circumstance　which　ought　certainly　to　alleviate　it；　the

temptation　to　commit　the　crime。　Fourthly；　by　subjecting　the

people　to　the　frequent　visits　and　the　odious　examination　of　the

tax…gatherers；　it　may　expose　them　to　much　unnecessary　trouble；

vexation；　and　oppression；　and　though　vexation　is　not；　strictly

speaking；　expense；　it　is　certainly　equivalent　to　the　expense　at

which　every　man　would　be　willing　to　redeem　himself　from　it。　It　is

in　some　one　or　other　of　these　four　different　ways　that　taxes　are

frequently　so　much　more　burdensome　to　the　people　than　they　are

beneficial　to　the　sovereign。

　　　　　The　evident　justice　and　utility　of　the　foregoing　maxims　have

recommended　them　more　or　less　to　the　attention　of　all　nations。

All　nations　have　endeavoured；　to　the　best　of　their　judgment；　to

render　their　taxes　as　equal　as　they　could　contrive；　as　certain；

as　convenient　to　the　contributor；　both　in　the　time　and　in　the

mode　of　payment；　and；　in　proportion　to　the　revenue　which　they

brought　to　the　prince；　as　little　burdensome　to　the　people。　The

following　short　review　of　some　of　the　principal　taxes　which　have

taken　place　in　different　ages　and　countries　will　show　that　the

endeavours　of　all　nations　have　not　in　this　respect　been　equally

successful。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ARTICLE　I

　　　　　　　　　　Taxes　upon　Rent。　Taxes　upon　the　Rent　of　Land　

　　　　　A　tax　upon　the　rent　of　land　may　either　every　district　being

valued　at　a　certain　rent；　be　imposed　according　to　a　certain

canon；　which　valuation　is　not　afterwards　to　be　altered；　or　it　may

be　imposed　in　such　a　manner　as　to　vary　with　every　variation　in

the　real　rent　of　the　land；　and　to　rise　or　fall　with　the

improvement　or　declension　of　its　cultivation。

　　　　　A　land…tax　which；　like　that　of　Great　Britain；　is　assessed

upon　each　district　according　to　a　certain　invariable　canon；

though　it　should　be　equal　at　the　time　of　its　first　establishment；

necessarily　becomes　unequal　in　process　of　time；　according　to　the

unequal　degrees　of　improvement　or　neglect　in　the　cultivation　of

the　different　parts　of　the　country。　In　England；　the　valuation

according　to　which　the　different　countries　and　parishes　were

assessed　to　the　land…tax　by　the　4th　of　William　and　Mary　was　very

unequal　even　at　its　first　establishment。　This　tax；　therefore；　so

far　offends　against　the　first　of　the　four　maxims　above　mentioned。

It　is　perfectly　agreeable　to　the　other　three。　It　is　perfectly

certain。　The　time　of　payment　for　the　tax；　being　the　same　as　that

for　the　rent；　is　as　convenient　as　it　can　be　to　the　contributor

though　the　landlord　is　in　all　cases　the　real　contributor；　the　tax

is　commonly　advanced　by　the　tenant；　to　whom　the　landlord　is

obliged　to　allow　it　in　the　payment　of　the　rent。　This　tax　is

levied　by　a　much　smaller　number　of　officers　than　any　other　which

affords　nearly　the　same　revenue。　As　the　tax　upon　each　district

does　not　rise　with　the　rise　of　the　rent；　the　sovereign　does　not

share　in　the　profits　of　the　landlord's　improvements。　Those

improvements　sometimes　contribute；　indeed；　to　the　discharge　of

the　other　landlords　of　the　district。　But　the　aggravation　of　the

tax　which　may　sometimes　occasion　upon　a　particular　estate　is

always　so　very　small　that　it　never　can　discourage　those

improvements；　nor　keep　down　the　produce　of　the　land　below　what　it

would　otherwise　rise　to。　As　it　has　no　tendency　to　diminish　the

quantity；　it　can　have　none　to　raise　the　price　of　that　produce。　It

does　not　obstruct　the　industry　of　the　people。　It　subjects　the

landlord　to　no　other　inconveniency　besides　the　unavoidable　one　of

paying　the　tax。

　　　　　The　advantage；　however；　which　the　landlord　has　derived　from

the　invariable　constancy　of　the　valuation　by　which　all　the　lands

of　Great　Britain　are　rated　to　the　land…tax；　has　been　principally

owing　to　some　circumstances　altogether　extraneous　to　the　nature

of　the　tax。

　　　　　It　has　been　owing　in　part　to　the　great　prosperity　of　almost

every　part　of　the　country；　the　rents　of　almost　all　the　estates　of

Great　Britain　having；　since　the　time　when　this　valuation　was

first　established；　been　continually　rising；　and　scarce　any　of

them　having　fallen。　The　landlords；　therefore；　have　almost　all

gained　the　difference　between　the　tax　which　they　would　have　paid

according　to　the　present　rent　of　their　estates；　and　that　which

they　actually　pay　according　to　the　ancient　valuation。　Had　the

state　of　the　country　been　different；　had　rents　been　gradually

falling　in　consequence　of　the　declension　of　cultivation；　the

landlords　would　almost　all　have　lost　this　difference。　In　the

state　of　things　which　has　happened　to　take　place　since　the

revolution；　the　constancy　of　the　valuation　has　been　advantageous

to　the　landlord　and　hurtful　to　the　sovereign。　In　a　different

state　of　things　it　might　have　been　advantageous　to　the　sovereign

and　hurtful　to　the　landlord。

　　　　　As　the　tax　is　made　payable　in　money；　so　the　valuation　of　the

land　is　expressed　in　money。　Since　the　establish