wealbk05-第29章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



society　should　contribute　towards　an　expense　of　which　the　benefit

is　confined　to　a　part　of　the　society。

　　　　　The　expense　of　maintaining　good　roads　and　communications　is；

no　doubt；　beneficial　to　the　whole　society；　and　may；　therefore；

without　any　injustice。　be　defrayed　by　the　general　contribution　of

the　whole　society。　This　expense；　however；　is　most　immediately　and

directly　beneficial　to　those　who　travel　or　carry　goods　from　one

place　to　another；　and　to　those　who　consume　such　goods。　The

turnpike　tolls　in　England；　and　the　duties　called　peages　in　other

countries；　lay　it　altogether　upon　those　two　different　sets　of

people；　and　thereby　discharge　the　general　revenue　of　the　society

from　a　very　considerable　burden。

　　　　　The　expense　of　the　institutions　for　education　and　religious

instruction　is　likewise；　no　doubt；　beneficial　to　the　whole

society；　and　may；　therefore；　without　injustice；　be　defrayed　by

the　general　contribution　of　the　whole　society。　This　expense；

however；　might　perhaps　with　equal　propriety；　and　even　with　some

advantage；　be　defrayed　altogether　by　those　who　receive　the

immediate　benefit　of　such　education　and　instruction；　or　by　the

voluntary　contribution　of　those　who　think　they　have　occasion　for

either　the　one　or　the　other。

　　　　　When　the　institutions　or　public　works　which　are　beneficial

to　the　whole　society　either　cannot　be　maintained　altogether；　or

are　not　maintained　altogether　by　the　contribution　of　such

particular　members　of　the　society　as　are　most　immediately

benefited　by　them；　the　deficiency　must　in　most　cases　be　made　up

by　the　general　contribution　of　the　whole　society。　The　general

revenue　of　the　society；　over　and　above　defraying　the　expense　of

defending　the　society；　and　of　supporting　the　dignity　of　the　chief

magistrate；　must　make　up　for　the　deficiency　of　many　particular

branches　of　revenue。　The　sources　of　this　general　or　public

revenue　I　shall　endeavour　to　explain　in　the　following　chapter。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　II　　　Of　the　Sources　of　the

General　or　Public　Revenue　of　the　Society　

　　　　　THE　revenue　which　must　defray；　not　only　the　expense　of

defending　the　society　and　of　supporting　the　dignity　of　the　chief

magistrate；　but　all　the　other　necessary　expenses　of　government

for　which　the　constitution　of　the　state　has　not　provided　any

particular　revenue；　may　be　drawn　either；　first；　from　some　fund

which　peculiarly　belongs　to　the　sovereign　or　commonwealth；　and

which　is　independent　of　the　revenue　of　the　people；　or；　secondly；

from　the　revenue　of　the　people。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　1

　　　　　　Of　the　Funds　or　Sources　of　Revenue　which　may　peculiarly

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　belong　to　the　Sovereign　or　Commonwealth　

