on the improvement of the understanding(提高阅读能力)-第2章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
and； as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered easy； and we can
in this way gain much time and convenience； the science of Mechanics
must in no way be despised。
＇16＇ （1） But before all things； a means must be devised for
improving the understanding and purifying it； as far as may be at the
5
… Page 6…
On the Improvement of the Understanding
outset； so that it may apprehend things without error； and in the best
possible way。 （2） Thus it is apparent to everyone that I wish to direct all
science to one end ＇e＇ and aim； so that we may attain to the supreme
human perfection which we have named； and； therefore； whatsoever in the
sciences does not serve to promote our object will have to be rejected as
useless。 （3） To sum up the matter in a word； all our actions and thoughts
must be directed to this one end。
＇17＇ （1） Yet； as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to attain
our purpose； and bring the understanding into the right path we should
carry on our life； we are compelled first of all to lay down certain rules of
life as provisionally good； to wit the following：… I。 （2） To speak in a
manner intelligible to the multitude； and to comply with every
general custom that does not hinder the attainment of our purpose。
（3） For we can gain from the multitude no small advantages；
provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves to its
understanding as far as possible： moreover； we shall in this way gain
a friendly audience for the reception of the truth。 II。 （17：4） To
indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they are necessary
for preserving health。 III。 （5） Lastly； to endeavor to obtain only sufficient
money or other commodities to enable us to preserve our life and
health； and to follow such general customs as are consistent with our
purpose。
＇18＇ （1） Having laid down these preliminary rules； I will betake
myself to the first and most important task； namely； the amendment of the
understanding； and the rendering it capable of understanding things in the
manner necessary for attaining our end。 （2） In order to bring this about；
the natural order demands that I should here recapitulate all the modes of
perception； which I have hitherto employed for affirming or denying
anything with certainty； so that I may choose the best； and at the same time
begin to know my own powers and the nature which I wish to perfect。
＇19＇ （1） Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge
may be reduced to four：… I。 （2） Perception arising from hearsay or from
some sign which everyone may name as he please。 II。 （3） Perception
arising from mere experience … that is； form experience not yet
6
… Page 7…
On the Improvement of the Understanding
classified by the intellect； and only so called because the given event
has happened to take place； and we have no contradictory fact to set
against it； so that it therefore remains unassailed in our minds。 III。
（19：4） Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing； but not adequately； this comes when ＇f＇ from some
effect we gather its cause； or when it is inferred from some general
proposition that some property is always present。 IV。 （5） Lastly； there is
the perception arising when a thing is perceived solely through its
essence； or through the knowledge of its proximate cause。
＇20＇ （1） All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples。 （2）
By hearsay I know the day of my birth； my parentage； and other matters
about which I have never felt any doubt。 （3） By mere experience I know
that I shall die； for this I can affirm from having seen that others like
myself have died； though all did not live for the same period； or die by the
same disease。 （4） I know by mere experience that oil has the property of
feeding fire； and water of extinguishing it。 （5） In the same way I know
that a dog is a barking animal； man a rational animal； and in fact nearly all
the practical knowledge of life。
＇21＇ （1） We deduce one thing from another as follows： when we
clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other； we thence clearly
infer that the mind is united ＇g＇ to the body； and that their union is the
cause of the given sensation； but we cannot thence absolutely understand
＇h＇ the nature of the sensation and the union。 （2） Or； after I have become
acquainted with the nature of vision； and know that it has the property of
making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than when
near； I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears； and can draw other
conclusions of the same kind。
＇22＇ （1） Lastly； a thing may be perceived solely through its essence；
when； from the fact of knowing something； I know what it is to know that
thing； or when； from knowing the essence of the mind； I know that it is
united to the body。 （2） By the same kind of knowledge we know that two
and three make five； or that two lines each parallel to a third； are parallel
to one another； &c。 （3） The things which I have been able to know by this
kind of knowledge are as yet very few。
7
… Page 8…
On the Improvement of the Understanding
＇23＇ （1） In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer light； I
will make use of a single illustration as follows。 （2） Three numbers are
given … it is required to find a fourth； which shall be to the third as the
second is to the first。 （23：3） Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know
what is required to find the fourth number； for they have not yet forgotten
the rule which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters；
others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple
numbers； where the fourth number is self…evident； as in the case of 2； 4； 3；
6； here it is evident that if the second number be multiplied by the third；
and the product divided by the first； the quotient is 6； when they see that
by this process the number is produced which they knew beforehand to be
the proportional； they infer that the process always holds good for finding
a fourth number proportional。
＇24＇ （1） Mathematicians； however； know by the proof of the
nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid； what numbers are
proportionals； namely； from the nature and property of proportion it
follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal to the product
of the second and third： still they do not see the adequate proportionality
of the given numbers； or； if they do see it； they see it not by virtue of
Euclid's proposition； but intuitively； without going through any process。
＇25＇ （1） In order that from these modes of perception the best may be
selected； it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means necessary
for attaining our end。
I。 （2） To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect； and to know as much as is needful of nature in general。
II。 To collect in this way the differences； the agreements； and the
oppositions of things。 III。 To learn thus exactly how far
they can or cannot be modified。 IV。 To compare this result
with the nature and power of man。 （4） We shall thus discern the
highest degree of perfection to which man is capable of attaining。
＇26＇ （1） We shall then be in a position to see which mode of perception
we ought to choose。 （2） As to the first mode； it is evident that from
hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain； and； moreover； can give
us no insight into the essence of a thing； as is manifest in our illustration；
8
… Page 9…
On the Improvement of the Understanding
now one can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its
essence； as will hereafter appear。 （3） We may； therefore clearly conclude
that the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its character。
（4） For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose understanding does not；
so to speak； meet it half way。
＇27＇ （1） The second mode of perception ＇i＇ cannot be said to give us
the idea of the proportion of which we are in search。 （2） Moreover its
results are very uncertain and indefinite； for we shall never discover
anything in natural phenomena by its means； except accidental properties；
which are never clearly understood； unless the essence of the things in
question be known first。 （3） Wherefore this mode also must be rejected。
＇28＇ （1） Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner that
it gives us the idea of the thing sought； and that it us to draw conclusions
without risk of error； yet it is not by itself sufficient to put us in possession
of the perfection we aim at。
＇29＇ （1） The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of a
thing without danger of error。 （2） This mode； therefore； must be the one
which we chiefly employ。 （3） How； then； should we avail ourselves of it
so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with the least delay concerning
things previously unknown？ （4） I will proceed to explain。
＇30＇ （1） Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for us；
we