　　　　　THE　funds　or　sources　of　revenue　which　may　peculiarly　belong

to　the　sovereign　or　commonwealth　must　consist　either　in　stock　or

in　land。

　　　　　The　sovereign；　like　any　other　owner　of　stock；　may　derive　a

revenue　from　it；　either　by　employing　it　himself；　or　by　lending

it。　His　revenue　is　in　the　one　case　profit；　in　the　other　interest。

　　　　　The　revenue　of　a　Tartar　or　Arabian　chief　consists　in　profit。

It　arises　principally　from　the　milk　and　increase　of　his　own　herds

and　flocks；　of　which　he　himself　superintends　the　management；　and

is　the　principal　shepherd　or　herdsman　of　his　own　horde　or　tribe。

It　is；　however；　in　this　earliest　and　rudest　state　of　civil

government　only　that　profit　has　ever　made　the　principal　part　of

the　public　revenue　of　a　monarchial　state。

　　　　　Small　republics　have　sometimes　derived　a　considerable

revenue　from　the　profit　of　mercantile　projects。　The　republic　of

Hamburg　is　said　to　do　so　from　the　profits　of　a　public　wine　cellar

and　apothecary's　shop。　The　state　cannot　be　very　great　of　which

the　sovereign　has　leisure　to　carry　on　the　trade　of　a　wine

merchant　or　apothecary。　The　profit　of　a　public　bank　has　been　a

source　of　revenue　to　more　considerable　states。　It　has　been　so　not

only　to　Hamburg；　but　to　Venice　and　Amsterdam。　A　revenue　of　this

kind　has　even　by　some　people　been　thought　not　below　the　attention

of　so　great　an　empire　as　that　of　Great　Britain。　Reckoning　the

ordinary　dividend　of　the　Bank　of　England　at　five　and　a　half　per

cent　and　its　capital　at　ten　millions　seven　hundred　and　eighty

thousand　pounds；　the　net　annual　profit；　after　paying　the　expense

of　management；　must　amount；　it　is　said；　to　five　hundred　and

ninety…two　thousand　nine　hundred　pounds。　Government；　it　is

pretended；　could　borrow　this　capital　at　three　per　cent　interest；

and　by　taking　the　management　of　the　bank　into　its　own　hands；

might　make　a　clear　profit　of　two　hundred　and　sixty…nine　thousand

five　hundred　pounds　a　year。　The　orderly；　vigilant；　and

parsimonious　administration　of　such　aristocracies　as　those　of

Venice　and　Amsterdam　is　extremely　proper；　it　appears　from

experience；　for　the　management　of　a　mercantile　project　of　this

kind。　But　whether　such　a　government　as　that　of　England…　which；

whatever　may　be　its　virtues；　has　never　been　famous　for　good

economy；　which；　in　time　of　peace；　has　generally　conducted　itself

with　the　slothful　and　negligent　profusion　that　is　perhaps　natural

to　monarchies；　and　in　time　of　war　has　constantly　acted　with　all

the　thoughtless　extravagance　that　democracies　are　apt　to　fall

into…　could　be　safely　trusted　with　the　management　of　such　a

project；　must　at　least　be　good　deal　more　doubtful。

　　　　　The　post　office　is　properly　a　mercantile　project。　The

government　advances　the　expense　of　establishing　the　different

offices；　and　of　buying　or　hiring　the　necessary　horses　or

carriages；　and　is　repaid　with　a　large　profit　by　the　duties　upon

what　is　carried。　It　is　perhaps　the　only　mercantile　project　which

has　been　successfully　managed　by；　I　believe；　every　sort　of

government。　The　capital　to　be　advanced　is　not　very　considerable。

There　is　no　mystery　in　the　business。　The　returns　are　not　only

certain；　but　immediate。

　　　　　Princes；　however；　have　frequently　engaged　in　many　other

mercantile　projects；　and　have　been　willing；　like　private　persons；

to　mend　their　fortunes　by　becoming　adventurers　in　the　common

branches　of　trade。　They　have　scarce　ever　succeeded。　The　profusion

with　which　the　affairs　of　princes　are　always　managed　renders　it

almost　impossible　that　they　should。　The　agents　of　a　prince　regard

the　wealth　of　their　master　as　inexhaustible；　are　careless　at　what

price　they　buy；　are　careless　at　what　price　they　sell；　are

careless　at　what　expense　they　transport　his　goods　from　one　place

to　another。　Those　agents　frequently　live　with　the　profusion　of

princes；　and　sometimes　too；　in　spite　of　that　profusion；　and　by　a

proper　method　of　making　up　their　accounts；　acquire　the　fortunes

of　princes。　It　was　thus；　as　we　are　told　by　Machiavel；　that　the

agents　of　Lorenzo　of　Medicis；　not　a　prince　of　mean　abilities；

carried　on　his　trade。　The　republic　of　Florence　was　several　times

obliged　to　pay　the　debt　into　which　their　extravagance　had

involved　him。　He　found　it　convenient；　accordingly；　to　give　up　the

business　of　merchant；　the　business　to　which　his　family　had

originally　owed　their　fortune；　and　in　the　latter　part　of　his　life

to　employ　both　what　remained　of　that　fortune；　and　the　revenue　of

the　state　of　which　he　had　the　disposal；　in　projects　and　expenses

more　suitable　to　his　station。

　　　　　No　two　characters　seem　more　inconsistent　than　those　of

trader　and　sovereign。　If　the　trading　spirit　of　the　English　East

India　Company　renders　them　very　bad　sovereigns；　the　spirit　of

sovereignty　seems　to　have　rendered　them　equally　bad　traders。

While　they　were　traders　only　they　managed　their　trade

successfully；　and　were　able　to　pay　from　their　profits　a　moderate

dividend　to　the　proprietors　of　their　stock。　Since　they　became

sovereigns；　with　a　revenue　which；　it　is　said；　was　originally　more

than　three　millions　sterling；　they　have　been　obliged　to　beg

extraordinary　assistance　of　government　in　order　to　avoid

immediate　bankruptcy。　In　their　former　situation；　their　servants

in　India　considered　themselves　as　the　clerks　of　merchants：　in

their　present　situation；　those　servants　consider　themselves　as

the　ministers　of　sovereigns。

　　　　　A　state　may　sometimes　derive　some　part　of　its　public　revenue

from　the　interest　of　money；　as　well　as　from　the　profits　of　stock。

If　it　has　amassed　a　treasure；　it　may　lend　a　part　of　that　treasure

either　to　foreign　states；　or　to　its　own　subjects。

　　　　　The　canton　of　Berne　derives　a　considerable　revenue　by

lending　a　part　of　its　treasure　to　foreign　states；　that　is；　by

placing　it　in　the　public　funds　of　the　different　indebted　nations

of　Europe；　chiefly　in　those　of　France　and　England。　The　security

of　this　revenue　must　depend；　first；　upon　the　security　of　the

funds　in　which　it　is　placed；　or　upon　the　good　faith　of　the

government　which　has　the　management　of　them；　and；　secondly；　upon

the　certainty　or　probability　of　the　continuance　of　peace　with　the

debtor　nation。　In　the　case　of　a　war；　the　very　first　act　of

hostility；　on　the　part　of　the　debtor　nation；　might　be　the

forfeiture　of　the　funds　of　its　creditor。　This　policy　of　lending

money　to　foreign　states　is；　so　far　as　I　know；　peculiar　to　the

canton　of　Berne。

　　　　　The　city　of　Hamburg　has　established　a　sort　of　public

pawnshop；　which　lends　money　to　the　subjects　of　the　state　upon

pledges　at　six　per　cent　interest。　This　pawnshop　or　Lombard；　as　it

is　called；　affords　a　revenue；　it　is　pretended；　to　the　state　of　a

hundred　and　fifty　thousand　crowns；　which；　at　four　and　sixpence

the　crown；　amounts　to　L33；750　sterling。

　　　　　The　government　of　Pennsylvania；　without　amassing　any

treasure；　invented　a　method　of　lending；　not　money　indeed；　but

what　is　equivalent　to　money；　to　its　subjects。　By　advancing　to

private　people　at　interest；　and　upon　land　security　to　double　the

value；　paper　bills　of　credit　to　be　redeemed　fifteen　years　after

their　date；　and　in　the　meantime　made　transferable　from　hand　to

hand　like　bank　notes；　and　declared　by　act　of　assembly　to　be　a

legal　tender　in　all　payments　from　one　inhabitant　of　the　province

to　another；　it　raised　a　moderate　revenue；　which　went　a

considerable　way　towards　defraying　an　annual　expense　of　about

L4500；　the　whole　ordinary　expense　of　that　frugal　and　orderly

government。　The　success　of　an　expedient　of　this　kind　must　have

depended　upon　three　different　circumstances；　first；　upon　the

demand　for　some　other　instrument　of　commerce　besides　gold　and

silver　money；　or　upon　the　demand　for　such　a　quantity　of

consumable　stock　as　could　not　be　had　without　sending　abroad　the

greater　part　of　their　gold　and　silver　money　in　order　to　purchase

it；　secondly；　upon　the　good　credit　of　the　government　which　made

use　of　this　expedient；　and；　thirdly；　upon　the　moderation　with

which　it　was　used；　the　whole　value　of　the　paper　bills　of　credit

never　exceeding　that　of　the　gold　and　silver　money　which　would

have　been　necessary　for　carrying　on　their　circulation　had　there

been　no　paper　bills　of　credit。　The　same　expedient　was　upon

different　occasions　adopted　by　several　other　Ameri